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THE DIFFUSION OF DOCTRINAL 
INNOVATIONS IN TORT LAW 
KYLE GRAHAM* 
This Article examines the spread of “successful” common-law 
doctrinal innovations in the law of torts.  Its analysis reveals recurring 
influences upon and tendencies within the diffusion of novel tort doctrines 
across the states.  The studied diffusion patterns also document a trend 
toward common-law doctrinal “stabilization” over the past quarter-
century.  As detailed herein, this stabilization owes in part to altered 
adoption dynamics associated with the ongoing shrinkage and 
fragmentation of the common-law tort dockets entertained by state 
supreme courts.  Prevailing conditions will make it difficult, this Article 
concludes, for even well-received common-law doctrinal innovations of 
the future to match the rapid diffusion rates associated with tort-law 
innovations that spread during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tort law is perpetually in flux.  At any given moment, some doctrinal 
innovations are still coalescing, others are finding their first few takers, 
and still others are well along in the diffusion process.  In calendar year 
2013, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court became the first state 
high court to apply a theory of “innovator liability” to drug 
manufacturers,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court joined approximately 
half of its peers in recognizing the “loss of a chance” theory of recovery 
for medical malpractice,2 and the Maryland Court of Appeals declined a 
plaintiff’s request to bring the Old Line State in line with the forty-six 
other states that already had replaced contributory negligence regimes 
with comparative responsibility systems.3 
Torts scholarship takes this change as a given, but spends little time 
considering the precise manner in which it occurs.  This gap in the 
scholarship dovetails with Richard Posner and William Landes’s thirty-
year-old lament that “[o]nly a small proportion of the literature [on tort 
law] attempts a scientific study of the tort system, comparable to the 
 
1.  Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1:10-cv-602, slip op. at 50–52 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013), 
withdrawn and aff’d, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014). 
2.  Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 333–37 (Minn. 2013). 
3.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1150 (Md. 2013). 
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study of organic systems by biologists or of the price system by 
economists.”4 
This Article undertakes an investigation of the sort described by 
Posner and Landes, namely, a propagation analysis that considers the 
diffusion of doctrinal innovations in tort law across the states.5  This 
inquiry charts the spread of doctrinal developments in this field from the 
1850s through 2014, and considers the patterns that emerge across 
innovations and eras.  This analysis simultaneously illustrates the 
differences and similarities in diffusion patterns across innovations in 
tort law, illuminates the connections that exist between how and why 
particular common-law doctrines spread, and instantiates and updates 
the observation that the current era is one of doctrinal “stabilization.”6 
On the last of these points, this Article documents and examines the 
ongoing trend toward slower diffusion of common-law7 doctrinal 
innovations across the states.  Between the 1960s and the 1980s, several 
important changes in tort law were adopted by a large number of states.8  
State supreme courts served as a fulcrum for this movement as they 
cultivated a common agenda of doctrinal reform.9  But since the early 
1990s, after a “second wave” of doctrinal movement ran its course, 
innovations have not coursed through these courts as quickly as they 
once did.10  The following chart,11 depicting the diffusion of twenty 
 
4.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort 
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1981). 
5.  The District of Columbia was not included among the studied jurisdictions because it 
only recently (in the 1970s) acquired truly “local” courts.  See generally JEFFREY BRANDON 
MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (2001). 
6.  Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 648–49 (1992). 
7.  The “common law” is “[t]he body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than 
from statutes or constitutions.”  Common Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
8.  See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 50 
(2001) (defining 1945–1980 as “The Progressive Era in American Tort Law”); Schwartz, supra 
note 6, at 605–20 (discussing this era). 
9.  See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS 
IN STATE AND NATION 34 (1988) (“[I]nnovations in tort law . . . constitute state courts’ most 
important substantive contribution to legal development during the postwar era.”); Robert A. 
Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 133–35, 
142–45 (1977) (finding a significant increase in the number and proportion (relative to the 
courts’ overall docket) of tort cases heard by state supreme courts from the 1870–1900 period 
to the 1940–1970 period). 
10.  See infra Chart I. 
11.  See infra Chart I.  This chart and all other line charts and tables within this Article 
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“successful” doctrinal innovations in tort law across state supreme 
courts in the period since World War II, reflects this broader trend 
toward stabilization: 
 
CHART I: ADOPTION PATTERNS OF 
TORT INNOVATIONS, 1945 TO PRESENT 
 
This Article draws from research on the diffusion of innovations, 
“herding behavior,” and “cascade effects”12 in describing the sources 
and significance of this stagnation.  As detailed herein, the common-law 
tort caseloads of state supreme courts—the most important and 
influential “laboratories” of doctrinal innovation in this sphere13—are 
both contracting and fragmenting.  These trends owe to several 
contributing factors, including the aforementioned exhaustion of 
 
derive from data inputted within a Microsoft Excel file in the author’s possession.  The cases 
and statutes that comprise the data are reflected in infra Appendix B. 
12.  See generally Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
87 (1999) (discussing the possibility of herding behavior among judges and associated effects 
in assessing the likelihood of “precedential cascades”). 
13.  U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LABORATORIES OF TORT LAW: 
A THREE-YEAR REVIEW OF KEY STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1 (2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/tort-labs.pdf [http://perma.cc/QE8Y-
6KW2]. 
 2015]    DIFFUSION OF DOCTRINAL INNOVATIONS IN TORT LAW 79 
doctrinal reform priorities, the politicization of common-law tort 
doctrine, the increased attention that state high courts pay to issues 
arising under state-specific “tort reform” laws and civil-damages 
statutes, and the appearance of intermediate appellate courts in most 
states.14  These developments have shrunk the number of adoption 
opportunities that appear and have made it difficult for any given 
innovation in tort law to gain the prominence and momentum that can 
lead to a swift rush of adoptions.  In sum, current circumstances inhibit 
the dynamics that can catalyze and coordinate the review and 
disposition of common-law tort cases by state supreme courts, leading to 
slower diffusion rates. 
This shift has at least three important consequences for the present 
and future of tort law.  First, whereas some “successful” common-law 
innovations of the past experienced a surge of adoptions, either from the 
outset of their diffusion or upon reaching a “critical mass” of adherents, 
even the best received innovations of today and tomorrow will tend to 
be adopted at a slower, steadier rate.  Going forward, judges and 
academics should incorporate substantial lag times into forecasts of 
doctrinal movement across state high courts.  So too should the 
manufacturers and insurers of new technologies that some 
commentators assume will have a significant intersection with tort law, 
such as drones,15 nanotechnology,16 fracking,17 cloning,18 three-
dimensional printing,19 cloud computing,20 and advances in 
 
14.  See infra Part IV. 
15.  See generally Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil 
Liability Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned 
Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623 (2009) (addressing the possible tort consequences of 
increased use of aerial drones). 
16.  See generally J. Philip Calabrese & Stephanie E. Niehaus, Nano-Torts on the 
Horizon: A Jack and Jill Story, 9 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 156, (2012) (anticipating 
possible tort claims associated with nanotechnology); Lewis L. Laska, What Every Personal 
Injury Lawyer Should Know About Nanotechnology, TRIAL, Sept. 2012, at 26. 
17.  See generally Joe Schremmer, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict 
Liability for Hydraulic Fracking, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215 (2012) (considering whether 
“fracking” should be subject to strict liability). 
18.  See LORI B. ANDREWS, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE 
LEGAL STATUS OF CLONING F-52–F-55 (1997), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/pubs/cloning2/cc6.pdf [http://perma.cc/58TX-
ATY6] (discussing “potential tort claims based on cloning”). 
19.  See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Essay, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: 
Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013) (assessing how modern 
products-liability law applies to three-dimensional printing technologies). 
20.  See generally Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud 
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neuroscience.21  All of these inventions and advances likely will occasion 
more gradual (if any) common-law doctrinal change across state 
supreme courts than one might project from diffusion rates of the past.  
And as this Article will discuss, legislatures, lower state courts, and 
federal courts cannot be relied upon to completely fill in all of the 
resulting gaps. 
Second, slower diffusion rates may generate more splits of authority.  
A doctrinal innovation may experience only a relatively brief “policy 
window” in which surrounding circumstances align favorably for its 
adoption.22  These apertures often close as economic and cultural 
climates change, and the drawbacks of and alternatives to a doctrinal 
innovation become more apparent.  From the 1960s through the 1980s, 
the relatively robust tort dockets entertained by state supreme courts 
permitted the exploitation of even fairly brief policy windows.23  New 
ideas could appear, undergo refinement by early adopters, and then 
attract a broad audience within a relatively short period.24  Today’s 
smaller, more fragmented dockets provide fewer opportunities for new 
ideas to capitalize upon hospitable environments.25  Because only a 
limited number of states will have the opportunity to adopt an 
innovation before a policy window narrows or slams shut, the slower 
diffusion rates of today and tomorrow will generate more persistent 
splits of authority across the states than otherwise would be the case. 
Third, the stagnation of the national torts docket may become self-
perpetuating.  Although decisions by lower state appellate courts and 
 
Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 341 (2013) (addressing the legal consequences, in tort law and otherwise, of burgeoning 
reliance on “cloud” computing and data storage). 
21.  See Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 833 
(2014) (predicting significant changes in the types of proof used to establish damages in tort 
cases if a “technology-driven neurolaw revolution” occurs).  Of course, speculation about the 
legal consequences of new technologies is nothing new.  See, e.g., Andrew F. Haley, Space 
Vehicle Torts, 36 U. DET. L.J. 294 (1959); Note, Artificial Rainmaking, 1 STAN. L. REV. 508 
(1949); Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1953). 
22.  See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165–95 
(2d ed. 2011) (discussing “policy windows,” periods in which circumstances are propitious for 
a policy change).  For another discussion of policy windows tailored to the torts context, see 
generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61 
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) (applying the concept of a “policy window” to the evaluation 
and adoption of no-fault automobile-insurance schemes). 
23.  See infra Part III. 
24.  See generally EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (5th ed. 2003). 
25.  See infra Part IV. 
 2015]    DIFFUSION OF DOCTRINAL INNOVATIONS IN TORT LAW 81 
federal courts may tug tort law in a particular direction, state supreme 
courts remain the most important oracles of common-law tort 
principles.26  The dearth of coordinated conversations across these 
entities on generic common-law topics lends itself to an impression of 
doctrinal lethargy.  All else being equal, this perception may discourage 
litigants from pursuing the sorts of novel arguments that provide raw 
material for additional innovation and make judges less inclined to craft 
path-breaking opinions. 
As a whole, the analysis presented within this Article provides 
insights into the patterns of common-law doctrinal change and confirms 
the existence of a new era in tort law.  In developing and reflecting upon 
its subject of study, this Article proceeds in five additional parts.  
Following this Introduction, Part II considers the body of diffusion 
analysis that this Article builds upon and applies to the diffusion of 
innovations in tort law.  Part III then presents an empirical analysis of 
the diffusion patterns associated with doctrinal innovations in this 
sphere.  This assessment identifies and describes several recurring 
diffusion patterns and spots the modern slowdown in diffusion rates 
that, from that point forward in the text, will represent this Article’s 
principal topic of discussion.  Part IV considers the possible reasons for 
this deceleration in diffusion, and Part V then discusses its significance.  
Finally, by way of conclusion, Part VI suggests possible next steps for 
researchers interested in advancing the basic analysis presented within 
this piece. 
II. DIFFUSION RESEARCH 
In examining the spread of tort innovations across the states, this 
Article draws from a robust body of research into the diffusion of other 
types of innovations, from products to policies.  The text below surveys 
this scholarship and discusses its pertinence to the diffusion of novel 
doctrines in tort law. 
A. The Diffusion of Innovations 
The diffusion of innovations—in other words, how and why 
consumers and other users adopt new products or ideas—is a well-
 
26.  See Randall T. Shepard, State High Courts as Central Figures in the Future of the 
American Legal System, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997) (discussing the influence 
that state supreme courts exert in certain areas of the law, including torts). 
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developed area of study.27  The urtext in this field is Everett Rogers’ 
Diffusion of Innovations,28 first published in 1962 and now in its fifth 
edition. 
Diffusion of Innovations identifies four factors as especially 
pertinent to the breadth and pace of an innovation’s adoption: (1) the 
relative “innovativeness” of potential adopters, i.e., whether they are 
prone or hesitant to innovate;29 (2) the existence and abilities of “change 
agents” and “opinion leaders”—individuals with the ability to encourage 
or discourage adoption by others;30 (3) the presence and operation of 
communications channels and diffusion networks through which 
information regarding an innovation may be transmitted;31 and (4) the 
attributes of the innovation at issue.32  Concerning the last of these 
factors, Diffusion of Innovations casts five characteristics as particularly 
consequential in the adoption equation.  The first of these traits is the 
innovation’s perceived “relative advantage” compared to substitutes.33  
A second pertinent quality is the innovation’s “complexity,” with 
greater complexity being negatively correlated with adoption.34  The 
three remaining traits are positively associated with enhanced diffusion 
prospects: an innovation’s “compatibility” with existing attitudes, values, 
beliefs, knowledge, practices, and technologies;35 its “trialability,” 
meaning whether it can be auditioned at a reduced cost prior to 
wholesale adoption;36 and its “observability,” meaning whether 
 
27.  Frank M. Bass, The Relationship Between Diffusion Rates, Experience Curves, and 
Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations, 53 J. BUS. S51, S51 
(1980); William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 203, 239 
(2005) (“There is a vast and varied literature on diffusion in the social sciences.”). 
28.  ROGERS, supra note 24; see also Twining, supra note 27, at 219 (describing Diffusion 
of Innovations as having been recognized as “the basic handbook of the field” of diffusion 
research). 
29.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 267–99. 
30.  Id. at 316–25, 366, 368–70, 373–80, 388–91, 394–401. 
31.  Id. at 204–08, 330–31, 333–35, 337–43. 
32.  Id. at 219–66. 
33.  Id. at 229 (defining “relative advantage” as the “degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes”). 
34.  Id. at 257 (defining “complexity” as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived 
as relatively difficult to understand and use”). 
35.  Id. at 240 (defining “compatibility” as “the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential 
adopters”). 
36.  Id. at 258 (defining “trialability” as “the degree to which an innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis”). 
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acceptance by others, and the success or failure of these adoptions, can 
be appreciated by other potential consumers.37  Additional research has 
established that these five attributes represent only a starting point for 
analysis and that, in a given context, other characteristics of an 
innovation also may influence the adoption process.38 
A great deal of diffusion research considers how the interplay among 
these factors can promote or enervate the diffusion process.  These 
assessments often identify or presume a standard diffusion process for 
successful innovations that involves a slow initial pace of adoption, then 
a rapid increase in the adoption rate, and finally a leveling off as 
laggards either slowly come into the fold or remain holdouts.39  When 
plotted with time on the x-axis and the number of adopters on the y-
axis, this adoption pattern forms what is commonly known as an “s-
curve.”40  Within an s-curve, the point of “critical mass” or “take-off” at 
which the adoption rate soars sometimes appears when an innovation 
reaches a threshold of users that causes its usefulness to skyrocket41 or 
when an innovation, refined by earlier use, improves in quality, falls in 
price, or both.42 
 
37.  Id. at 258 (defining “observability” as “the degree to which results of an innovation 
are visible to others”). 
38.  See, e.g., Gary C. Moore & Izak Benbasat, Development of an Instrument to 
Measure the Perceptions of Adopting an Information Technology Innovation, 2 INFO. SYS. 
RES. 192, 195 (1991) (adding “image” and “voluntariness of use” to the five characteristics 
identified in Diffusion of Innovations); Louis G. Tornatzky & Katherine J. Klein, Innovation 
Characteristics and Innovation Adoption-Implementation: A Meta-Analysis of Findings, EM-
29 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 28, 33 (1982) (adding “cost,” 
“communicability,” “divisibility,” “profitability,” and “social approval” to the list of pertinent 
attributes). 
39.  GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA 172 (2010); 
ROGERS, supra note 24, at 272; Peter N. Golder & Gerard J. Tellis, Growing, Growing, Gone: 
Cascades, Diffusion, and Turning Points in the Product Life Cycle, 23 MARKETING SCI. 207, 
208 (2004).  This curve does not describe the diffusion of all innovations, only some.  
Attendance at new “blockbuster” movies, for example, often declines dramatically after the 
first week of release.  See Mohanbir S. Sawhney & Jehoshua Eliashberg, A Parsimonious 
Model for Forecasting Gross Box-Office Revenues of Motion Pictures, 15 MARKETING SCI. 
113 (1996). 
40.  BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 37–46; ROGERS, supra note 24, at 272–75. 
41.  See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 349–53; John Hauser et al., Research on Innovation: 
A Review and Agenda for Marketing Science, 25 MARKETING SCI. 687, 692 (2006). 
42.  Rajshree Agarwal & Barry L. Bayus, The Market Evolution and Sales Takeoff of 
Product Innovations, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1024, 1024–25, 1038 (2002); Bass, supra note 27, at S61 
tbl.2 (charting the decreased prices over time of electric refrigerators, room air conditioners, 
dishwashers, black-and-white televisions, electric clothes dryers, and color televisions); Peter 
N. Golder & Gerard J. Tellis, Will It Ever Fly? Modeling the Takeoff of Really New Consumer 
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B. Policy Diffusion 
While diffusion research is perhaps most closely associated with the 
marketing of new consumer products, political scientists also have 
applied diffusion theory to try to discern why governments adopt 
innovative policies.43 
Several of these studies have examined the diffusion of legal rules 
across the fifty United States.  These analyses have considered topics 
such as whether recurring diffusion patterns appear,44 whether 
individual state legislatures or courts can be identified as relatively 
innovation prone or innovation phobic,45 whether particularly effective 
communication channels or thought leaders appear with policy 
innovations,46 and whether certain types of policies spread more quickly 
and broadly than others do.47 
Most of this work has considered the diffusion of policies across 
state legislatures, as opposed to the spread of legal rules across courts.48  
These studies have identified several influences upon policy adoptions 
by legislators.49  Some inquiries have emphasized the importance of 
“internal determinants,” meaning “political, economic, and social 
 
Durables, 16 MARKETING SCI. 256 (1997). 
43.  E.g., BOUSHEY, supra note 39; Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State 
Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 
395 (1990); Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 
1174 (1973); Kim Quaile Hill & Patricia A. Hurley, Uniform State Law Adoptions in the 
American States: An Explanatory Analysis, 18 PUBLIUS 117 (1988); Todd Makse & Craig 
Volden, The Role of Policy Attributes in the Diffusion of Innovations, 73 J. POL. 108 (2011); 
Christopher Z. Mooney & Mei-Hsien Lee, The Temporal Diffusion of Morality Policy: The 
Case of Death Penalty Legislation in the American States, 27 POL’Y STUD. J. 766 (1999); 
Robert L. Savage, Policy Innovativeness as a Trait of American States, 40 J. POL. 212 (1978); 
Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POLI. SCI. 
REV. 880 (1969). 
44.  E.g., Gray, supra note 43. 
45.  E.g., BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 92–138; Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, 
Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial 
Doctrines, 75 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 975 (1981). 
46.  Patricia K. Freeman, Interstate Communication Among State Legislators Regarding 
Energy Policy Innovation, 15 PUBLIUS 99 (1985); David L. Huff et al., A Geographical 
Analysis of the Innovativeness of States, 64 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 137 (1988); Alfred R. Light, 
Intergovernmental Sources of Innovation in State Administration, 6 AM. POL. Q. 147 (1978). 
47.  E.g., BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 62–91; Makse & Volden, supra note 43. 
48.  James M. Lutz, Regional Leaders in the Diffusion of Tort Innovations Among the 
American States, 27 PUBLIUS 39, 39 (1997). 
49.  Makse & Volden, supra note 43, at 108 (reviewing existing scholarship on policy 
diffusion).  
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characteristics internal to the state.”50  Other analyses have stressed 
geography and its consequences, with a common conclusion being that 
states tend to emulate their neighbors when deciding whether to adopt a 
given policy.51  Still other researchers have assigned weight to adoptions 
by leading states52 or the efforts of “policy entrepreneurs” in promoting 
new policies.53  Finally, some authors have focused on the types of 
policies involved and their specific qualities (such as their perceived cost 
and salience),54 with a common conclusion being that certain policies 
tend to diffuse more rapidly and broadly than others do, on account of 
their subject matter and other traits.55 
Contemporary scholarship concerning policy diffusion generally 
recognizes that these determinants are not mutually exclusive and that, 
as to any single innovation, they can operate either in concert or at 
cross-purposes.56  One leading study, which considered the adoption of 
lotteries by states, concluded that a given state’s decision whether to 
adopt a lottery was influenced not only by the decisions already made by 
neighboring states but also by “internal” characteristics of the state, 
such as its fiscal health and the personal incomes and religiousness of its 
residents.57  A more recent analysis of the diffusion of 133 different 
policies across state legislatures likewise concluded that multiple factors 
typically influence the adoption process.58  This more extensive study 
found that the precise pace of diffusion tended to vary based on a 
policy’s content, with “governance” polices (such as term limits) and 
“morality” policies (like restrictions on abortion) diffusing more rapidly 
than “regulatory” policies (e.g., licensing schemes).59  From these 
discoveries, the author surmised that two diffusion tracks for policies 
exist, one of which involves a “gradual process of policy 
incrementalism” and the other “a rapid decision-making process typified 
by attention-driven choice.”60  Regardless of policy type, this study 
 
50.  See Berry & Berry, supra note 43, at 395–96 (discussing this approach). 
51.  Id. at 396; Lutz, supra note 48, at 40–41; Makse & Volden, supra note 43, at 117. 
52.  Huff, et al., supra note 46, at 144–45. 
53.  BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 139, 174–80; Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs 
and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 738 (1997). 
54.  E.g., Makse & Volden, supra note 43. 
55.  Id. at 121–22. 
56.  Berry & Berry, supra note 43, at 410–11; Lutz, supra note 48, at 41. 
57.  Berry & Berry, supra note 43, at 410. 
58.  See BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 169–79, 187–92. 
59.  Id. at 175. 
60.  Id. at 60. 
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found that successful policies tended to diffuse across jurisdictions more 
rapidly than the standard s-curve model would predict.61 
C. Common-Law Diffusion Patterns 
As compared to the robust body of literature that considers the 
diffusion of policies across legislatures, the adoption of innovations by 
state courts has received relatively little attention,62 and the study of the 
diffusion of innovations in tort law even less.63 
The studies of common-law diffusion that do exist often mine 
citation patterns in order to detect communication channels across, and 
change agents among, the courts.64  These studies have identified shared 
legal reporting districts, geographic proximity, and “cultural linkages” 
between states as relevant to the diffusion of precedent.65  The prestige 
of a state supreme court also has been identified as affecting the spread 
of its decisions, with studies suggesting that some state supreme courts 
are looked to as thought leaders while others are not.66  On this point, a 
recent article found that decisions produced by the California Supreme 
Court generated by far the most “followed” Shepard’s citations of any 
state high court.67  This inquiry also discovered that the influence of 
specific state supreme courts waxed and waned over time.68  The 
supreme courts of states such as Washington and Arizona attracted 
more “followed” citations as the studied time frame progressed, while 
 
61.  Id. at 55. 
62.  Lutz, supra note 48, at 42 (“Adoptions of innovations by state judiciaries have been 
less frequently analyzed than legislative adoptions.”). 
63.  Canon & Baum, supra note 45, at 975 (discussing the dearth of scholarship on this 
point).  Since Canon and Baum made this observation, there has been some additional work 
on the spread of tort doctrines, e.g., Thomas Arthur Schmeling, The Dynamics of Legal 
Change: A Diffusion of Innovations Perspective (Feb. 19, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, the University of Wisconsin-Madison), but comprehensive scholarship on this 
subject remains sparse. 
64.  See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Donald J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and the 
Diffusion of the Strict Liability Rule for Manufacturing Defects, 1963–1987, 37 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 565 (2012). 
65.  Id.; Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the Communication of Precedent Among 
State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449, 476 (1985) (concluding that 
“cultural regionalism to be an increasingly important factor in the communication of 
precedent among state supreme courts”). 
66.  E.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State 
Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 191 (1985). 
67.  Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940–
2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 693 (2007). 
68.  See id. at 697. 
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other high courts fell behind.69  That said, the most “followed” decision 
over the study’s sixty-five-year time span attracted only twenty followers 
among state supreme courts,70 suggesting that significant limits exist to 
the influence exerted by any single court. 
Among common-law subjects, tort law provides particularly fertile 
ground for diffusion study.71  State courts of last resort possess 
significant discretion when deciding which tort innovations to adopt and 
which to reject.72  This discretion admits to a diverse range of potential 
influences, which the larger body of diffusion research may illuminate.  
Nevertheless, comprehensive studies of the diffusion of tort doctrines 
have been rare.73  The most thorough such effort to date examined the 
diffusion of twenty-three “plaintiff-oriented” doctrines in the years prior 
to and including 1975.74  This inquiry specifically sought to measure “the 
innovativeness of state judicial systems.”75  From its data, this study 
identified Minnesota, Texas, Kentucky, Washington, and California as 
the “most innovative” states, and Alaska, Maine, Vermont, Hawaii, and 
Wyoming as the least.76  Looking solely at the post-World War II period, 
New Jersey claimed the crown as the most innovative state.77  The 
authors concluded that a state’s population was the most important 
 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 708. 
71.  See Marshall S. Shapo, Millenial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1999) (describing 
torts as “the quintessential common law subject”). 
72.  Michael E. Solimine, Activism and Politics on State Supreme Courts, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 987, 996 (1989) (reviewing TARR & PORTER, supra note 9) (“Unrestrained by most 
federal (or state) constitutional limitations, state courts generally have a free hand in 
developing common law in private party litigation.”). 
73.  One such study is Schmeling, supra note 63.  Schmeling considered the diffusion of 
five doctrinal innovations (namely, recognition of claims for: (1) wrongful pregnancy or 
conception, (2) wrongful birth, (3) loss of a husband’s consortium, (4) prenatal injuries, and 
(5) wrongful death of a stillborn fetus) across state appellate courts.  Id. at 89–90.  Other 
researchers have examined the spread of a single innovation in tort law across the states.  
E.g., Bird & Smythe, supra note 64; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of 
Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 
110 YALE L.J. 333, 358–68 (2000) (discussing the influence that the Johnstown Flood may 
have had on the diffusion of strict liability under the rule of Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 
737 (Ex. 1865), rev’d, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff’d, 3 L.R.-E & I. App. 330 (H.L. 
1868)). 
74.  Canon & Baum, supra note 45. 
75.  Id. at 975. 
76.  Id. at 977 tbl.1. 
77.  Id. 
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single influence on its innovativeness.78  Otherwise, they found “no 
strong consistency over time in the innovativeness of state court 
systems.”79  Instead, the authors concluded, “[b]ecause courts are 
dependent upon litigants’ demands, a strong element of idiosyncrasy 
governs the diffusion of tort doctrines.”80  A similar study identified 
some “regional leaders” and “regional followers” among state 
judiciaries,81 but otherwise determined that “[i]t is possible that the 
adoption of tort doctrines is more idiosyncratic than other types of 
judicial innovations.”82 
D. Issues in the Study of the Diffusion of Tort-Law Innovations 
This idiosyncrasy makes it impossible to craft a model that perfectly 
describes and predicts the diffusion of tort doctrines.  Certainly, several 
of the factors identified as pertinent to the diffusion of innovations in 
general, such as the presence or absence of change agents and effective 
communication channels, seem relevant to the diffusion of innovations 
in tort law.83  The basic diffusion model runs into particular difficulty, 
 
78.  Id. at 980 tbl.2.  This observation was later refined by another author who observed, 
based on an empirical study of the spread of five doctrinal innovations, that “population is 
more strongly associated with the production of cases than with adoption of the innovations” 
implicated by these cases.  Schmeling, supra note 63, at 154. 
79.  Canon & Baum, supra note 45, at 982. 
80.  Id. at 985. 
81.  Lutz, supra note 48, at 56–57. 
82.  Id. at 58. 
83.  See Dear & Jessen, supra note 67, at 708 (observing that the two most-followed 
cases within the studied era were torts cases); see also Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 359, 386–87 (2008) (discussing the important roles that “agents” sometimes 
play in the demise of tort theories); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A 
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 
(1985) (arguing that academics played an important role in laying the foundation for broad 
acceptance of strict products liability in tort).  But cf. Duncan J. Watts & Peter Sheridan 
Dodds, Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 441, 454 
(2007) (“Under most conditions, we would argue, cascades do not succeed because of a few 
highly influential individuals influencing everyone else but rather on account of a critical mass 
of easily influenced individuals influencing other easy-to-influence people.”).  Certainly, 
modern courts do not reflexively embrace the wisdom of their peers.  For example, the 
California Supreme Court, responsible for the two most followed cases in the Dear and 
Jessen study, also hatched the tort of “bad faith denial of contract.”  Seaman’s Direct Buying 
Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984).  This tort was 
roundly criticized.  See, e.g., Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 
1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“In inventing the tort of bad faith denial of a contract, the 
California Supreme Court has created a cause of action so nebulous in outline and so 
unpredictable in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window 
than a rule of law.” (citation omitted)).  This din of criticism grew so loud that that the 
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however, when one tries to pinpoint those characteristics of a tort 
innovation that will facilitate or hinder its diffusion. 
These characteristics may overlap but not completely coincide with 
those identified as pertinent to the diffusion of other types of 
innovations.  Some of these basic qualities—such as greater 
“compatibility” with the surrounding legal, social, and political 
culture84—intuitively would seem to affect the fate of novel tort 
doctrines as well.  But the diffusion of common-law innovations also 
depends on traits that have less impact in other contexts.85  For example, 
while the diffusion of other innovations often presumes an immediate 
and infinite supply of a product or (especially) an idea, adoption within 
the common-law process requires that litigants come before courts with 
cases that present the innovation in a proper posture.86  The limitations 
of these litigants, and of the system within which they operate, mean 
that these opportunities cannot be taken for granted.  Instead, one of 
the characteristics of a tort innovation seemingly most pertinent to its 
diffusion concerns the “frequency” with which an innovation will appear 
before courts of precedent.  In other words, certain doctrinal 
innovations will generate more adoption opportunities than others do.  
An innovation may claim this advantage because it has a close 
 
California Supreme Court, with a somewhat different cast of justices, would repudiate the tort 
just over a decade later.  Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670 (Cal. 
1995).  Likewise, even the most respected treatises and other secondary resources in this area 
have had their hits and misses.  See Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 25–26 (Minn. 2011) 
(discussing the tepid reaction courts afforded to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 321 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Torts 2.0: The Restatement 3rd and 
the Architecture of Participation in American Tort Law, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1582, 
1590 (2011) (describing some provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as “spectacular 
failures”). 
84.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 240. 
85.  The “frequency” factor that will be discussed in the text above does not exhaust the 
set of qualities potentially pertinent to the diffusion of tort doctrines.  James Henderson has 
identified the “comprehensibility” of a doctrine, among other features, as relevant to its 
acceptance by courts.  James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. 
REV. 901, 911–13 (1982).  A lack of comprehensibility may explain why the prima facie tort 
theory has not been broadly accepted.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979) (defining the prima facie tort); Ellen M. Bublick, Economic Torts: Gains in 
Understanding Losses, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 693, 705 (2006) (observing that “very few states have 
latched on to the prima facie tort at all, let alone placed it in a significant role”).  The breadth 
and vagueness of this tort have been blamed for its failure to catch on; one scholar has written 
that, if recognized, the “tort, like an open-mouthed whale taking in plankton, would ingest 
too much.”  Bublick, supra, at 705. 
86.  See Canon & Baum, supra note 45, at 985. 
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connection with commonly arising controversies;87 because it is highly 
“visible” to litigants, counsel, and courts at the point of injury, 
allegation, or judicial review;88 or because it costs little to assert and 
promises significant rewards.89 
A more intractable problem associated with application of the 
standard model to the adoption of innovations in tort law concerns the 
indeterminacy of the concept of “relative advantage” in this context.  
Diffusion of Innovations identifies an innovation’s relative advantage 
over its substitutes as one of the most important factors in the diffusion 
calculus.90  But in the law, relative advantage vis-à-vis the status quo or 
alternative approaches is very much in the eye of the beholder.91  An 
 
87.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
88.  It is difficult to pin down the precise circumstances that make some innovations or 
issues more “visible” or salient than others.  In addition to the frequency with which an issue 
arises, a nonexhaustive list of potentially pertinent factors would include: (1) whether there 
exists a custom of recognizing a certain issue as suitable for presentation to the courts, see 
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 122–23 (1991) (finding a marked difference in claiming tendencies between 
persons injured in automobile accidents and persons injured in different circumstances); 
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980–1981); Marc Galanter, Real World 
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1103 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Do 
We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183–86 (1992) (reviewing several studies regarding injury 
awareness and claiming patterns among prospective and actual plaintiffs); (2) the costs and 
benefits associated with the presentation of an issue to the court; (3) procedural matters, such 
as whether the issue is classified as one of law or one of fact; (4) whether the issue has a close 
connection to a factually compelling, notorious, or socially significant event, see, e.g., RACHEL 
MAINES, ASBESTOS AND FIRE: TECHNOLOGICAL TRADE-OFFS AND THE BODY AT RISK 20 
(2005) (discussing how disasters may whet the public’s appetite for regulation and spark claim 
consciousness); Shugerman, supra note 73, at 373 (referencing “a growing body of scholarship 
contending that dramatic events produce legal change by making risks more ‘salient’ for the 
public”); (5) whether a “signature” set of facts, a label, or some other organizing or attention-
getting device makes the issue or innovation relatively easy to recognize and recall, see 
generally CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND 
OTHERS DIE (2007); W. Caroline West & Phillip J. Holcomb, Imaginal, Semantic, and 
Surface-Level Processing of Concrete and Abstract Words: An Electrophysiological 
Investigation, 12 J. COG. NEUROSCIENCE 1024, 1024 (2000) (discussing the processing 
advantage that “concrete” words have over “abstract” words); (6) whether the innovation 
implicates the interests of groups more likely to appreciate its importance, and aggressively 
pursue their interests in the courts; and (7) whether an innovation is one of several competing 
approaches to a perceived problem, or stands alone as an alternative to the status quo. 
89.  See Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 
555, 593600 (2014) (discussing the cost-benefit calculations associated with claims for strict 
products liability in tort). 
90.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 233. 
91.  See id. at 265. 
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advantage to a defendant in a tort lawsuit commonly spells a 
disadvantage to the plaintiff, and vice versa.  Likewise, courts may 
disagree about the qualities of an innovation that confer upon it an 
“advantage” relative to substitutes. 
The common lack of a consensus as to any relative advantage, 
together with other gaps and contingencies within the diffusion process, 
introduce an irreducible amount of uncertainty into the diffusion of 
innovations in tort law.  The shifting prospects of tort claims for 
spoliation of evidence illustrate this unpredictability.92  Back in 1997, a 
leading torts scholar identified spoliation as a “semisuccessful” new 
tort.93  The tort’s association with intuitions ingrained within several 
areas of the law, not merely the law of torts, was identified as a reason 
for its (qualified) success.94  This assessment seemed wholly plausible at 






92.  In general terms, a “spoliation of evidence” claim seeks damages for “the tampering 
with, loss of, or destruction of . . . potential evidence, when that destruction interferes with 
another party’s civil action.”  Bart S. Wilhoit, Comment, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability 
of Four Emerging Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 633 (1998). 
93.  Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 
1549 (1997). 
94.  Id. at 1549–50. 
95.  See infra Chart II.  Chart II reflects rejections by the supreme courts of Arizona 
(Lips v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 229 P.3d 1008 (Ariz. 2010)); Arkansas (Goff v. Harold 
Ives Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 387 (Ark. 2000)); California (Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior 
Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998)); Florida (Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342 
(Fla. 2005)); Indiana (Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005)); Kansas 
(Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. Kimball, 259 P.3d 676 (Kan. 2011)); Kentucky (Monsanto Co. 
v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997)); Massachusetts (Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 
N.E.2d 420 (Mass. 2002)); Mississippi (Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124 
(Miss. 2002)); Montana (Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999)); Nevada 
(Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Prods. v. Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2002)); and Texas 
(Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998)).  (Montana does allow spoliation claims 
against third parties, however.)  The adoptions that appear in the chart reflect the acceptance 
of these spoliation claims by the supreme courts of Alaska (Hazen v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986)); Connecticut (Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 
A.2d 1165 (Conn. 2006)); New Jersey (Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749 (N.J. 2001)); 
New Mexico (Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995)); Ohio (Smith v. 
Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993)); and West Virginia (Hannah v. Heeter, 
584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003)).  Thus, the present scoreboard reads: six adopters, twelve 
rejecters, and only three adopters since 1995. 
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CHART II: JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF FIRST-PARTY 
INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION CLAIMS 
 
Since 1997, more states have rejected the tort than have adopted it,96 
others have passed up opportunities to embrace it,97 and the cause of 
action remains in limbo, with no pertinent high-court caselaw one way 
or the other, in many jurisdictions.98  Regardless of the asserted virtues 
of the spoliation claim, its perceived drawbacks,99 the availability of 
alternative sanctions for evidence destruction,100 and a wait-and-see 
attitude among some jurisdictions have led to the stalled diffusion of this 
new tort. 
E. This Study 
Because of this inherent uncertainty, instead of offering a one-size-
fits-all model for the diffusion of tort doctrines, the analysis presented 
here instead has the more modest goals of charting the diffusion 
 
96.  There exist four different types of recurring spoliation claims: negligent “first-party” 
spoliation; negligent “third-party” spoliation; intentional “first-party” spoliation; and 
intentional “third-party” spoliation.  See Wilhoit, supra note 92, at 659–61 (discussing the 
various kinds of spoliation claims).  None of these claims have found an especially broad 
audience. 
97.  Cf. Hills v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 232 P.3d 1049, 1057–58 (Utah 2010) (declining 
to recognize a claim for third-party spoliation, at least on the facts of the case before it). 
98.  E.g., Matsuura v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 73 P.3d 687, 706 (Haw. 2003). 
99.  Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 517–21 (discussing the perceived undesirable 
aspects of this tort). 
100.  See Lips, 229 P.3d at 100910 (discussing these alternatives). 
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patterns associated with numerous innovations, identifying trends that 
emerge from the studied data, and suggesting some explanations for and 
consequences of these tendencies.  This analysis does not relate a 
wholesale endorsement or unalloyed application of diffusion research in 
the tort-law context.  At the same time, the larger body of diffusion 
research, with some modifications to account for the circumstances and 
idiosyncrasies of common-law change, provides a basic framework and 
vocabulary for the task at hand. 
As a starting point for its analysis, this Article maps the diffusion 
across the states of twenty “successful” common-law doctrinal 
innovations in tort law.  The studied innovations consist of (1) strict 
products liability in tort;101 (2) a “right to privacy” enforceable in tort;102 
(3) a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, as 
triggered by witnessing physical harm befall another (also known as a 
“bystander” emotional-distress claim);103 (4) a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy;104 (5) a claim for “loss of 
a chance” in the medical-malpractice context;105 (6) the “learned 
intermediary” doctrine as a defense available to drug or medical-device 
manufacturers in a products-liability action;106 (7) the “crashworthiness” 
 
101.  As first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) and subsequently endorsed by the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  Since then, certain 
aspects of “strict” products liability have been reconciled with the same notions of 
“reasonableness” that inform the larger corpus of negligence law.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reporters’ note (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
102.  Here, acceptance of one of the four privacy torts recognized in William L. Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960), or an ancestor thereof, was regarded as an adoption. 
103.  A “bystander” claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress involves 
recovery for “the mental distress which may result from the observation of a third person’s 
peril or harm.”  Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 1984). 
104.  This sort of claim is “commonly predicated upon a specific and identifiable public 
policy against discharge on the particular facts of [a] case. . . . In most cases the employer fires 
the at-will employee for refusing to engage in illegal conduct, for blowing the whistle on the 
employer’s illegal conduct, or for asserting her rights . . . .”  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 454 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
105.  One court has described this theory as follows:   
[T]he loss of chance doctrine views a person’s prospects for surviving a serious 
medical condition as something of value, even if the possibility of recovery was less 
than even prior to the physician’s tortious conduct.  Where a physician’s negligence 
reduces or eliminates the patient’s prospects for achieving a more favorable medical 
outcome, the physician has harmed the patient and is liable for damages. 
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008). 
106.  “Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical 
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doctrine in products-liability lawsuits;107 (8) strict liability for damage 
associated with concussions from blasting operations;108 (9) the 
“attractive nuisance” doctrine;109 (10) the “Connecticut Rule,” requiring 
that a premises owner exercise reasonable care when removing natural 
accumulations of snow and ice from their property;110 (11) the “mode of 
operation” approach in slip-and-fall cases;111 (12) the MacPherson 
 
product satisfies its duty to warn the end user of its product’s potential risks by providing an 
adequate warning to a ‘learned intermediary,’ who then assumes the duty to pass on the 
necessary warnings to the end user.”  Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 
2012).  A jurisdiction was regarded as having “adopted” this doctrine if it recognized the 
doctrine as available to the manufacturer of either a pharmaceutical product or a medical 
device. 
107.  “The ‘second collision’ or ‘crashworthiness’ doctrine allows an injured plaintiff to 
hold a manufacturer liable for a product defect that did not cause the initial accident but 
enhanced or aggravated the plaintiff’s injuries.”  Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff’s 
Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 
DEPAUL L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
108.  See Dyer v. Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc., 984 A.2d 210, 215–19 (Me. 2009) 
(discussing this rule). 
109.  This doctrine, as explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides that 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing 
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon land if: 
 (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows 
or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and 
 (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know 
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or 
serious bodily harm to such children, and 
 (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize 
the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made 
dangerous by it, and 
 (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of 
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and 
 (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or 
otherwise to protect the children. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
110.  This rule requires possessors of land “to exercise reasonable care in preventing 
dangerous conditions in common areas due to accumulations of snow and ice,” at least to 
invitees or others generally owed a duty of reasonable care.  Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 
930 N.E.2d 142, 154 n.17 (Mass. 2010).  Its nemesis is the so-called “Massachusetts Rule,” 
which prescribes “that property owners owe no duty to remove natural accumulations of 
snow and ice.”  Id. at 146. 
111.  This approach provides that 
where an owner’s chosen mode of operation makes it reasonably foreseeable that a 
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doctrine in products-liability cases;112 (13) the “false light” privacy 
tort;113 (14) abolition of the “completion and acceptance” rule;114 (15) 
abolition or substantial modification of the “assumption of the risk” 
defense;115 (16) repudiation of the “impact rule” limiting recovery for 
 
dangerous condition will occur, a store owner could be held liable for injuries to an 
invitee if the plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable 
precautions necessary to protect invitees from these foreseeable dangerous 
conditions. 
Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007). 
112.  In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), the New York 
Court of Appeals (through Justice Cardozo) rejected a “privity of contract” requirement in 
negligence actions involving defective products where “the nature of [the product] is such that 
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made.”  Id. at 1053.  In 
this study, the Kentucky Supreme Court is regarded as the first adopter of this innovation, as 
that court previously had adopted a similar diminution of the privity requirement in products-
liability lawsuits cast in negligence.  See Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047, 1051–52 
(Ky. 1911). 
113.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines this tort as follows: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before 
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, 
if 
 (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and 
 (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
114.  “Under the completion and acceptance doctrine, once an independent contractor 
finishes work on a project and the work has been accepted by the owner, the contractor is no 
longer liable for injuries to third parties, even if the work was negligently performed.”  Davis 
v. Baugh Indus. Contractors, Inc., 150 P.3d 545, 546 (Wash. 2007).  In other words, 
“[h]istorically, after completion and acceptance, the risk of liability for the project belonged 
solely to the property owner.”  Id. 
115.  The Restatement of Torts defined assumption of the risk as follows: 
A person who knows that another has created a danger or is doing a dangerous act 
or that the land or chattels of another are dangerous, and who nevertheless chooses 
to enter upon or to remain within or permit his things to remain within the area of 
risk is not entitled to recover for harm unintentionally caused to him or his things by 
the other’s conduct or by the condition of the premises, except where the other’s 
conduct constitutes a breach of duty to him or to a third person and has created a 
situation in which it is reasonably necessary to undergo a risk in order to protect a 
right or avert a harm. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 893 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939).  Beginning in the 1950s, courts 
began to abolish this doctrine, or significantly limit it.  DOBBS, supra note 104, at § 211 
(describing this development). 
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the negligent infliction of emotional distress;116 (17) abolition of one or 
more of the distinctions drawn between invitees, licensees, and 
trespassers in premises-liability cases;117 (18) abrogation of parental 
immunity, at least in connection with motor-vehicle accidents 
occasioned by negligence; (19) abrogation of interspousal immunity for 
negligence, in automobile cases or otherwise; and (20) the “economic 
loss” rule, as applied in cases involving defective or negligently made 
products.118  Also, at appropriate junctures, this Article will consider the 
judicial adoption of other innovations, including but not limited to 
spoliation of evidence; the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ formulation 
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress;119 the 
“discovery rule” for medical malpractice claims;120 abrogation or 
limitation of governmental121 and charitable immunities;122 overturn of 
the rule barring recovery for injuries suffered in utero;123 abolition of the 
 
116.  The “impact rule” bars recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress 
where said distress is not derived, in some way, from physical contact or injury to the plaintiff.  
See Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 14–15, 14 n.39 (Ky. 2012) (discussing this rule). 
117.  Where recognized, these status-based classifications mean that possessors of land 
owe progressively diminishing duties to invitees, licensees, and trespassers.  Some states have 
replaced these classifications with a “unitary” standard of reasonable care, while others have 
adopted a “modified” approach that regards only invitees and licenses as being owed a duty 
of reasonable care.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2012). 
118.  This rule “prevents the commercial purchaser of a product from suing in tort to 
recover for economic losses arising from the malfunction of the product itself, recognizing 
that such damages must be recovered, if at all, pursuant to contract law.”  Giddings & Lewis, 
Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Ky. 2011). 
119.  This provision provides, in pertinent part, “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
bodily harm.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
120.  “The discovery rule is the legal principle which, when applicable, provides that 
limitations run from the date the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered, in the exercise 
of reasonable care and diligence, the nature of the injury.”  Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 
642, 644 (Tex. 1988). 
121.  See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108 (1941) 
(discussing the broad recognition of this type of immunity as of 1941). 
122.  See id. 
123.  This rule has been summarized as follows: 
[A]t common law, in the absence of statute, prenatal injury affords no basis for an 
action in tort, in favor either of the child or its personal representative. 
 This conclusion is predicated, it appears, on the assumption that a child en 
ventre sa mere has no juridical existence, and is so intimately united with its mother 
as to be a “part” of her and as a consequence is not to be regarded as a separate, 
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“heart balm” torts of alienation of affections,124 criminal conversation,125 
and breach of promise to marry;126 and the availability of “medical 
monitoring” damages based on as-yet unrealized increased risks of 
harm.127  These innovations span several eras.  Some first appeared in 
the mid-1800s, while others represent relatively recent developments.  
Most of these innovations benefitted tort plaintiffs, while a few aided 
defendants.  All were adopted in most instances by courts, although 
other innovations, adopted primarily by legislatures, also will be 
discussed for purposes of reference and comparison.  In all, this analysis 
considers the diffusion of more than thirty innovations in tort law—far 
from a complete recitation of the broad changes that have occurred in 
this field, but a respectable sample nevertheless. 
Across the studied innovations, this analysis assigns specific meaning 
to three words: “successful,” “innovation,” and “adoption.”  Of these 
terms, the term “successful” is the simplest to define.  As employed in 
this study, “successful” signifies an innovation that has been “adopted” 
(as that term is defined below) by twenty or more states. 
As for “innovation,” this Article uses a definition that other 
diffusion researchers have advanced: An innovation is a change or 
complement to existing doctrine “that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption.”128  Any study of “innovations” in 
tort law must concede some challenges in spotting when an innovation 
has emerged.129  After all, “[t]he common law sometimes jumps, but 
often it creeps or bounces or slides incrementally; and the jumps (big 
 
distinct, and individual entity. 
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946). 
124.  An alienation of affections claim alleges that the defendant has intentionally and 
wrongfully interfered with a marriage, thereby straining relations between the spouses.  
Graham, supra note 83, at 364. 
125.  This claim alleges that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the 
plaintiff’s spouse.  No additional allegation of alienated affections is required for this claim to 
be actionable.  Id. at 364, 364 n.22. 
126.  A plaintiff in a breach of promise to marry claim alleges that her or his former 
fiancé or fiancée failed to follow through upon an accepted promise of marriage.  Id. at 364. 
127.  See D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the 
Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095 (2006) (explaining this theory of recovery). 
128.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 12; cf. Hauser et al., supra note 41, at 687 (defining 
“innovation” as “the process of bringing new products and services to market.”). 
129.  See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 12. 
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and small) are typically disguised as nonjumps.”130  Tort law is not 
exceptional in this respect, however.  Incremental, erratic, and 
unpredictable development processes also appear with other ideas and 
products as to which diffusion research has proven useful.  Just as a 20-
mexapixel camera does not lose its status as an innovation simply 
because 10-mexapixel cameras already exist, an expressly “strict” theory 
of products liability in tort was regarded as innovative even by those 
judges who already had liberalized negligence doctrine so as to make it 
practically equivalent to strict liability in some situations.131  
Finally, the word “adoption” admits to several possible definitions in 
this sphere.132  This Article equates “adoption” with endorsement by a 
state’s legislature or its highest court.  Applying this definition, this 
Article does not include among a roster of adopters those jurisdictions 
where an innovation represents an accepted matter of trial-court 
practice, even without ratification by the state’s legislature or its 
supreme court.  Therefore, the analysis presented here likely 
undercounts the number of de facto adopters of many of the studied 
innovations.  That said, this definition avoids the counting problems that 
would arise if some lesser standard, such as decisions by lower state 
courts or local federal courts (which are prone to conflict with one 
another, and are subject to review or reversal by state supreme courts), 
supplied the operative meaning for “adoptions.” 
This restrictive approach toward “adoption” reduces, but does not 
eliminate, the interpretive issues associated with this term.  Ambiguities 
over whether and when an “adoption” has occurred can arise in 
numerous ways.133  In each such instance, pinpointing the precise 
 
130.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Losing One’s Head: Judges and the Law in Nineteenth-
Century American Legal History, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 255 (1999). 
131.  See Graham, supra note 89, at 57379. 
132.  How one defines “adoption” can make a significant difference in the number of 
jurisdictions identified as adhering to a principle and when this acceptance is perceived as 
taking place.  See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 903–05 (W. 
Va. 2007) (discussing discrepancies across various fifty-state surveys of the adoption of the 
“learned intermediary” doctrine). 
133.  For example, a judicial decision may refer to an innovation favorably, but not 
expressly adopt it; a decision may adopt a closely related innovation; a series of decisions may 
adopt an innovation in piecemeal fashion; a decision may endorse a broad principle that 
encompasses the innovation, but leave the door open for exceptions; a decision may appear to 
adopt the innovation in text susceptible to characterization as dicta; a decision may imply that 
the court has adopted an innovation, but never make its reasoning clear; a decision may 
dubiously interpret an earlier statute or decision as having adopted an innovation long before; 
a decision may apply an innovation without expressly adopting it, making it unclear whether 
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moment of adoption can incorporate a dollop of subjectivity.  Most of 
the studied innovations, therefore, involve at least a few debatable 
adoption dates, and some innovations, such as the rule of strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities, had adoption paths so twisted, 
obscure, or carved out in bits and chunks that they were rejected as 
potential subjects of study.  To accommodate the ambiguities that arise 
on the “adoption” front, this Article avoids premising any of its 
conclusions on isolated and debatable adoption decisions and instead 
focuses upon the broader trends illuminated by the data. 
III. THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS IN TORT LAW 
The text below charts and analyzes the diffusion paths associated 
with twenty significant innovations in tort law.  As will appear, these 
innovations have diffused along different routes, which permit a degree 
of aggregation and generalization. 
A. Innovation Patterns 
The following chart depicts how long it has taken each of the studied 
innovations to attract its current cast of adopters.134  For each 
innovation, the timeline commences with its first adoption by any state 





the adoption question was properly presented for review; a decision may decline to expressly 
adopt an innovation, but simultaneously refuse to repudiate case law from lower courts or 
local federal courts that accepted the reform; a decision may decline to adopt an innovation in 
a particular context, but use language that suggests that the court would endorse the 
innovation as applied elsewhere; a decision may say it has adopted an innovation, while the 
court’s holding suggests otherwise; or it may do the opposite, claiming it has rejected an 
innovation, when its result seems to embrace the concept.  Finally, in a few instances a state 
has adopted an innovation, then later rejected it (as where a statute effectively reverses an 
earlier court decision).  In Colorado, for example, the legislature overturned the state 
supreme court’s decision in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314–15 (Colo. 
1971), which had abrogated the invitee/licensee/trespasser classifications that had determined 
the duties owed to entrants upon the defendant’s land.  An Act Concerning Civil Actions 
Brought by Persons Injured While on the Property of Another, ch. 109, § 1, 1986 Colo. Sess. 
Laws 683.  In this last sort of ambiguous “adoption” situation, due to this Article’s focus upon 
the spread of ideas, an “adoption” is recognized upon the initial adoption and the later 
backtracking is ignored. 
134.  See infra Chart III.  The data upon which this chart is based can be found in infra 
Appendix B. 
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CHART III: ADOPTIONS OVER TIME 
 
This chart reveals the significant differences in adoption patterns 
across innovations.  Strict products liability in tort represents the fastest-
diffusing innovation within the sampled set.  This doctrine took less than 
a quarter-century to attract its forty-five adherents.135  At the other 
extreme lies the attractive nuisance doctrine, which first appeared in 
protean form as the “turntable doctrine” in the 1800s136 and required 
more than a century to gain forty-five followers.  The other innovations 
lie between these poles.  The table below details how many years it took 
for each innovation to reach certain adoption milestones137: 
 
135.  A full recitation of these adoptions and their timing appears in Graham, supra note 
89, at 577–78, 78 n.161. 
136.  The turntable doctrine was described this way by a contemporary court (which 
rejected the concept): “That a railroad company which maintains on its own ground a 
turntable, which, from its attractiveness to the eyes of children, or from its being adapted by 
its construction to provide for children an attractive thing to play upon, is bound to take 
reasonable care that they be not injured thereby.”  Turess v. N.Y., S. & W.R. Co., 40 A. 614, 
614 (N.J. 1898); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 76 
(1955) (discussing the doctrine); Turn-Tables, 27 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 344–49 (Charles F. Williams ed., 1895) (discussing the rule and 
citing decisions that applied it).  For a memoir discussing the fun associated with turntable 
mischief, see R.L. DUFFUS, WILLIAMSTOWN BRANCH: IMPERSONAL MEMORIES OF A 
VERMONT BOYHOOD 99–100 (1958). 
137.  See infra Table I.  The data upon which this table is based can be found in infra 
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Attractive Nuisance 1858 30 44 72 
Strict Liability (Blasting 
Concussions)
1886 44 73 81 
Abrogation of Impact 
Rule
1890 20 76 86 
Right to Privacy 1903 39 54 63 
MacPherson Doctrine 1911 18 35 47 
Abrogation of 
Interspousal Immunity
1914 28 61 68 
Connecticut Rule 
(Premises Liability)
1921 43 52 N/A 
Bystander NIED 1933 47 52 58 




1949 14 29 56 
Revision or Abolition of 
Assumption of the Risk 
Defense
1959 13 17 25 
Strict Products Liability 
in Tort
1963 5 8 11 
“Mode of Operation” 1963 21 38 N/A 
Abrogation of Parental 
Immunity 
1963 8 14 20 
Economic Loss Rule 1965 17 22 28 
Learned Intermediary 
(Drugs and Devices)
1967 16 26 46 
Conflation of Invitee, 
Licensee, Trespasser 
Categories
1968 9 26 N/A 
Crashworthiness 1969 6 13 24 
Wrongful Discharge 1973 8 12 15 
Loss of a Chance 1978 10 23 N/A 
 
Appendix B. 
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The diffusion paths of the studied innovations can be disentangled to 
reveal three basic diffusion patterns.  In idealized form, these patterns 
look like this: 
 
CHART IV: BASIC ADOPTION CURVES 
 
Each trajectory tells a different story.  Curve A suggests a doctrinal 
invention that was quickly and widely accepted: an unqualified success.  
Curve B follows the “classic” s-curve model for the diffusion of 
innovations: slow acceptance at first, then a quickened pace as the 
concept reached and built upon a critical mass of adherents, and finally 
a leveling off as laggards either came into the fold, or did not.  Finally, 
Line C depicts a doctrine that slowly, but steadily, gained broad 
acceptance.138  The text below will discuss each of these patterns, and the 
innovations they pertain to, in more detail. 
1. Rapid Diffusion 
The first of these diffusion patterns (typified by Curve A as depicted 
in Chart IV) describes a sequence in which an innovation quickly 
attracts a large coterie of adherents.  Among the studied common-law 
innovations, this pattern describes the diffusion trajectories of strict 
products liability in tort, the “crashworthiness” doctrine in automobile 
products-liability cases, the tort of wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy, the abolition or modification of the assumption of the risk 
defense, and the abolition of parental immunity for negligence in cases 
 
138.  Of course these patterns only depict the diffusion of successful innovations.  
Different patterns would appear if one also included unsuccessful innovations in the studied 
set. 
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involving motor vehicle accidents.139  Each of these innovations collected 
at least twenty adopters within twenty years of its first adoption by a 
state supreme court.140 
Even granting a significant degree of contingency within the 
diffusion process, each of these innovations also benefitted from 
circumstances and characteristics that predictably promoted its diffusion 
prospects.  Among their beneficial qualities, all of these innovations 
admitted to numerous adoption opportunities.  Sometimes this 
frequency owed to a close connection to commonly occurring events or 
accidents (such as car crashes) widely appreciated as providing grounds 
for a tort lawsuit.141  Other quickly adopted doctrinal innovations cost 
little to pursue, promised substantial rewards, or both.142  For example, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, which was not included within the studied set of 
innovations, also exhibited a rapid diffusion pattern.143  One possible 
reason why many states quickly adopted the Restatement’s approach 
involves the overlap between this tort (as styled by the Restatement) 
and other causes of action.144  Because an intentional infliction of 
 
139.  See supra Table I. 
140.  See supra Table I.  This pattern is commonly found with the spread of successful 
statutory reforms with a bearing on tort law, such as workers’ compensation laws, PRICE V. 
FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 103–04 tbl.4.3 (2000) (relating the enactment of 
workers’ compensation statutes by every state between 1910 and 1948); “recreational use 
statutes” that limit the liability of landowners who make their property available for 
recreational uses, Stuart J. Ford, Comment, Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute: Towards 
Sharpening the Picture at the Edges, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 491, 498, 498–99 nn.24–26 (describing 
the adoption of recreational use statutes in all fifty states between 1953 and the 1980s); and 
automobile “guest statutes” that denied recovery to the non-paying “guests” of a negligent 
automobile driver, Stanley W. Widger, Jr., Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest 
Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 659 (1974) (observing that these statutes were enacted in 
more than half of the states between 1927 and 1939).  See also BOUSHEY, supra note 39, at 55 
(describing the adoption trajectories of “successful” policy innovations that diffused through 
legislatures, as opposed to courts). 
141.  See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 88, at 121–23. 
142.  See Graham, supra note 83, at 388 (noting that some torts “incorporate procedural 
or substantive hurdles that make recovery almost impossible” and that litigants “turn their 
backs on claims that produce inadequate paydays”). 
143.  More than thirty states adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ formulation of 
this tort between 1965 and 1984.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (discussing 
this trend). 
144.  Russell Fraker, Refomulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort 
of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 996–1000 (2008) (discussing the overlaps between intentional 
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emotional distress claim often arises out of facts that also generate other 
viable tort claims, it can be relatively cheap to “tack on” this cause of 
action to a tort lawsuit that would have been filed regardless.145  This 
cost-effectiveness likely has increased the frequency with which this 
innovation has been alleged by plaintiffs and has appeared before courts 
of precedent.146 
Fast-diffusing innovations also have tended to have good timing.  
Some capitalized upon the 1960–1980 window in which state supreme 
courts were particularly engaged with the reconstruction of tort 
doctrine.147  Other innovations within this class represented important 
second-order responses to these changes.148  For example, the adoption 
of comparative negligence by many states in the 1960s and the 1970s149 
necessitated the widespread reconceptualization of the assumption of 
the risk defense—a development that, as reflected on the chart below, 












infliction of emotion distress and other torts). 
145.  See Graham, supra note 83, at 388–89 (developing this argument). 
146.  Cf. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic 
Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 195–207 (2010) (discussing the problems associated with the 
integration of new torts into the ambient law and arguing that subtle integration issues loom 
especially large with “parasitic” torts that stand in the shadows of other claims). 
147.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 603. 
148.  See, e.g., Graham, supra note 89, at 579; Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated 
Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 
S.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002). 
149.  See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
§§ 1.04–1.05 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the adoption of comparative negligence regimes by 
numerous states through statutes and court decisions during this span).  The comparative 
negligence data within the chart in the accompanying text draws from the Schwartz text. 
150.  See infra Chart V.  The data upon which this table is based appear in infra 
Appendix B. 
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CHART V: ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
SCHEMES AND ABOLITION OR MODIFICATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF 
THE RISK DEFENSE 
 
With some of these innovations, several favorable circumstances 
aligned to promote rapid diffusion.  Strict products liability in tort offers 
an example.  This innovation benefitted from a lengthy incubation 
period between its conception in the early 1940s151 and its first adoption 
by a court in 1963.152  To borrow terminology from Diffusion of 
Innovations, during this period the ongoing liberalization of res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine in products cases and the erosion of the privity bar as 
it applied to warranty and negligence claims enhanced the 
“compatibility” of strict products liability in tort with existing law.153  
Meanwhile, William Prosser, Fleming James, and other academics acted 
as “change agents” throughout this era, using their scholarship to whet 
judges’ appetites for doctrinal reform.154  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts served as an effective “communications channel” for Prosser’s 
efforts.155  Prosser used his pulpit as the reporter for the products-
 
151.  See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442–43 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (advocating a strict-liability approach in products cases); PROSSER, 
supra note 121, § 83 (same). 
152.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
153.  See Graham, supra note 89, at 568–79 (discussing these trends); see also Schwartz, 
supra note 6, at 641–42. 
154.  See generally Priest, supra note 83 (discussing the role that academics played in the 
development of the intellectual underpinnings for strict products liability in tort). 
155.  See id. at 512–18. 
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liability portion of this Restatement to compose a coherent set of strict-
liability principles to govern these actions.156  These rules took shape in a 
series of high-profile drafts that incrementally expanded the scope of 
tort liability as applied to products cases.157  As ultimately promulgated 
within Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, these 
provisions seemed to resolve the key practical problems that had been 
associated with the application of negligence and warranty law in 
lawsuits concerning defective products.158  Meanwhile, by the mid-1960s, 
the notion of strict liability to the consumer dovetailed neatly with 
enhanced claim consciousness among prospective plaintiffs,159 improved 
organization of the plaintiff’s bar,160 and an activist mindset prevalent 
among some state-court judges.161  In other words, all of the relevant 
parties were relatively innovation prone. 
As for the “relative advantage” of strict products liability, the 
perceived gains depended upon the viewer.  As mentioned above, 
judges saw in strict products liability a possible solution to some of the 
nagging problems associated with the application of negligence and 
warranty law to the recurring case types of the 1950s and 1960s.162  
Judges also may have regarded adoption of a “pure” tort theory of strict 
products liability as signaling their participation in a common project 
involving the modernization of tort doctrine.163  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
meanwhile, appreciated the relatively low cost/high reward nature of the 
incremental products-liability tort claim.  A claim alleging strict liability 
 
156.  See Graham, supra note 89, at 577–78. 
157.  See id. at 577–79.  The history of strict products liability in tort hints that some 
rapid adoption patterns may be slightly modified versions of the s-curve diffusion sequence 
that will be discussed next.  With strict products liability, two decades of discourse in the 
academic literature may have fulfilled the same “testing” or refinement purpose that other 
innovations have realized through adoption by a handful of pioneering states.  In other 
instances, similar vetting can occur upon early adoption by a court not captured on the charts 
above, such as a lower state appellate court.  The tort of wrongful discharge, for example, was 
first recognized by a California District Court of Appeal in 1959, Petermann v. Local 396, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), fourteen years 
before its first adoption by a state supreme court.  Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 
N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). 
158.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Graham, 
supra note 89, at 577. 
159.  Graham, supra note 89, at 585–92. 
160.  Id. at 593–600. 
161.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 619. 
162.  Graham, supra note 89, at 600–13. 
163.  Priest, supra note 154, at 519; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 619, 641–42. 
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in tort could be added to an already viable warranty or negligence 
lawsuit, and thereby allow claimants to bring an additional defendant or 
defendants into the case, or otherwise enhance a plaintiff’s odds of 
success.164  For their part, defendants and their counsel were not 
necessarily enthusiastic about this development in the law but, by the 
early 1960s, may have regarded some doctrinal change as inevitable.165  
The confluence of these attitudes, attributes, and circumstances meant 
that even though it took some time for any state to take the initial leap 
and adopt strict products liability in tort, once the California Supreme 
Court became the first state to do so,166 a tidal wave of adoptions soon 
followed.167 
2. S-curve Diffusion 
A second recurring diffusion pattern with tort innovations (as 
depicted by Curve B in Chart IV) resembles the pattern commonly 
associated with the spread of other types of innovations, from hybrid 
corn168 to cell phones.169  With this pattern, a slow initial diffusion rate 
picks up momentum once an innovation reaches a “critical mass” of 
adopters.170  At that point, the adoption rate surges.171 After a period of 
rapid diffusion, the pace of adoption tapers off, until only laggards and 
holdouts remain.172  Within the studied cohort of innovations, this 
pattern describes the diffusion of “bystander” claims for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; strict liability for damage associated with 
concussions caused by blasting operations; recognition of a cause of 
action for infringement of a “right to privacy;” and a specific type of 
privacy claim, a “false light” cause of action.173  This pattern also 
describes other innovations not included within the charted set of 
 
164.  Graham, supra note 89, at 598–99. 
165.  See generally id. at 593–600. 
166.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
167.  Graham, supra note 89, at 577–79 (discussing the timing of states’ adoption of strict 
products liability in tort). 
168.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 273. 
169.  See Global ICT Developments, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/R3VR-49KP] 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (depicting the growth in mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions 
between 2001 and 2014). 
170.  ROGERS, supra note 24, at 343–52. 
171.  Id. at 343–44. 
172.  Id. at 272–73. 
173.  See supra Table I. 
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innovations, such as the partial or wholesale rejection of charitable174 
and governmental175 immunities and application of the “discovery rule” 
to medical malpractice claims.176  
The diffusion of tort innovations can start slowly and then pick up 
pace for various reasons.  Among them, the legal cultures or social, 
political, or economic circumstances of certain states may make them 
 
174.  A few states either reined in, or refused to recognize, charitable immunity in the 
early 1900s.  Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 68 So. 4 (Ala. 1915); St. Mary’s Acad. v. 
Solomon, 238 P. 22 (Colo. 1925); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minn. 
Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. Am., 175 N.W. 699 (Minn. 1920).  A handful of 
states followed in the 1930s and 1940s.  E.g., Sheehan v. N. Country Cmty. Hosp., 7 N.E.2d 28 
(N.Y. 1937); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 95 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. 1936).  A surge of similar 
decisions then appeared in the 1950s and 1960s.  See Charles Glidden Johnson, Charitable 
Immunity: A Diminishing Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 110 nn.4–5 (1966) (listing 
jurisdictions that had refused to recognize, or had limited or eliminated charitable immunity).  
It was only in this last period that a large cluster of states that had previously recognized 
charitable immunity decided to abolish the doctrine.  Id. at 110 n.5. 
175.  This subject was rejected as a subject of close study because of the existence of 
numerous exceptions to the pre-existing rule of immunity (such as the so-called “propriety 
function” exception) and significant variation across the states regarding the scope of 
immunity that remains intact today.  Even with these caveats, one can safely regard New 
York as a pioneer in the limitation of governmental immunity.  There, a 1945 decision by the 
Court of Appeals construed a 1929 statute as limiting local governments’ immunity from tort 
liability.  Bernardine v. City of New York, 62 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1945).  A few states limited 
governmental immunity in the 1950s.  See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 
(Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).  But substantial 
movement on this front did not commence until 1961 when the supreme courts in California 
and Michigan took a similar step.  Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961); 
Williams v. City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1961).  Over the next two decades, the 
supreme courts of more than twenty other states would pare back municipal immunity.  
Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68 (Ala. 1975); Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 
(Alaska 1962); Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n., 381 P.2d 107 (Ariz. 1963); Parish v. Pitts, 
429 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968); Smith v. State, 473 P.2d 937 (Idaho 1970); Klepinger v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 239 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 
(Ky. 1964); Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976); Whitney v. City of Worcester, 
366 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1977); Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 
1962); Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Brown v. City of Omaha, 
160 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1968); Walsh v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 419 P.2d 774 (Nev. 1966); Merrill 
v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378 (N.H. 1974); Hicks v. State, 544 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1975); 
Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974); Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 
A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973); Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896 (R.I. 1970); Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 
390 P.2d 2 (Wash. 1964); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975); Holytz v. 
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, (1962); Oroz v. Bd. of Cty Comm’rs, 575 
P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978).  Other courts have since joined this trend, e.g., McCall v. Batson, 329 
S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985), while others have declined to do so, e.g., Hillerby v. Town of 
Colchester, 706 A.2d 446 (Vt. 1997). 
176.  See, e.g., Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943) (rejecting the discovery 
rule in practice). 
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particularly susceptible to an innovation.177  This small cadre of states 
may adopt the innovation well before others do.178  S-curve patterns also 
may result from the impact that early adoptions can have on an 
innovation’s prospects.179  An initially rough-hewn doctrinal innovation 
may require the refinement that comes from vetting by multiple courts 
before it takes a form acceptable to a larger cohort of jurists.180  Or a tort 
innovation may be too subtle to attract much attention until adopted by 
a leading court, or a substantial number of courts, at which point both 
litigants and courts may come to appreciate the innovation’s existence 
and potential benefits.181  A critical mass of adoptions also may kindle 
academic interest in a topic, a development that, on occasion, may 
produce scholarship that serves to clarify and publicize an innovation.182 
Comparative negligence offers another example of an innovation 
with an s-curve diffusion pattern, albeit one where adoptions occurred 
mostly through state legislatures.  Georgia enacted the first comparative 
negligence law in 1860.183  This limited statute, applicable on its face only 
to claims brought against railroads,184 was engrossed over time by the 
 
177.  See Canon & Baum, supra note 45, at 980–81. 
178.  See Appendix B. 
179.  See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 283 (observing that “[e]arly adopters help trigger 
the critical mass when they adopt an innovation”). 
180.  This refinement may take the form of modifications that strip an innovation of its 
most objectionable features, that add new, ancillary innovations that temper the innovation’s 
impact, or something else.  For example, the “Connecticut Rule” has been blunted somewhat 
by recognition of the “storm in progress” doctrine, which provides a safe harbor to the 
Connecticut Rule’s reasonable-care standard for the removal of natural accumulations of 
snow and ice by allowing landowners to postpone cleanup efforts for so long as a storm is 
ongoing.  See Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 717 (R.I. 1999); Connor 
Fallon, Note, Premises Liability–Breaking News: It Snows in Massachusetts, and Snow is 
Slippery.  Why Massachusetts Should Adopt the Storm in Progress Rule, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 579 (2012). 
181.  See Schmeling, supra note 63, at 170 (observing that “as more courts adopt an 
innovation, attorneys become more likely to raise it in additional courts, and those courts 
become more likely to adopt the innovation”). 
182.  See id. at 132 (observing that law review articles “may provide an important force 
in the diffusion of new legal doctrines to both attorneys and judges”).  William Prosser’s 
development of a taxonomy for the privacy torts represents perhaps the best example of a law 
professor imposing order on an unruly mass of judicial decisions, and thereby facilitating the 
adoption of newly clarified doctrines.  See generally Prosser, supra note 102. 
183.  SCHWARTZ & ROWE, supra note 149, § 1.04[b][1]; see also Ernest A. Turk, 
Comparative Negligence on the March (pt. 2), 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 304, 327–28 (1950) 
(describing the murky history of this law). 
184.  As enacted, the law provided: 
No person shall recover damage from a railroad company, for injury to himself or 
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Georgia Supreme Court so as to create a general comparative 
negligence regime within that state.185  Mississippi was the next state to 
adopt comparative negligence, in 1910.186  As of 1968, only five other 
jurisdictions had followed these states’ lead.187  The shift to comparative 
negligence represented a major doctrinal leap, which many states were 
understandably hesitant to take.  Over the next two decades, however, 
more than three dozen other states switched from contributory 
negligence to some sort of comparative negligence system.188  This 
“take-off” occurred at a point at which earlier adoptions had 
“auditioned” the innovation sufficiently for other, more cautious courts 
and legislatures to better assess its benefits and drawbacks, allowing 
them to learn from the experiences of early adopters.189  Courts and 
legislators also could weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different types of comparative negligence frameworks that had 
emerged.190  Furthermore, realization of a critical mass of adherents 
meant that individual states could draw from a collective pool of 
caselaw, produced by the courts of many states, addressing the 
numerous novel legal issues implicated by comparative negligence 
schemes.191  The existence of this body of law reduced the disruption 
attendant in the switch to comparative fault and thereby muffled one 
argument for retaining the status quo. 
In other instances, an s-curve diffusion pattern has appeared when 
an innovation languished in obscurity until it was adopted by a leading 
court, or a large enough number of courts so as to raise its profile and 
trigger a spurt of additional adoptions. The s-curve pattern associated 
 
his property, where the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own 
negligence.  If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault, the 
former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion 
to the amount of default attributable to him. 
H. CLARK ET AL., THE CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA § 2979 (1861).  Though published 
in 1861, this code was approved by the legislature in 1860, to take effect in 1862.  Id. at iv. 
185.  SCHWARTZ & ROWE, supra note 149, § 1.05[a][2]. 
186.  Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, § 1, 1910 Miss. Laws 125, 125. 
187.  These states were Wisconsin, South Dakota, Nebraska, Arkansas, and Maine.  
SCHWARTZ & ROWE, supra note 149, § 1.04[b][3]–[4], [6]. 
188.  Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption 
of Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007). 
189.  See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 283. 
190.  See Best, supra note 189, at 11–15 (referencing the differences that existed across 
the comparative negligence regimes established by early adopters). 
191.  See id. at 6–7, 7 n.35. 
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with diffusion of the “discovery rule” for the accrual of a medical-
malpractice cause of action, for example, began with the subtle initial 
unveiling of this innovation.  This rule originated in 1917, when the 
Maryland Court of Appeals observed that a patient’s cause of action for 
malpractice would accrue only when the patient knew, or reasonably 
should have known, of his or her injury.192  But the court’s decision in 
Hahn v. Claybrook discussed this point only in passing terms, and held 
that the plaintiff’s claim failed in any event.193  Unsurprisingly, other 
courts took little notice of such an offhand “adoption,” which very well 
might have slipped off a thoughtless clerk’s pen.194  There also existed 
several other approaches to the statute of limitations problems 
addressed by the discovery method, a crowd that further diminished this 
innovation’s profile.195  As a result, as late as 1960, only two other state 
supreme courts had expressly adopted variants of this rule.196  
In the 1960s, however, the discovery approach became the subject of 
an apparent “trend,” with several states adopting this principle in rapid 
succession.  A 1961 decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
specifically and conspicuously adopted an accrual date for medical 
malpractice claims tied to the patient-plaintiff’s actual or constructive 
discovery of his or her harm and its cause.197  A barrage of decisions 
from other state high courts soon followed.  Nebraska198 and 
Oklahoma199 adopted a discovery-based approach in 1962 (though the 
 
192.  Hahn v. Claybrook, 100 A. 83 (Md. 1917). 
193.  Id. at 86. 
194.  Only in 1957 did an enterprising law student read Hahn carefully and identify it as 
the first decision to apply a discovery-based approach to the accrual issues that often arose in 
malpractice cases.  John E. Stanfield, Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions for 
Undiscovered Malpractice, 12 WYO. L.J. 30, 34 (1957). 
195.  Other jurisdictions favored alternative approaches to accrual problems when they 
arose in medical-malpractice cases (with cases implicating this problem often involving the 
deposit of a foreign object in the plaintiff during or after surgery), such as reliance upon the 
continuing violations doctrine or the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.  E.g., Morrison v. 
Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 595–96 (Ariz. 1948); Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865, 870 (Ohio 1902).  In 
yet another approach, a few courts allowed plaintiffs to allege malpractice as a breach of 
contract and thereby avail themselves of a longer limitations period.  E.g., Sellers v. Noah, 95 
So. 167 (Ala. 1923). 
196.  Huysman v. Kirsch, 57 P.2d 908, 910–13 (Cal. 1936); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).  In 1943, the Missouri Supreme Court suggested that the discovery rule 
was consistent with its state’s statute of limitations but more fulsomely endorsed the 
continuing, wrong approach.  See Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943). 
197.  Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 285–86 (N.J. 1961). 
198.  Spath v. Morrow, 115 N.W. 2d 581 (Neb. 1962). 
199.  Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962). 
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Oklahoma decision also sounded in fraudulent concealment); Kansas,200 
Louisiana,201 and Michigan202 did the same in 1963.  The last of these 
decisions also became the first to describe the plaintiff’s-knowledge 
approach as the “discovery rule.”203  In 1964, the Idaho Supreme Court 
conducted a thorough survey of all the approaches taken to the statute 
of limitations issue in medical malpractice cases, and chose to adopt the 
discovery rule.204  In 1965, the West Virginia Supreme Court would 
write, “We believe that the ‘discovery rule’ . . . represents a distinct and 
marked trend in recent decisions of appellate courts throughout the 
nation.”205  Between 1966 and 1969, this increasingly palpable “trend” 
would attract another ten states.206 
The rapid diffusion of the discovery rule upon “take-off” hinged on 
the existence of a substantial volume of malpractice cases that presented 
this issue for review, and the availability and willingness of state high 
courts to entertain this issue.  As detailed below, these circumstances 
are not always present with tort innovations, leading to slower and 
steadier diffusion patterns. 
3. Steady Diffusion 
A third pattern (Curve C in Chart IV) reflects diffusion at a steadier 
rate than that found in the other sequences.  This pattern may result 
from persistently rare adoption opportunities, evenly pitched arguments 
for and against an innovation, or other circumstances that prevent a 
burst of adoptions within a short window.207 
 
200.  Act of Feb. 27, 1963, ch. 303, § 60-513, 1963 Kan. Sess. Laws 601, 695. 
201.  Phelps v. Donaldson, 150 So. 2d 35 (La. 1963). 
202.  Johnson v. Caldwell, 123 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1963). 
203.  Id. at 791. 
204.  Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 389 P.2d 224, 227–32 (Id. 1964). 
205.  Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156, 162 (W. Va. 1965). 
206.  Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 433 P.2d 220 
(Haw. 1967); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa 1967); Flanagan v. Mount Eden 
Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1969); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); 
Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Or. 1966); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 745 (R.I. 1968); 
Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968); 
Fraser v. Weeks, 456 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1969). 
207.  Relatively steady diffusion patterns also appear with innovations not included 
within the studied set.  For example, between 1964 and 2005, more than twenty states rejected 
one or more of the exceptions, as found at the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413–
416, 427 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) to the general rule that the hirer of an independent contractor 
is not vicariously liable to an employee of the contractor.  See Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 
P.2d 474 (Alaska 1976); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op., 606 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1980); 
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Some innovations simply do not generate enough adoption 
opportunities to allow for rapid diffusion across the states.  One 
innovation that may have relatively low “frequency” in this respect is 
the “loss of a chance” theory for recovery for medical malpractice.208  
This theory recognizes a lost chance of a better patient outcome as a 
cognizable injury, even if the physical harm complained of by the 
plaintiff more likely than not would have occurred even without the 
doctor’s negligence.209  About twenty state supreme courts have adopted 
“loss of a chance,”210 while approximately half as many have rejected 
it.211  In other words, more than thirty-five years after its first adoption 
in 1978,212 almost half of all state high courts have yet to decide whether 
 
Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1993); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 
2d 293 (Fla. 1964); Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 744 P.2d 102 (Idaho 1987); Dillard v. 
Strecker, 877 P.2d 371 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 
(Ky. 1973); Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 505 A.2d 494 (Md. 1986); Vertentes v. Barletta 
Co., 466 N.E.2d 500 (Mass. 1984); Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 
1981); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991); Wells v. 
Stanley J. Thill & Assocs., Inc., 452 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1969); Anderson v. Nashua Corp., 519 
N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1994); Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Rinehart, 665 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1983); 
Whitaker v. Norman, 551 N.E.2d 579 (N.Y. 1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 
N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994); Curless v. Lathrop Co., 583 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); 
Wilson v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 448 P.2d 562 (Ore. 1968); Metzger v. J.F. Brunken & Son, 
Inc., 169 N.W.2d 261 (S.D. 1969); Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999); Tauscher v. 
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426 (Wash. 1981); Peneschi v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 
295 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1982); Wagner v. Cont’l Cas. Co., Wis.2d 379, 421 N.W.2d 835, 143 
(1988); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986); see also PSI Energy, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. 2005) (following this trend); DeShambo v. Nielsen, 684 N.W.2d 
332 (Mich. 2004) (same).  Likewise, since the early 1970s, more than twenty state supreme 
courts have recognized a cause of action against hospitals for “negligent credentialing.”  
Brookins v. Mote, 292 P.3d 347, 361 n.6 (Mont. 2012). 
208.  See Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients 
Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105 (1990); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey 
Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 413 (1995). 
209.  Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828–35 (Mass. 2008) (discussing this 
theory of recovery). 
210.  See infra Appendix B. 
211.  Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc. 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Manning v. 
Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185 (Idaho 1992); Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 
580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990); Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1987); Pillsbury-Flood v. 
Portsmouth Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126 (N.H. 1986); Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371 (S.C. 1995); 
Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 
S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993); Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843 (Vt. 2003). 
212.  Some authors have identified the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), as the wellspring of 
the loss-of-a-chance doctrine.  In that medical malpractice case brought under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, the court observed: 
 
 114 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:75 
they accept the doctrine, including the courts of last resort in California 
and New York.213 
The diffusion of “loss of a chance” has not been unusually slow for a 
common-law innovation, but it has been much slower than, for example, 
the diffusion of strict products liability in tort.214  And it seems unlikely 
that loss of a chance could ever trigger a series of rapid-fire adoptions in 
the same manner that strict products liability in tort once did.  This 
difference owes in part to a relative lack of opportunities for adoption of 
the loss of a chance theory, a circumstance that may be associated with 
the subtlety of the lost-chance claim in the eyes of would-be plaintiffs.  
Given that this doctrine’s utility lies in situations where the plaintiff’s or 
decedent’s tangible injury already was more probably than not going to 
occur even without any negligence on the part of the defendant-
physician,215 it seems likely that some potential plaintiffs, already 
conditioned to accept a bad outcome, overlook the possibility of this 
sort of claim.216  Other facts also limit this issue’s “observability.”  A 
loss-of-a-chance claim requires fairly precise probabilistic estimates of 
survival (or of a more positive result) with and without the doctor’s 
negligence.217  These figures may not exist in a given case, or they may 
be available but be consistent with a “normal” malpractice claim that 
 
When a defendant’s negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a 
person’s chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to raise 
conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility 
of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant 
has destroyed it, he is answerable. 
Id. at 632.  But it took a while for this idea to pique the interest of very many courts.  The first 
significant cluster of courts to adopt the doctrine did so in the early 1980s, shortly after the 
Yale Law Journal published an article on the topic.  Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future 
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
213.  See Bromme v. Pavitt, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 618 (Cal. App. 1992) (“California does 
not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death based on medical negligence where the 
decedent did not have a greater than 50 percent chance of survival had the defendant 
properly diagnosed and treated the condition.” (footnote omitted)); Wild v. Catholic Health 
System, 991 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 2013) (regarding a party as having forfeited the 
opportunity to have the court consider this issue). 
214.  See supra Table I. 
215.  Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 829–30 (Mass. 2008). 
216.  For discussions about patients’ ability to recognize and act upon malpractice 
claims, see May & Stengel, supra note 208; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 208. 
217.  See Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213–14 (Md. 1990) (describing 
the evidence associated with “loss of a chance” claims). 
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plaintiffs regard as preferable to pursuit of a more contentious and 
uncertain theory. 
With other innovations, slow diffusion may represent the result of a 
wait-and-see attitude among courts.  Unlike “loss of a chance,” there 
has been no shortage of premises-liability claims that state supreme 
courts could use as vehicles to jettison the tripartite 
invitee/licensee/trespasser framework for ascertaining the duties owed 
to entrants.218  Yet this innovation also has had a relatively slow and 
steady diffusion rate.219  The California Supreme Court was the first 
state high court to wholly reject these classifications in its 1968 decision 
in Rowland v. Christian.220  Most courts in other states responded 
cautiously to the Rowland decision.221  The categorization of entrants 
was well-established in the law, and the tiered standards of care it 
prescribed for possessors of land resonated with many judges.222  And 
so, only about half of the states have adopted either the Rowland 
approach, or even a compromise rule that eradicates only the distinction 
between invitees and licensees (a result achieved by elevating the duty 
 
218.  See CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JURY 
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf [http://perma.cc/B22X-YTXX] (showing that 
premises-liability cases were the second most common type of tort case disposed of across a 
75-county set between July 1991 and June 1992). 
219.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 reporter’s note (AM. LAW. INST. 2012) (relating state-by-state 
adoption dates for what the Restatement describes as the “unitary” and “modified” 
approaches to premises liability). 
220.  443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).  Rowland was not the first authority to reject at least 
portions of the invitee/licensee/trespasser classification.  As far back as 1957, a decision by the 
Louisiana Court of Appeals repudiated the distinction between invitees and licensees—albeit 
in dicta.  Alexander v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 734 (La. Ct. 
App. 1957).  Later, a 1959 United States Supreme Court decision refused to engraft these 
classifications upon admiralty law, Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 
U.S. 625, 631 (1959), and a 1963 Connecticut statute eliminated the distinction that had been 
drawn between social invitees and business invitees, An Act Concerning Duty of Reasonable 
Care to Social Invitee, Pub. Act No. 575, 1963 Conn. Pub. Acts 812. 
221.  See, e.g., Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899, 907 (N.D. 1972) (declining 
to endorse the Rowland approach “until additional time has elapsed in which experience can 
be gained”).  Other courts flatly rejected Rowland.  Mooney v. Robinson, 471 P.2d 63, 65 
(Idaho 1970); Astleford v. Milner Enters., Inc., 233 So. 2d 524, 525–26 (Miss. 1970). 
222.  E.g., Mooney, 471 P.2d at 65; Astleford, 233 So. 2d at 525–26; Carter v. Kinney, 896 
S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. 1995) (“We are not persuaded that the licensee/invitee distinction no 
longer serves.”). 
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owed to the latter to one of reasonable care).223  No “take-off” in 
adoptions has ever emerged.224 
Judicial circumspection on this subject has been facilitated by the 
exceptions that most states recognize to the invitee, licensee, and 
trespasser classifications.225  By invoking an exception, a hesitant court 
can accommodate its sympathy to a plaintiff in a particular premises-
liability case, while ducking the broader issue of whether to retain or 
reject the classifications—safe in the knowledge that cases that turn on 
these distinctions are common enough that additional opportunities to 
revisit the issue certainly will appear in the future.226 This escape valve 
has drawn out the adoption process in some states.  The Iowa Supreme 
Court, for example, avoided the Rowland issue in at least four separate 
cases before it ultimately abolished the invitee-licensee distinction, and 
only that distinction, in 2009.227  In a 1971 case, the issue was not 
properly presented for review, although one justice still would have 
considered it;228 in a 1972 case, the judges found that the child-trespasser 
exception applied to the case before them, obviating the classification 
issue;229 in a 1977 case, the court dodged the issue as not having been 
raised appropriately;230 and in 1998, a plurality would have eliminated all 
three classifications, replacing them with a general duty of reasonable 
care,231 but the court could not muster a majority on the issue.232 
Ultimately, in eradicating the divide between invitees and licensees, the 
Iowa court seized on a refinement that other courts had made to the 
Rowland approach.233  So modified, this innovation continues to slowly 
attract adherents, the most recent being Vermont in 2014.234 
 
223.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 51 reporter’s note (AM. LAW. INST. 2012). 
224.  See id. 
225.  See DOBBS, supra note 104, at §§ 232, 236 (discussing these exceptions). 
226.  E.g., Gildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ohio 1969) (noting the issue but 
remaining “convinced that a just measure of judicial restraint requires that this question be 
deferred to a later day and to another case”). 
227.  Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635, 641–43 (Iowa 2009). 
228.  Ives v. Swift & Co., 183 N.W.2d 172, 178–79 (Iowa 1971) (Becker, J., concurring). 
229.  Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 135–36 (Iowa 1972). 
230.  Champlin v. Walker, 249 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 1977). 
231.  Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 1998). 
232.  See id. at 607 (Ternus, J., concurring in the result). 
233.  The first state supreme court to adopt this modified form of the Rowland 
innovation was Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972). 
234.  Demag v. Better Power Equip., Inc., 102 A.3d 1101, 1110 (Vt. 2014). 
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Finally, an absence of a sustained surge in adoptions across the states 
may owe to the fact that with some innovations, express adoption by all 
states may be unnecessary to create what is recognized as a nationwide 
rule.  When an innovation overturns an existing rule, for example, the 
number of potential adopters may be no greater than the headcount of 
jurisdictions that formerly subscribed to the superseded principle.235  
Furthermore, when an apparent consensus on behalf of an innovation 
has emerged through an unbroken stretch of adoptions across several 
states, the tail end of a diffusion pattern can lag as litigants in other 
jurisdictions incorporate the rule into courtroom practice even without 
an express endorsement of the principle by their local appellate courts.  
For example, the MacPherson doctrine, which drastically limited the 
need for privity of contract as a prerequisite for a negligence claim in a 
products-liability action, was widely understood to represent a universal 
rule well before several states expressly adopted it.236  Once this 
 
235.  This sort of dynamic appeared with judicial rejection of the old rule that no remedy 
lay for injuries suffered by a fetus in utero.  Once the twenty or so states that had adopted this 
rule backtracked from it, it was clear that no other state court, for which the issue was one of 
first impression, would somehow turn back the clock and embrace a principle roundly 
repudiated elsewhere.  Huskey v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1972); Tucker v. Howard L. 
Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1951); Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 
1953); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); 
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951); Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 
(Mass. 1960); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949); Steggall v. Morris, 258 
S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957); Smith v. Brennan, 
157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960); Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 
291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 
A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 
1962); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Seattle-First Nat’l 
Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 
Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107, 110 (1967).  The decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 
(D.D.C. 1946) is generally recognized as the leading case in this reform movement, but two 
state appellate courts previously had recognized a right to recover for injuries suffered in 
utero.  Scott v McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 
352 (La. Ct. App. 1923).  The Cooper decision, oddly enough, was not published until 1949, a 
circumstance that obviously limited the visibility of its holding. 
236.  Compare William L. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (stating that the MacPherson decision had “swept the 
country” and “with the barely possible but highly unlikely exceptions of Mississippi and 
Virginia, no American jurisdiction now refuses to accept it” (footnotes omitted)), with R.D. 
Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Negligence Action Against 
Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 74 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1205–26 
(1960) (surveying the law of the fifty states as to the MacPherson rule, finding that multiple 
states (e.g., Colorado and South Dakota) had no decisions squarely on point by state 
appellate courts, and omitting certain states altogether (e.g., Alaska, North Dakota, and 
Wyoming), apparently due to a lack of pertinent decisions). 
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principle had diffused fairly broadly, litigants in laggard states no doubt 
assumed that their own courts would come into the fold when they had 
the opportunity to do so.  These parties may have incorporated this 
assumption into their litigating positions, with defendants in products-
liability actions conceding that a lack of privity of contract would not 
defeat the plaintiff’s negligence claims.237  These concessions tended to 
delay the explicit adoption of the MacPherson rule by late-coming states 
because the issue was not often presented by litigants.238  In fact, in some 
states the MacPherson rule ultimately was adopted only sub silentio by a 
court’s adoption of a broader, superseding innovation—strict products 
liability to the consumer.239 
4.  Other Patterns 
Another diffusion trajectory does not appear within the studied set, 
but also occurs from time to time.  A few innovations have a “tiered” 
diffusion pattern, which incorporates multiple surges in adoption rates.  
The abolition of the “heart balm” torts of alienation of affections, 
















237.  Cf. Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. 167 P.3d 1058, 1063 (Utah 2007) (noting the 
defendant’s concession regarding the applicability of the “crashworthiness” doctrine”). 
238.  See, e.g., id. 
239.  E.g., Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 109 (S.D. 1973) (adopting strict 
products liability in tort). 
240.  See infra Chart VI.  The data upon which this chart is based appear in infra 
Appendix B. 
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CHART VI: ABOLITION OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS, 
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION, AND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY 
 
The patterns in Chart VI bespeak two policy windows in which 
conditions aligned in favor of these torts’ abolition.  The first such 
movement coalesced in the 1930s.241  This campaign allied critics of these 
causes of action who saw the torts as shovels in the hands of greedy 
“gold diggers” (a perception fostered by several well-publicized cases)242 
with female legislators who regarded the torts as perpetuating the 
stereotype of women as helpless victims in romantic affairs.243  These 
activists secured the abolition of at least one of these torts in more than 
a dozen states through legislation enacted between 1935 through 1945.244  
Legislative interest in this topic soon waned, however, leading to a 
slower pace of diffusion through the mid-1960s.245  By the end of this 
 
241.  See Graham, supra note 83, at 412–16 (discussing the circumstances that led to the 
first campaign against these torts).  In that piece, these torts, together with the action for 
seduction, were referred to as “heart balm” torts.  E.g., id. at 406.  There appears to be a 
division of opinion as to whether “heartbalm” (one word) or “heart balm” (two words) 
represents the correct term to describe these torts.  Compare Nathan P. Feinsinger, 
Legislative Attack on “Heart Balm,” 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935), with Note, Avoidance of 
the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1952).  To indicate the 
author’s neutrality on this topic, this Article uses “heart balm.” 
242.  Graham, supra note 83, at 417. 
243.  Id. at 416–18. 
244.  Id. at 418–19, 419 n.382. 
245.  Id. at 419–22. 
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span, lawsuits alleging heart balm torts had become uncommon in the 
diminished set of jurisdictions that still recognized these claims.246 
The second, more recent push to abolish the heart balm torts has 
capitalized upon their increasing rarity and obscurity.  This second drive, 
more gradual and less headline-driven than the first, has condemned the 
torts as archaic relics of an earlier age in which wives represented their 
husbands’ property, divorces were difficult to obtain, a woman was 
spoiled by premarital sex, and you could indeed put a price tag on 
love.247  Upon these arguments, since the mid-1960s more than two 
dozen states have abolished the tort of alienation of affections, almost as 
many have eliminated criminal conversation, and about half as many 
have rid themselves of claims for breach of promise to marry.248  In other 
states, these torts (especially criminal conversation) are moribund 
without ever having been formally abolished.249  In these jurisdictions, 
litigants and lawyers either have forgotten about the heart balm torts, or 
anticipate that local judges will follow the broader trend toward 
abolition if given the opportunity and therefore decline to pursue 
seemingly dead-on-arrival causes of action.250 
5.  Conclusions: Interactive Aspects of the Diffusion Process 
The discussion above establishes a few points concerning the 
diffusion of doctrinal innovations in tort law.  First, “successful” 
innovations in this sphere diffuse along different trajectories.  Second, 
although the basic model for the diffusion of innovations cannot be 
transplanted wholesale into this context, various aspects of this 
framework nevertheless can provide a useful vocabulary in accounting 
for the contours of specific adoption sequences.  Third, it seems likely 
that the idiosyncrasies of the common-law process tend to inhibit, 
although they do not necessarily prevent, realization of the s-curve 
pattern often associated with the diffusion of other types of successful 
innovations, or the even steeper diffusion curve often associated with 
the diffusion of successful statutory policy innovations. 
The data also disclose some basic parameters for the diffusion of 
innovations in tort law.  For example, the fastest-diffusing common-law 
 
246.  Id. at 422–25. 
247.  Id. at 425–29. 
248.  Id. at 425–28. 
249.  Id. at 429. 
250.  Id. at 428–30. 
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innovation, strict products liability in tort, spread at a rate of 
approximately three states per year for a decade and a half before its 
diffusion tapered off.  Given the almost perfect combination of 
surrounding circumstances that facilitated the diffusion of this doctrine, 
this rate may represent a best-case scenario for the long-term diffusion 
of tort doctrines through the courts. 
Perhaps most interestingly, these diffusion patterns reveal certain 
dynamic qualities of common-law change, whereby early adoptions of 
tort innovations can influence the choices made by other potential 
adopters later in the diffusion process.  To collect and build upon 
observations made in the preceding text, early acceptances of an 
innovation may encourage emulation by later actors in a variety of ways.  
Among them, these adoptions may (1) reshape the innovation into a 
more attractive form;251 (2) create a pool of caselaw regarding the 
innovation from which multiple jurisdictions can draw; (3) reduce the 
available caselaw elaborating alternative approaches; (4) assure laggard 
courts that the innovation does not produce unwelcome or 
unanticipated consequences when put in practice;252 (5) raise the 
innovation’s profile among both litigants and courts;253 (6) enhance the 
reputational risks associated with rejecting an innovation, and decrease 
the analogous perils tied to acceptance (such as limiting the risk that 
 
251.  See Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. 
POL. ECON. 43 (2007) (developing the “Cardozo Theorem” for beneficial legal evolution 
through the refinement of a rule by biased judges). 
252.  See Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Ky. 2012) (observing, in the course of 
abandoning the “impact rule” for recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
“that there has been no noticeable flood of litigation in other jurisdictions that have adopted 
a similar rule”).  Similarly, in 1972 the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to abolish 
the distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers.  The court observed: 
[W]e are of the opinion that until additional time has elapsed in which experience 
can be gained in California, Hawaii, Colorado, and other states which may have 
abandoned the distinctions based upon the status of the entrant upon the land, we 
should not abandon those distinctions which in our state have been reasonably 
useful in the past. 
Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899, 907 (N.D. 1972).  Five years later, that court 
eliminated the distinctions between invitees and licensees but (following the emerging trend) 
retained the distinct trespasser classification.  O’Leary v. Coenan, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 
1977). 
253.  As one study of state supreme courts has observed, “the respectability that 
doctrinal changes gain through their acceptance by sister courts requires a state supreme 
court to hear the cases in which they are proposed and to give the changes serious 
consideration.”  TARR & PORTER, supra note 9, at 243. 
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members of an adopting court will be perceived as “judicial activists”);254 
and (7) increase the actual, as opposed to merely reputational, costs of 
holdout status.255 
Early adoptions also may create an “informational cascade” said to 
arise “when people with incomplete personal information on a 
particular matter base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of 
others.”256  Such a cascade is associated with “herding behavior” among 
courts, whereby later actors view the acceptance of innovations by peer 
courts as bespeaking information not otherwise apparent to them.  
Specifically, prior adoptions may be regarded by latecomers as 
 
254.  With “a reputational cascade,” “individuals do not subject themselves to social 
influences because others may be more knowledgeable.  Rather, the motivation is simply to 
earn social approval and avoid disapproval.”  Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685–86 (1999); see also Richard A. 
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13, 15 (1993) (“[P]restige is unquestionably an element of the judicial 
utility function,” and “a potentially significant element in the judicial utility function is 
reputation, both with other judges . . . and with the legal profession at large.”).  This dynamic 
would tend to draw courts toward an emerging consensus, for “a judge may fear that he is not 
as skilled as his [peers], and therefore may attempt to ‘hide’ within existing precedent, 
believing that if the policy it represents is eventually exposed as improvident, it is much better 
to fail within a group than to do so alone.”  Talley, supra note 12, at 128. 
255.  In Blankenship v. General Motors Corporation, for example, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court felt compelled to adopt the “crashworthiness” principle for automobile design 
because so many other jurisdictions already had done so: 
In light of the fact that all of our sister states have adopted a cause of action for lack 
of crashworthiness, General Motors is already collecting a product liability premium 
every time it sells a car anywhere in the world, including West Virginia.  West 
Virginians, then, are already paying the product liability insurance premium when 
they buy a General Motors car, so this Court would be both foolish and 
irresponsible if we held that while West Virginians must pay the premiums, West 
Virginians can’t collect the insurance after they’re injured. 
Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 784–85 (W. Va. 1991) (citation omitted); 
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1386–87 (2006) (discussing “spillover effects” associated with the adoption of rules 
by state courts). 
256.  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 254, at 685–86; see also Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A 
Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. 
ECON. 992, 992 (1992) (“An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, 
having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding 
individual without regard to his own information.”); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. 
Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999) (explaining herding behavior among peer courts); Sophie 
Harnay & Alain Marciano, Judicial Conformity Versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of 
Judicial Precedent, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 405 (2004); Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. 
Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 31 (1994). 
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increasing the odds that adoption represents the “correct” result.257  
While the precise influence of these cascades is debatable,258 the 
diffusion data reveal that it has been rare for a late-coming court to 
break from an emerging consensus regarding an issue of first 
impression.259  When the West Virginia Supreme Court became the first 
state high court to snub the “learned intermediary” doctrine in 2007,260 
for example, it felt compelled to downplay the number of past adopters, 
perhaps to make its decision seem at least slightly less aberrant.261 
Less often, a contrary dynamic also can appear whereby early 
adoptions repel or deter emulation.  The above analysis explains why 
adoption dynamics can cause the law of the fifty states to converge.262  It 
therefore may come as a surprise that most innovations claim persistent 
“holdouts”—jurisdictions that have refused to adopt an otherwise well-
accepted doctrinal change.  Even if one recognizes a “holdout” only 
where a state has squarely rejected an innovation (as opposed to never 
having expressly considered it), holdouts presently exist to otherwise 
widely adopted innovations such as comparative negligence,263 strict 
products liability in tort,264 the “false light” privacy tort,265 claims for 
 
257.  Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 256, at 180–81 (relating a model of herding 
behavior). 
258.  Talley offers a skeptical assessment of informational cascades, concluding that 
“[w]hile it is certainly possible for precedent to manifest some cascade-like characteristics, the 
necessary conditions for such phenomena to occur appear somewhat implausible.”  Talley, 
supra note 12, at 92.  Talley cites to “long-standing institutional practices within the 
judiciary—such as long judicial tenures, written opinions, and . . . hierarchical appeals 
process” as “tend[ing] to reduce the likelihood of a ‘bad’ precedential cascade.”  Id. 
259.  There are exceptions, of course, such as the recent rejection of the otherwise well-
accepted “baseball rule,” which limits the liability of the proprietors of baseball teams for 
spectator injuries, by the supreme courts of Idaho, Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 296 P.3d 
373, 377–79 (Idaho 2013), and Indiana, S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 909 
(Ind. 2014). 
260.  State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 914 (W. Va. 2007). 
261.  See id. at 903–04. 
262.  For a thoughtful discussion of doctrinal convergence as it pertains to states’ 
decisions to adopt or reject “no-fault” automobile insurance schemes, see Engstrom, supra 
note 22, at 371–79. 
263.  See SCHWARTZ & ROWE, supra note 149, § 1.01 (identifying Alabama, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Virginia as states that continue to apply contributory negligence). 
264.  See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 281–85 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing 
the status of Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia as holdouts 
against strict products liability in tort). 
265.  E.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 901–03 (Colo. 2002); Jews for Jesus, 
Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1105–14 (Fla. 2008). 
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wrongful discharge,266 the “attractive nuisance” doctrine,267 and the 
learned intermediary rule,268 among others.269  Other holdout 
jurisdictions have refused to join trends to abolish rules such as the 
“completion and acceptance” doctrine;270 the “impact” requirement for 
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress;271 charitable,272 
inter-spousal,273 and parental immunities;274 assumption of the risk;275 
and the tort of alienation of affections.276 
These holdouts can appear for any of several reasons.  Most 
obviously, courts may have principled and adamant disagreements with 
the majority of their peers over the desirability of an innovation, either 
in general277 or as applied to their state.278  Or these courts may disagree 
 
266.  Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for 
Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common 
Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 359, 395–414 (2005) 
(surveying state law on wrongful discharge and identifying Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Maine, New York, and Rhode Island as holdouts that have not yet recognized, or refuse to 
recognize, a cause of action for wrongful discharge). 
267.  See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 926 (Vt. 1998) 
(observing that Vermont has never recognized the attractive nuisance doctrine); Herring v. 
Christensen, 249 A.2d 718, 719 (Md. 1969) (declining to recognize the attractive nuisance 
doctrine). 
268.  State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 N.E.2d 899, 914 (W. Va. 2007). 
269.  Such as the “firefighter rule,” Ruiz v. Mero, 917 A.2d 239, 245–46 (N.J. 2007); 
Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984); Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc., 564 
S.E.2d 98, 103 (S.C. 2002), and strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, Moulton v. 
Groveton Papers Co., 289 A.2d 68, 72 (N.H. 1972); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 
(Tex. 1936). 
270.  Bragg v. Oxford Constr. Co., 674 S.E.2d 268, 269 (Ga. 2009) (retaining this rule). 
271.  See Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 14 n.39 (Ky. 2012) (listing jurisdictions that 
continue to recognize the “impact” requirement). 
272.  Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 974 A.2d 286, 290–94 (Me. 2009) (surveying the 
law of other states regarding charitable immunity). 
273.  GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8 (LexisNexis 2014). 
274.  See Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 803–04 (Ala. 1992) (describing the state’s 
acceptance of the doctrine of parental immunity as applied to negligence claims). 
275.  See Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 482 S.E.2d 
569, 573 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (identifying holdouts against abolition or substantial 
modification of the assumption of the risk defense), aff’d, 508 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 1998). 
276.  Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1035–36 (Miss. 2007) (Dickinson, J., 
concurring) (listing the states that have abolished and retained the tort of alienation of 
affections). 
277.  State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 914 (W. Va. 2007) 
(declining to adopt the learned-intermediary exception to the duty to warn of a danger 
associated with a product). 
278.  See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 225–26 (Tex. 1936) (explaining its 
rationale for rejecting the strict-liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher). 
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as to whether it is proper for the judiciary, as opposed to the legislature, 
to adopt an innovation.279  Holdouts also may result from aleatory 
circumstances, such as inopportune timing.280  A jurisdiction may reject a 
principle at an early stage of its diffusion, and then either lack 
opportunities to revisit this stance or feel bound by stare decisis or 
reliance interests to maintain this objection.  And some holdouts simply 
involve jurisdictions that have selected a somewhat different doctrinal 
solution to a commonly recognized problem, as sometimes occurs when 
pioneers in one generation of reform become laggards in the next.281 
Finally, some jurisdictions embrace holdout status as symbolically 
significant.  In certain instances, broad acceptance of an innovation 
elsewhere may enhance the salience, or alter the meaning, of an issue 
within straggler states.  For instance, North Carolina has not abolished 
the tort of alienation of affections, as all of its neighbors have.282  The 
Tar Heel State likely could have made this leap without much fuss a few 
decades ago, around the time South Carolina,283 Virginia,284 and 
Tennessee285 did.  But for whatever reason it did not.  Meanwhile, the 
repudiation of alienation of affections by other states drew attention to 
the tort in the handful of jurisdictions where it remained in place.286  
Ensuing efforts to justify the tort’s existence imbued it with meaning 
 
279.  Compare Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1156–57 (Md. 2013) 
(declining to abolish contributory negligence in the face of legislative inaction), with Li v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Cal. 1975) (abolishing contributory negligence). 
280.  See Coleman, 69 A.3d at 1157–58. 
281.  See Graham, supra note 89, at 61418 (discussing how several states that adopted 
broad warranty protections at a relatively early juncture lagged in recognizing strict products 
liability in tort). 
282.  Jean M. Cary & Sharon Scudder, Breaking up Is Hard to Do: North Carolina 
Refuses to End Its Relationship with the Heart Balm Torts, 4 ELON L. REV. 1, 2, 16–19 (2012) 
(discussing efforts to abolish alienation of affections); Infidelity & Alienation of Affection, 
ROSEN LAW FIRM, http://www.rosen.com/divorce/divorcearticles/alienation-of-affection-and-
criminal-conversation/?hvid=4mwM3F [http://perma.cc/8R66-5XTQ] (last visited Jan. 21, 
2015) (estimating that approximately two hundred alienation of affections lawsuits are filed 
annually in North Carolina). 
283.  Act of Mar. 21, 1988, No. 391, § 1, 1988 S.C. Acts 2783, 2783 (abolishing the tort of 
criminal conversation); Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750, 754 (S.C. 1992) (abolishing the tort of 
alienation of affections). 
284.  Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 716, § 1, 1968 Va. Acts 1259, 1259 (abolishing the torts of 
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry). 
285.  Act of May 1, 1990, ch. 1056, § 1, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 773, 773–74 (abolishing the 
tort of criminal conversation); Act of June 2, 1989, ch. 517, § 1, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 902, 902 
(abolishing the tort of alienation of affections). 
286.  See JOHN RUSTIN & JERE Z. ROYALL, PROTECTING MARRIAGE: 10 GOOD 
REASONS TO PRESERVE MEANINGFUL TORT LAWS (2002). 
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that was not so apparent or deeply felt when many other states also 
recognized this cause of action.287  Today, efforts to abolish alienation of 
affections within North Carolina are condemned as contrary to the 
“family values” that this formerly picayune tort supposedly protects.288  
By retaining the tort, North Carolina can express (at modest cost) its 
devotion to an ideal seemingly rejected almost everywhere else.289 
B. Diffusion Patterns over Time 
At this point, this Article will transition into a discussion of the 
diffusion patterns of the studied innovations across historical eras.  
When plotted over the period from 1857 (the year before the first 
adoption of one of the studied innovations) to the present, the diffusion 










287.  Bland v. Hill 735 So. 2d 414, 422 (Miss. 1999) (Smith, J., concurring). 
288.  See Tracy Rose, The Price of Illicit Love, MOUNTAIN XPRESS (Mar. 29, 2000), 
https://mountainx.com/news/community-news/0329alienation-php/ [http://perma.cc/7JQH-
3YGX] (discussing the perception that legislators who would vote to abolish alienation of 
affections within that state would be cast as hostile to “family values”). 
289.  Similarly, when in 1999 the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff’s plea to 
add Mississippi to the roster of states that had abolished the tort of alienation of affections, 
one justice wrote a special concurrence to convey his dismay with the path taken in many 
other states.  Bland, 735 So. 2d at 421 (Smith, J., concurring).  The justice wrote, “The 
traditional family is under such attack both locally and nationally these days that this Court 
should not retreat now from the sound view of the tort of alienation of affections.”  Id. at 422.  
Referencing the dissent’s call for abolition of the tort, he later added: 
The dissent states that this tort serves no legitimate purpose whatsoever in modern 
society, but rather, has simply been extended past its time.  This is somewhat akin 
to the view that “everybody else is doing it, so should I.”  While I agree that it 
appears society’s moral values have changed during modern times, I do not believe 
Mississippi should get aboard this runaway train. 
Id. 
290.  See infra Chart VII.  The data upon which this chart is based appear in infra 
Appendix B. 
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CHART VII: AGGREGATE ADOPTION PATTERNS, 1857 TO PRESENT 
 
This chart illustrates the importance of opportune historical 
moments in the evolution of tort doctrine.  The chart reflects a 
significant upsurge in adoption rates from the 1960s through the 1980s, 
the period in which state courts were particularly engaged with the 
reform of tort doctrine through the overturn of hoary rules and the 
subsequent reevaluation of several “second-order” principles, such as 
the assumption of the risk defense.291 
This trend toward faster diffusion has since slowed down.  A closer 
focus upon the period from 1975 to the present reveals that the diffusion 









291.  See Green, supra note 148 (using the phrase “ripple effects” in discussing the 
various second-generation issues raised in jurisdictions that switched from contributory to 
comparative negligence). 
292.  See infra Chart VIII.  The data upon which this chart is based appear in infra 
Appendix B. 
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CHART VIII: ADOPTIONS OVER TIME, 1975 TO PRESENT 
 
To quantify this pattern, the period from 1975 to 1984 saw 177 
adoptions of the studied innovations; from 1985 to 1994, 145; from 1995 
to 2004, 55; and from 2005 to 2014, only 25.293 
This slowdown has affected more than merely the studied cluster of 
innovations.  The slower diffusion rates observed within the cohort of 
innovations discussed above could be attributed to the simple fact that 
many of these innovations were adopted by a significant number of 
states long ago, limiting the number of recent adoption opportunities.  
But the trend toward slower diffusion is affecting more than merely the 
innovations of yesteryear.  Going beyond the sampled set, even the most 
“successful” common-law innovations of recent vintage also have spread 
only slowly.  In addition to spoliation of evidence, discussed earlier, the 
innovations and issues most commonly addressed by state high courts 
over the past two decades include the viability of freestanding “medical 
monitoring” claims,294 the proper measure of damages for medical 
 
293.  Although few commentators identify the 1980s as a period of substantial doctrinal 
change, many of the studied innovations gained more than ten new adopters during this 
decade.  These adoptions often involved laggard states coming into the fold, adopting an 
innovation that already qualified as “successful” due to a large number of earlier adoptions. 
294.  Decisions by state supreme courts that have ruled one way or the other on this 
issue include Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001); Potter v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 
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expenses when billed rates are subject to negotiated discounts within 
health-insurance compacts,295 the “any exposure” rule in asbestos 
cases,296 whether an employer or premises owner owes a duty to a family 
member of an employee or visitor when the family member becomes 
sick due to asbestos that the employee or visitor brought home with 
them,297 and the status of the “sophisticated user” defense in products-
liability actions.298  Of these issues, since 2000 only the dispute over 
accounting for negotiated health-insurance discounts has generated an 
 
S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1998) 
(overturned by statute, 1999 La. Acts 2661); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 44 (Md. 
2013); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 901–03 (Mass. 2009); Henry v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 
So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007); Meyer v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2007); Badillo v. Am. 
Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 
1987); Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013); Lowe v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 187 (Or. 2008); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996); 
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999). 
295.  The courts that have addressed this issue this millennium include Stayton v. Del. 
Health Corp., 117 A.3d 521 (Del. 2015); Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2014); Tri-
Cty. Equip. & Leasing, LLC v. Klinke, 286 P.3d 593 (Nev. 2012); Howell v. Hamilton Meats 
& Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 
2011); Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205 (Kan. 2010); Law v. Griffith, 930 
N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010); Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2010); Stanley v. 
Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009); White v. Jubitz Corp., 219 P.3d 566 (Or. 2009); Wills v. 
Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, 302 Wis. 2d 
110, 736 N.W.2d 1; Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio 2006); Bozeman v. State, 879 
So. 2d 692 (La. 2004); Slack v. Kelleher, 104 P.3d 958, 967 (Idaho 2004); Covington v. George, 
597 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 2004); Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316 (Va. 2000); see also 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson, 976 S.W.2d 382 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a 
customer’s negotiated discount for her medical care fell within the collateral source rule). 
296.  CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010); Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 
908 So. 2d 749 (Miss. 2005); Holcomb v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 289 P.3d 188 (Nev. 2012); Betz v. 
Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2012); Bostic v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. 
2014); Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 736 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 2013). 
297.  Price v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011); CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005); Simpkins v. CSX Transp., 965 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 
2012); Van Fossen v. MidAmerica Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa 2009); Ga. Pac., LLC v. 
Farrar, 69 A.3d 1028 (Md. 2013); Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from the 
Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007); Olivo v. Owens-
Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); 
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010); Satterfield v. Breeding 
Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). 
298.  Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905 (Cal. 2008); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 
778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001); Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2001); 
Miss. Valley Silica Co. v. Eastman, 92 So. 3d 666 (Miss. 2012); Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 
676 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2004); Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 
2004); Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2003 WI App 192, 266 Wis. 2d 970, 669 N.W.2d 737. 
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average of one or more state supreme court decisions per year.299  
Meanwhile, none of these issues have produced even one adoption per 
year of any particular approach that plausibly could be characterized as 
an “innovation.”300 
This slowdown perpetuates a trend toward doctrinal “stabilization” 
in tort law detected by some commentators as far back as the early 
1990s.  In 1992, the late Gary Schwartz observed: 
By the early 1980s, a new tort era had begun.  Undeniably, in 
dozens of cases contemporary courts have routinely applied the 
strong liability rules inherited from preceding years; moreover, in 
some instances those courts have actually extended liability.  Yet 
in many recent cases, courts have also rejected particular strict 
liability proposals, refused to recognize certain negligence-based 
causes of action, affirmed no-duty rules, narrowly interpreted the 
negligence concept, asserted the application of certain 
affirmative defenses, conservatively ruled on a number of 
damage issues, and rejected legal doctrines that might have 
subjected employers to tort liability on account of workers’ 
injuries.  This recent period can hence be described in terms of 
the stabilization and the mild contraction of doctrine.301 
Schwartz then added, “An important question concerns whether 
these tendencies are likely to continue into the future.  (Otherwise, the 
 
299.  As of writing (September 2015), sixteen state supreme courts have addressed this 
issue since 2000.  See supra note 295. 
300.  Furthermore, some of the innovations associated with this period met with such 
lukewarm or hostile receptions as to cause early adopters to backtrack.  In abandoning its 
“bad faith denial of contract” tort, the California Supreme Court noted a “tide of critical or 
contrary authority.”  Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 678 (Cal. 1995).  
Quoting an earlier decision, the court observed that “[a]lthough holdings from other states 
are not controlling, and we remain free to steer a contrary course, nonetheless the near 
unanimity of agreement . . . indicates we should question the advisability of continued 
allegiance to our minority approach.”  Id. (quoting Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 64 (Cal. 1988)). 
301.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 700; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 521–22 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the “liability explosion” of the second half 
of the Twentieth Century and then the “backlash and counterrevolution” of the 1980s); James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Why the Recent Shift in Tort?, 26 GA. L. REV. 777, 777 (1992) (agreeing 
with Schwartz’s observations regarding doctrinal stabilization but only concurring in part with 
his explanations for this trend); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet 
Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 
488–99 (1990) (discussing judicial reevaluation of broad products liability in the 1980s); 
Robert L. Rabin, Rowland v. Christian: Hallmark of an Expansionary Era, in TORTS 
STORIES 73, 91–95 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
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recent period may merely be a respite, which could soon give rise to a 
new growth in liability.)”302 
The data suggest that the trend toward doctrinal stabilization that 
Schwartz spotted has continued over the last two decades.  The 
remainder of this Article considers the possible reasons for this shift and 
its consequences for the present and future of tort law. 
IV. THE SOURCES OF SLOWER DIFFUSION 
Professor Schwartz offered four reasons for the stabilization he 
perceived: (1) the exhaustion of the reform agenda that had consumed 
courts from the 1960s through the early 1980s;303 (2) an increasingly 
conservative judiciary that was growing disinclined to adopt liability-
enhancing innovations;304 (3) an enhanced awareness of the costs, 
drawbacks, limitations, and unintended consequences of previously 
adopted doctrinal reforms, and a resulting hesitance to adopt additional 
innovations;305 and (4) criticisms and concerns that some academics had 
directed toward certain liability-expanding innovations.306 
These factors still ring true, but they require some updating.  When 
Schwartz wrote, courts were retreating from endorsement or extension 
of far-reaching innovations, such as market-share liability and truly 
“strict” liability for warning defects on products.307  Most of the 
innovations at issue today, almost a quarter-century later, are more 
incremental in nature and, thus, perhaps less likely to elicit a harsh 
reaction among conservative jurists.  Meanwhile, the justices who sit on 
state supreme courts today, taken as a whole, are neither 
overwhelmingly conservative nor solidly liberal.  On the contrary, a 
recent study that used the sources of campaign donations as a proxy for 
ideological leanings revealed an almost even ideological split (171 
liberal, 165 conservative, and 4 “other”) across 340 state supreme court 
justices.308  A related study found that the members of specific courts 
 
302.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 700. 
303.  Id. at 683–84. 
304.  Id. at 685–87. 
305.  Id. at 687–93. 
306.  Id. at 693–99. 
307.  Id. at 618–19, 688–89, 697–98. 
308.  Political Outlook of State Supreme Court Justices, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://judgepedia.org/Political_outlook_of_state_supreme_court_justices [http://perma.cc/KM
3G-D55W] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
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were relatively ideologically cohesive, suggesting that ideology varies 
more across courts than within them.309 
These updates to Schwartz’s observations do not necessarily render 
his analysis obsolete, however.  An ideological split across courts may be 
more detrimental to broad acceptance of innovations than either 
lockstep conservatism or a liberal consensus would be.  Tort law has 
become increasingly politicized over the past few decades.310  If roughly 
half the courts (with a majority of justices leaning “conservative” per the 
latter study described above) are disinclined to adopt innovations 
perceived as favoring plaintiffs, the other half (those leaning “liberal”) 
disfavor innovations that benefit defendants, and many or most 
innovations involve a palpable pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff valence, 
opportunities for precedent cascades across broad swaths of courts 
become quite limited. 
Yet even when updated, the factors Schwartz identified do not 
provide a complete explanation for the current stagnation.  Something 
else, more structural and systemic than the forces Schwartz spotted, also 
appears to be at work.  The discussion below therefore builds upon the 
diffusion analysis presented in Parts II and III to explain how changes 
within the dockets of state supreme courts and in the interactions 
between these courts are partially responsible for the stifled spread of 
common-law doctrinal innovations. 
Specifically, this analysis tethers this trend to several developments 
that are shrinking the common-law tort dockets of the fifty state 
supreme courts and driving these caseloads apart.  This shrinkage and 
fragmentation of the national torts docket, the Article goes on to argue, 
has important consequences for the future of tort law. 
A. The Declining Common-Law Tort Dockets of State Supreme Courts 
Overall, state supreme courts are deciding fewer common-law tort 
cases today than they did a few decades ago.311  This trend owes to 
 
309.  Adam Bonica & Michael Woodruff, State Supreme Court Ideology and “New 
Style” Judicial Campaigns 17–18 (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169664 [http://perma.cc/GV83-5LFW]. 
310.  Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1483 (2005) (discussing the political connotations and consequences of recent tort-reform 
proposals, especially insofar as these proposals affect the election of state-court judges); F. 
Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 437, 529–30 (2006). 
311.  See infra Table II. 
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circumstances that include the general decrease in the total number of 
cases entertained by state supreme courts, a decline in tort filings and 
trials, a burgeoning number of statutory causes of action and defenses, 
the enhanced roles that intermediate state appellate courts and federal 
courts play in resolving tort cases, and changes in the litigation strategies 
of plaintiffs and defendants. 
The decline in common-law tort cases heard by state supreme courts 
has been pervasive and, in some states, marked.  The following chart 
compares the number of these cases decided in 1970 and in 2010 by the 
state supreme courts of California, which one study identified as the 
“most followed” state supreme court;312  Minnesota, recognized as the 
“most innovative” state by another inquiry;313 New Jersey, which the 
latter study tagged as the “most innovative” state in the 1945–1975 
period;314 and seven other randomly selected states. The totals below 
reflect the number of cases decided by each court in calendar years 2010 
and 1970 that involved the review of common-law tort claims, or 
defenses to these claims315: 
 
TABLE II: COMMON-LAW TORT CASES BY STATE  
SUPREME COURT, 2010 AND 1970 
 
Year CA NJ MN ME WA UT NY OH GA MO 
2010 4 5 5 13 3 5 8 6 11 5 
1970 9 12 59 8 10 23 18 20 7 49 
 
While the number of tort cases decided by the supreme courts of 
Maine and Georgia increased slightly, the volume of these cases decided 
in the eight other states declined, in some instances precipitously.316  
When a state supreme court decides the merits of a claim or defense in 
only three, four, five, or six common-law tort cases a year, the output of 
 
312.  Dear & Jessen, supra note 67, at 693. 
313.  Canon & Baum, supra note 45, at 977 tbl.1. 
314.  Id. at 978 tbl.1. 
315.  See infra Table II.  In compiling this table, judgment calls were made as to whether 
the court was reviewing a claim, a defense, or an evidentiary matter somehow related to the 
merits of a claim (all of which were included within Table II), or a procedural issue 
sufficiently distinct from a merits review as to warrant exclusion from the dataset.  For 
formatting reasons, the citations for each state and year appear in infra Appendix A. 
316.  See supra Table II. 
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a majority of these courts in 2010,317 this limited docket provides only a 
small aperture for the embrace of tort innovations. 
Several trends have contributed to this diminution of the torts 
docket across state supreme courts.  For starters, these courts tend to 
decide fewer cases altogether today than they did just a few years ago.318  
The decade between 2003 and 2012 saw a 12% decline in cases accepted 
by state supreme courts,319 a decrease that perpetuated a longer trend.320  
This decline partly owes to the appearance of intermediate appellate 
courts in many states and the associated growth of discretionary 
jurisdiction across state supreme courts.321  As recently as 1968, only 
nineteen states possessed intermediate appellate courts.322  Today, this 
number has more than doubled, with intermediate appellate courts 
functioning in forty states323 (soon to become forty-one, as Nevada 
voters recently approved a ballot measure that called for the creation of 
an intermediate appellate court).324  States that have created these 
 
317.  See supra Table II. 
318.  Gerald F. Uelmen, The Fattest Crocodile: Why Elected Judges Can’t Ignore Public 
Opinion, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1998, at 4, 5–6. 
319.  Appellate Court Caseloads: Appellate Court Caseload Trends 2003–2012, COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Appellate/2014Appellate.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/XUC7-9TQX] (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
320.  See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. 
REV. 961, 964–65, 981 (1978) (discussing this trend); Uelmen, supra note 318, at 5–6. 
321.  Project, The Effect of Court Structure on State Supreme Court Opinions: A Re-
Examination, 33 STAN. L. REV. 951, 959 (1981) (observing that after a state creates an 
intermediate appellate court, the volume of tort cases heard by the state’s supreme court 
tends to fall); see also Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions 
and Civil Litigation, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2010) (“The presence of lower appellate 
courts seemingly provides wide latitude for state supreme courts to structure their docket.”); 
Paul Brace, et al., Judges, Litigants, and the Design of Courts, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 502 
(2012) (relating that as of 1998, sixteen state supreme courts had complete discretion over 
what tort cases they would take); Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences 
into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1629, 1649 (2010) (“[M]ost state supreme courts retain substantial discretion over which 
cases to hear.”). 
322.  Daryl R. Fair, State Intermediate Appellate Courts: An Introduction, 24 W. POL. Q. 
415, 415 & n.2 (1971). 
323.  COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUDGES OF THE STATE COURTS OF APPEAL, THE ROLE OF 
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTING TO CHANGE 2–4 (2012), 
http://www.sji.gov/wp/wp-content/uploads/Report_5_CCJSCA_Report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C9F4-W3TN]. 
324.  Nev. Sec’y of State, Ballot Questions, SILVER STATE ELECTION, 
http://www.silverstateelection.com/ballot-questions/ [http://perma.cc/R2ZQ-H3YQ] (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (reflecting the passage of 2014 State Question No. 1, “Shall the Nevada 
Constitution be amended to create a Court of Appeals that would decide appeals of District 
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intermediate appellate courts commonly see a significant decline in the 
number of decisions issued by their state supreme courts.325  In these 
states, intermediate appellate courts often produce precedential 
opinions that their respective state supreme courts regard as adequate 
statements of law on the subjects involved. 
Meanwhile, recent years have seen a drop in tort filings and trials.  
Several surveys of civil case filings have detected a slow but steady drop 
in tort cases brought since 1990.326  The decrease in tort trials has been 
even more pronounced; a study of the nation’s 75 largest counties 
detected a 40% decline in tort trials between 1992 and 2005.327  
Although there may be several reasons behind this decrease, as a 
general matter, fewer trials means fewer appeals,328 and fewer appeals 
means less fodder for innovation. 
Yet these trends have not dictated a decline in the number of 
compelling common-law tort cases heard by state supreme courts.  A 
smaller number of filed and contested tort cases could, in theory, still 
generate a substantial volume of cases that present interesting issues 
worthy of high-court attention.329  And a drop-off in tort cases decided 
 
Court decisions in certain civil and criminal cases?”). 
325.  Kagan, et al., supra note 320, at 981. 
326.  R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 27 (2010), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx 
[http://perma.cc/5G8R-9AT2] (identifying a 25% decline in tort filings in surveyed state 
courts between 1999 and 2008); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS, 2003: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 23 
(2004) (relating data showing a 5% drop in tort filings across 17 states between 1993 and 2002, 
and adding that tort filings appear to have peaked in 1990); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar, 
The Effect of “Tort Reform” on Tort Case Filings, 43 VALP. U. L. REV. 559, 572–74 (2009) 
(documenting a decline in tort filings in Oklahoma following the enactment of tort reform 
legislation in the early 2000s); Thomas B. Marvell, Tort Caseload Trends and the Impact of 
Tort Reforms, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 193, 195–96 (1994). 
327.  LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL 
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 8 (2008), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [http://perma.cc/DS52-Q3NJ]; see also Marc 
Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline & 
Displacement of Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115, 118 (discussing 
this decline). 
328.  Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: 
Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 659, 
660 (2004) (observing an appeal rate of 39.6% in tried cases and 10.0% in nontried cases in 
federal cases terminating between 1988 and 2000, with an appeal rate of 19.0% in untried 
cases that led to a judgment [and 40.9% in tried cases leading to a judgment]). 
329.  See Kagan et al., supra note 9, at 133–35, 142–45 (finding a significant increase in 
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by state supreme courts may simply reflect the disappearance of docket 
dross, mandatory-review cases that present no particularly important or 
novel issues. 
Therefore, additional forces must tether together the shrinkage of 
the common-law tort docket and the observed slowdown in diffusion 
rates for significant tort-law innovations.  One potential influence 
involves the depressed salience of common-law tort issues relative to 
other topics that also compete for state supreme courts’ limited 
bandwidth.  As Professor Schwartz observed, the exhaustion of the 
reform agenda of the 1960s through the early 1980s meant that there 
were fewer hot-button issues for state courts to resolve in the years that 
followed.330  The absence of high-profile issues percolating through the 
courts became particularly pronounced after most states resolved 
several key “second-order” issues connected to their earlier, 
transformative decisions to adopt comparative fault and strict products 
liability in tort.331  For example, by 2000 most states already had 
addressed, through caselaw or statute, whether a plaintiff’s negligence 
could represent a full or partial defense to a claim that alleges strict 
products liability in tort.332 
The dearth of engaging tort issues before state supreme courts also 
can be attributed in part to the fact that much of the creative energy 
presently directed toward tort reform courses through state legislatures, 
Congress, and federal courts.  Modern defendants and their advocates 
have grown increasingly sophisticated and vocal in directing arguments 
for reform toward state legislatures and federal outlets, in effect 
bypassing state courts.333  In response to these calls, the legislatures of 
many states have modified the rule of joint-and-several liability,334 
imposed caps on noneconomic damages,335 altered the collateral source 
 
the number and proportion (relative to the courts’ overall docket) of tort cases heard by state 
supreme courts from the 1870–1900 period to the 1940–1970 period). 
330.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 683–84. 
331.  See Green, supra note 148 (discussing the second-order doctrinal issues generated 
by the repudiation of contributory negligence). 
332.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17, reporter’s 
note (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (discussing this body of law). 
333.  See Hubbard, supra note 310, at 469–73 (discussing the development of the modern 
tort reform movement). 
334.  See Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-reform [http://perma.cc/3NH6-
C52U] (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting these measures). 
335.  See Noneconomic Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
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rule,336 and limited the availability and extent of punitive damages,337 just 
to name a few common topics of tort-reform campaigns.338  Other state 
and federal laws have limited or eliminated certain types of claims or 
lawsuits.339  Two relatively recent examples of liability-limiting laws are 
the “commonsense consumption” measures that swept through about 
half of the states in the mid-2000s in a swift reaction to so-called 
“obesity lawsuits,”340 and a 2005 federal law, the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act,341 that strangled in its crib an emerging effort 
to hold firearm manufacturers liable for gun violence.342  Concurrently, 
tort defendants have obtained several significant victories from the 
United States Supreme Court, most notably in cases where the Court 
construed federal statutes as preempting the assignment of tort liability 
under state law.343 
Meanwhile, issues associated with damages claims brought under 
 
http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconomic-damages-reform [http://perma.cc/D4RW-J6AW] 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting these measures). 
336.  See Collateral Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N,  
http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral-source-rule-reform [http://perma.cc/MBC5-JYDC] (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting these measures). 
337.  See Punitive Damage Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform [http://perma.cc/4CQE-2MV2] (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting these measures). 
338.  See Mark Thompson, Letting the Air Out of Tort Reform, ABA J., May 1997, at 64 
(remarking upon the “remarkable gains” that “proponents of limitations on personal injury 
lawsuits” had made in state legislatures). 
339.  See Medical Liability Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/medical-liability-reform [http://perma.cc/9522-X36L] (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting measures that put limits on medical malpractice 
claims); Product Liability Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/product-liability-reform [http://perma.cc/P257-HB72] (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2015) (listing state laws adopting measures that limit product-liability claims). 
340.  See Graham, supra note 83, at 399–405. 
341.  15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03 (2006). 
342.  See R. Clay Larkin, The “Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act”: Immunity 
for the Firearm Industry is a (Constitutional) Bulls-Eye, 95 KY. L.J. 187, 189–91 (2006) 
(discussing the impetus for this law). 
343.  See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2569–70 (2011) (holding that federal 
drug regulations preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of 
generic drugs); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (holding that the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers); 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that the preemption clause within 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 preempts certain state-law tort claims); Geier v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard promulgated under federal law had a preemptive effect on certain state-law tort 
claims). 
 138 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:75 
federal and state statutes have been prevailing over common-law tort 
issues in the battle for space on state supreme courts’ dockets.344  The 
cases likely having the greatest cannibalistic effect in this respect involve 
private causes of action conferred under state consumer-protection,345 
wage-and-hour,346 whistle-blower,347 and antidiscrimination348 laws.  
These statutes, many of which are of relatively recent vintage, have 
generated a large volume of litigation and many important 
interpretative issues of first impression.349  To the extent that state high 
courts may deliberately or unconsciously dedicate only a certain share of 
their dockets to non-contractual damages claims brought by private 
parties, grants of review in cases arising under these statutes come at the 
expense of matters that emerge out of the common law. 
The California Supreme Court’s docket illustrates this transition.  As 
noted earlier, only four opinions issued by that court in 2010 involved 
the substantive review of common-law tort claims, or defenses to these 
claims, whereas nine opinions issued in 1970 had this posture.350  But the 
court’s 2010 output also included decisions rendered in cases that 
involved damages claims brought under wage-and-hour,351 antitrust,352 
civil-rights,353 unfair-competition,354 anti-spam,355 and whistleblower-
 
344.  See The Effect of Court Structure on State Supreme Court Opinions: A Re-
Examination, supra note 321, at 959 (observing that after intermediate appellate courts were 
created in Michigan and North Carolina, the state supreme courts in these states heard more 
criminal, constitutional, and public law cases, and fewer private business, property, and tort 
law cases). 
345.  See 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
SOURCEBOOK 2297–3179 (2014) (relating state laws pertaining to unfair and deceptive acts 
by businesses); Edward W. Crane et al., U.S. Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist 
Patchwork, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 305, 326–28 (2011) (discussing these statutes). 
346.  See 1 GREGORY K. MCGILLIVARY, WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY (2d ed. 2010). 
347.  See MICHAEL DELIKAT & RENÉE PHILLIPS, CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ERA/DODD-FRANK ERA, app. F at F-1–F-66 (2d ed. 2014) 
(summarizing state whistle-blower protection laws). 
348.  See Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of 
Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007) (“The vast 
majority of states . . . have their own antidiscrimination statutes that, like federal law, prohibit 
discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, national origin, and disability.”). 
349.  See infra notes 353–59 and accompanying text. 
350.  See supra Table II. 
351.  Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 241 P.3d 870 (Cal. 2010); Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens 
Casino, Inc., 236 P.3d 346 (Cal. 2010); Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010). 
352.  Clayorth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066 (Cal. 2010). 
353.  Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 224 P.3d 41 (Cal. 2010). 
354.  Clark v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 171 (Cal. 2010). 
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protection statutes.356  Given the California Supreme Court’s substantial 
criminal-law docket357 and its ongoing engagement with other areas of 
state law, the justices could be forgiven if they believed that this array of 
cases filled any unspoken quota or target for civil-liability matters. 
The aforementioned trends have shrunk the common-law tort 
dockets of the state supreme courts, limiting the opportunities for 
doctrinal reform. As will be discussed next, a second trend, the 
fragmentation of the national tort docket, also has contributed toward 
the stifled diffusion of doctrinal innovations in this sphere.358 
B. The Divergence of the Tort Dockets of State Supreme Courts 
The tort dockets of state supreme courts have diverged as they have 
shrunk.  To the extent that these courts are still granting review in 
common-law tort cases, the topics presented for decision often are of a 
state-specific nature.  The provincial nature of these issues frustrates the 
development of a national conversation over the present and future of 
tort law. 
The parochial nature of courts’ common-law dockets represents, to a 
degree, a consequence of the success of the “tort reform” movement 
discussed above.  As previously mentioned, over the past several 
decades a bevy of tort-reform statutes have appeared that confer a 
defense or limit liability.359  These statutes can present significant 
interpretive issues that clamor for courts’ attention.  Thus, when state 
supreme courts grant review in a tort action these days, the specific issue 
presented for review often concerns the interpretation of one of these 
statutes.  And because many of these laws contain idiosyncratic terms, 
these decisions commonly do not carry across state lines.  Almost two 
decades ago, one commentator noted the resulting divergence of state 
tort law: 
The fact is that over the past twenty years state tort law has 
grown further apart, not closer together.  The advent of so-called 
“tort reform” has augmented this trend.  This year alone, 
 
355.  Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 232 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2010). 
356.  Runyon v. Bd. of Trustees, 229 P.3d 985 (Cal. 2010). 
357.  See Gerald F. Uelmen, Justices United, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2012, at 30 (calculating 
that “[f]ully one-third of [the preceding] year’s published opinions [from the California 
Supreme Court] involved death penalty appeals”). 
358.  See infra Part IV.B. 
359.  See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 326. 
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approximately one dozen states have enacted tort reform 
statutes; yet none of them are the same.  A nuance in any one of 
them could be major and outcome determinative.360 
A return to the California Supreme Court’s recent tort-law docket 
serves to highlight these statutes’ impact.  In 2012, that court addressed 
the merits of a claim or a defense in six cases in which the plaintiffs 
alleged common-law tort claims.361  One of these cases, DiCampli-Mintz 
v. County of Santa Clara, turned on the interpretation of the claim-
presentation provision of the state’s Government Claims Act.362  
Another, LeFiell Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court, held that the 
state’s worker’s compensation scheme preempted a spousal consortium 
claim.363  And still another, Quarry v. Doe I, concerned the application 
of a statute of limitations to claims against the Catholic Church.364  In 
other words, half the court’s torts oeuvre in 2012 was concerned with the 
evaluation of defenses or procedural prerequisites associated with state 
statutes.  In each of these cases, the court’s ruling represented an 
important clarification of state law, but had little to no resonance 
outside of California. 
The California Supreme Court’s grant of review in the Quarry case 
also bespeaks another, related trend that has fractured the national torts 
docket.  Some tort plaintiffs today still press the frontiers of common-
law doctrines of general application.365  But modern litigation campaigns 
 
360.  Victor E. Schwartz, ‘Class Action’ Reform: Endless Clashes of Values of 
Constructive Results?, MASS TORT LITIG. REP., Aug. 1995, at 24; see also Thomas M. Reavley 
& Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule for New Reasons: Place of Injury as a Federal Solution 
to Choice of Law in Single-Accident Mass-Tort Cases, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1992) (“Tort 
reform is currently in vogue, and differences among the paces and directions of the reform 
movements in the various states account for the growing divergence among states’ substantive 
tort laws.”); Mark C. Weber, Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 472 (1998) (“At one time, tort law in the United States may have 
been converging towards a set of common principles, with differences among states falling 
into predictable categories . . . .  [H]owever, the wave of tort reform legislation in the 1980s 
and 1990s has shattered any emerging tort law consensus.”). 
361.  Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158 (Cal. 2012); DiCampli-Mintz v. County of 
Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012); LeFiell Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 282 P.3d 1242 (Cal. 
2012); Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977 (Cal. 2012); O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 
2012); C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2002). 
362.  DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885. 
363.  LeFiell Mfg. Co., 282 P.3d at 1243–44. 
364.  Quarry, 272 P.3d at 979–80. 
365.  See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM II: NEW TRENDS, TARGETS AND PLAYERS 6 (2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/evolving.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NQT-
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tend to focus on the pursuit of claims against certain classes of 
defendants, with broad doctrinal overhaul representing a secondary, 
instrumental goal.366  These operations often involve lawsuits brought 
against “deep pockets” such as government agencies, product 
manufacturers, tobacco companies, the Catholic Church, or a company 
somehow connected to asbestos.367  The visibility of these cases, the 
large number of claims often at stake, and the influence of the 
defendants involved often commend these disputes for high-court 
review.368  Yet the legal issues presented for review in these matters can 
be quite narrow, and commonly concern a defendant’s effort to invoke a 
defense prescribed by a state statute.369  Once again, since these defenses 
commonly hinge on the interpretation of non-uniform state laws, their 
resolution only occasionally generates opinions that transcend state 
boundaries.370 
The discussion above does not exhaust the array of potential 
explanations for the slower diffusion of tort innovations across state 
supreme courts, even when coupled with the (updated) factors discussed 
 
MB4U] (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely ask courts to push the limits on liability.”). 
366.  Hence the common modern practice of describing groups of potential defendants 
as collectively “big,” such as “Big Tobacco.”  See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Lawyers from Suits 
Against Big Tobacco Target Food Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at 1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/lawyers-of-big-tobacco-lawsuits-take-aim-at-
food-industry.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/82L9-6926] (discussing how plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
“searching for big paydays in business”).  Meanwhile, the litigation groups organized by the 
American Association for Justice, a leading professional organization for the plaintiff’s bar, 
often are organized around particular products or industries.  Litigation Groups, AM. ASS’N 
FOR JUSTICE, https://www.justice.org/membership/litigation-groups [http://perma.cc/3EE4-
S3WJ] (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
367.  For example, recent decisions of the California Supreme Court have touched all of 
these bases.  See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d 884 (government defendant); Quarry, 272 P.3d 
977 (Catholic Church); C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699 (Cal. 
2012) (government); O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012) (products manufacturer; 
asbestos); Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 250 P.3d 181 (Cal. 2011) (tobacco). 
368.  Cf. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting 
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1122 (1988) (proposing that “U.S. 
Supreme Court justices attempt to select cases for plenary review with the greatest potential 
social, economic, or political significance consistent with their own ideological preferences”); 
Kent L. Richland, Taming the Odds: Increasing the Chances of Getting Relief from the 
Supreme Court, CAL. LITIG., Winter 1992, at 3, 8 (describing how amicus letters, reflecting a 
case’s importance to a broad audience, can improve the odds that the California Supreme 
Court will grant a petition for review). 
369.  See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 361. 
370.  In other instances, these cases are ripe for removal to federal court, either because 
of their status as putative class actions or the prospect of a federal preemption defense. 
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by Professor Schwartz.371  But whatever the reason or reasons, this trend 
is occurring.  This transition might not provide grounds for comment or 
concern if doctrinal innovation across legislatures, intermediate 
appellate courts, and federal courts perfectly countered this retreat.  But 
on the contrary, as the next section of this Article explains, the ebbing 
involvement of state supreme courts will have important consequences 
for the present and future of tort law. 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SLOWER DIFFUSION 
It remains to discuss the significance of the slowdown in doctrinal 
diffusion.  Toward this point, the text below will consider the unique 
role that state supreme courts play in the spread of tort innovations, and 
then explain some consequences of these courts’ diminished 
engagement with common-law tort doctrine. 
A. State Supreme Courts and the Adoption of Innovations 
One might accept all of the developments described above, but 
nevertheless respond with a shrug.  Even granting changes in the 
dockets of state supreme courts, perhaps this shift simply means that 
lower state courts, federal courts, and legislatures bear greater 
responsibility for the diffusion of tort innovations today than they did in 
the past, and these policymakers represent fine substitutes for less-
involved state supreme courts.372 
 
371.  Another possible explanation for the slower diffusion of tort innovations would 
distinguish between issues and innovations.  It is possible that the pace at which issues work 
their way across state supreme courts has not declined quite as precipitously as the rate of 
adoption of particular innovations that provide a rule or standard applicable to these issues.  
Such a trend might arise from ideological polarization across state courts or a multiplicity of 
“decision points” upon which cases that present innovations can be resolved.  See JOHN P. 
FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 65–70, 85 (1969) (discussing 
the growing number of “decision points” within the law).  Either circumstance would hinder 
courts from rallying around particular solutions (i.e., innovations) to similar issues.  This 
fragmentation would then frustrate the development of bandwagon effects. 
372.  With some innovations, lower-court and federal authority do supply the law in 
many jurisdictions without a state supreme court decision on point.  For example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently surveyed state law relating to so-called 
“innovator liability,” whereby brand-name drug manufacturers may be held liable for 
deficient warnings on their generic equivalents.  In this review, the court cited federal cases as 
the lead authorities on state law in the vast majority of the twenty-two states surveyed.  In re 
Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 941–54 (6th Cir. 2014); 
see also Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n.11 (Conn. 2001) (counting the number of 
states deemed to have adopted the “learned intermediary” doctrine, and relying upon 
federal-court decisions for fifteen of these adoptions, and lower state appellate decisions for 
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With legislatures, the first assertion is certainly true; the second, 
certainly false.  This Article will not rehash the long-running debate 
over whether the common law is to be preferred over statutes as a 
source of legal rules.373  For now, it suffices to state the obvious: 
Legislatures and courts have different competencies and limitations;374 
the legislative process differs from the methods of common-law 
adjudication; and the content of tort-law rules that have been adopted 
by state legislatures (inclusive of the tort-reform measures discussed 
above) recently has diverged from the substance of rules that have 
emerged from the courts.375  These hopefully uncontroversial premises 
make the necessary point—that regardless of whether legislatures try to 
fill the policymaking gap left by the withdrawal of state supreme courts, 
the fruits of any such efforts will not be the same in their pacing and 
content as those produced by judges. 
There also is reason to believe that other courts are not filling the 
vacuum left by state supreme courts.  The slowdown in the diffusion of 
tort doctrines across state supreme courts may be a reflection of, and 
contributing to, a dwindling or at best stagnant conversation regarding 
generic common-law tort principles across all courts, be they state or 
federal, ultimate or inferior.  On this point, consider the following chart, 
which reflects “hits” on a Westlaw search for references (not judicial 
citations, merely references) to the first, second, and third Restatements 
of Torts within published decisions issued by state supreme courts, 
federal courts of appeals, and federal district courts from 1960 to 2013376: 
 
seven adoptions).  That said, no comparably extensive body of lower-court or federal-court 
precedent exists as to other innovations.  See Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 
N.E.2d 1276, 1282 n.5 (Mass. 2007) (identifying only five lower appellate court decisions as 
providing the prevailing state endorsements of the “mode of operation” approach). 
373.  See generally Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus 
Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008) (observing that the 
comparative merits of legal rulemaking through legislation and judicial decisions “have been 
debated since antiquity”). 
374.  See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, 
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND 
MASS TORTS 225, 230 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (listing the institutional capabilities 
necessary for the effective generation and implementation of policies). 
375.  For a discussion of differences that tend to exist between rules related in statutes 
and those developed through the common law, see generally M. Stuart Madden, The Vital 
Common Law: Its Role in a Statutory Age, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 560–72 
(1996). 
376.  Given the different phrasings used in references to these sources (e.g., 
“Restatement of Torts,” “Restatement (Second) of Torts,” “Restatement (Third) of Torts,” 
“Second Restatement of Torts,” etc.), this search was performed using the parameter 
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Chart IX: Published Cases Containing References to the 
Restatements of Torts, 1960–2013 
 
As the chart reveals, references to these Restatements in published 
opinions by state supreme courts and federal courts of appeals have 
declined markedly since their apex in the mid-1980s, and references in 
published federal district-court opinions has been essentially flat since 
the early 1990s.  State intermediate appellate courts were not included 
in the above chart because the ever-growing number of these entities 
makes historical comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, the data from 
published opinions by these tribunals also show a decline in 
Restatement references similar to that which appears in published 
opinions produced by state supreme courts and federal courts of appeal.  
A total of 443 cases published by state intermediate appellate courts in 
1985 were returned as “hits” on the (Restatement /3 Torts) search 
parameter, while only 237 cases published in 2010 appeared.377  There is 
certainly some noise within the data, especially given the rudimentary 
 
(Restatement /3 Torts), thereby identifying opinions that used any of these phrasings within 
their text.  This parameter may have swept in a handful of other usages of these two words in 
close proximity to one another, in which no reference to a Restatement was made, but the 
author’s review of samples of cases returned through this search indicates that any such 
overcounting would be minor. 
377.  If one counts both published and unpublished intermediate appellate court 
decisions, the number of hits for the (Restatement /3 Torts) search parameter goes from 
declining to merely static (from 462 hits in 1985 to 465 in 2010). 
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search parameter that was used.378  Nevertheless, the results indicate a 
broad stagnation or decline in published references to the most-often-
invoked secondary source of generic common-law tort principles, the 
timing of which dovetails with the slowdown in diffusion of tort 
doctrines. 
This stagnation may owe to the fact that federal and lower state 
courts provide an imperfect substitute for state supreme courts as 
sources of tort law.  One obvious reason being, absent unusual 
circumstances, lower state courts and federal courts cannot reverse a 
state supreme court’s prior interpretation of state law.379  Reliance on 
these alternative authorities as sources of innovation, therefore, limits 
the creative universe to concepts that build upon (instead of overturn) 
existing doctrine, at least absent statutory intervention.  Alternative 
sources of caselaw also tend not to provide the certainty and clarity 
associated with opinions issued by state supreme courts. Lower state 
courts and federal courts can, and sometimes do, disagree with each 
other, generating confusion as to the governing law.380  And, of course, 
decisions issued by these courts remain subject to reversal or 
disapproval from the pertinent state supreme court.381 
More importantly, adoptions of tort-law innovations by a medley of 
federal and lower state courts will not necessarily encourage emulation 
across states in the same manner that a cluster of adoptions by a 
comparable number of state supreme courts can. State supreme courts’ 
longtime leadership in the development of tort law means that their 
 
378.  Inclusion of references found in unpublished federal court of appeals decisions 
would not alter the downward trend.  If one sums the references found in published and 
unpublished decisions produced by these courts, references to the Restatements reached their 
high-water mark in 1993, a year that saw 192 such references and have since gradually 
declined to 118 references in 2013.  With district court cases, Westlaw’s capture of an 
increased volume of unpublished decisions as the studied time span has progressed would 
make the juxtaposition of 1960 data, early 1990s data, and 2013 data akin to a comparison of 
apples, oranges, and an ocean liner. 
379.  See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1921 (2011). 
380.  See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts 
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2014) (discussing 
the frequency and significance of intrajurisdictional splits of authority between lower federal 
courts and state courts). 
381.  State supreme courts can overrule their own decisions, of course.  For a discussion 
on this topic, see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Kevin Pybas, State Supreme Court Decisions to 
Overrule Precedent, 1965–1996, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 17, 23 (1998) (discussing the frequency with 
which a sampled set of state supreme courts overruled their precedent). 
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voices echo particularly loudly in the adoption calculus across states.  
The clarity and finality associated with the adoption of an innovation by 
state supreme courts amplifies several of the dynamics, discussed earlier 
in this Article, which can contribute to herding and cascade effects 
across courts.382  By providing an especially clear reflection of where a 
doctrinal innovation stands across jurisdictions, decisions by state 
supreme courts can make it obvious whether a state is lagging behind its 
peers by failing to join an emerging consensus.  Meanwhile, state 
supreme courts often look to the dockets of their counterparts when 
deciding whether to grant review in a discretionary matter.383  When a 
sufficient number of state supreme courts have considered a topic, 
pressure may build for the high courts of other states to do likewise. 
The slowdown in diffusion across state supreme courts also may 
decrease the quality of rules that eventually get adopted.  The 
contributions of “many minds” may or may not improve decision-
making.384  At a minimum, however, the engagement of many state 
supreme courts with a particular issue facilitates a robust dialogue.  The 
seriatim review of a particular innovation by numerous courts can 
present the issue in a variety of factual and procedural postures, permit 
contributions from many parties as well as amicus, prompt critical 
thinking from a larger pool of jurists, and provide iterative opportunities 
to assess and potentially refine the rules adopted by earlier decision-
makers.  A similar dynamic can evolve through the presentation of an 
issue to numerous lower courts or federal courts.  But a dialogue among 
state supreme courts may be superior, at least in certain respects.  
Among these benefits, within state court systems, amici curiae who can 
broaden and enlighten the dialogue that surrounds an issue often get 
involved with a case only after it attracts the attention of a state high 
court. 
Abdication to federal courts, in particular, may lead to elephantine 
rules standing on small pedestals of authority.  A federal judge, sitting in 
diversity, must guess as to how a state supreme court would rule on a 
state-law issue of first impression.385  Article III judges with this 
 
382.  See supra text accompanying notes 256–61. 
383.  See Tarr & Porter, supra note 9, at 243. 
384.  See generally Adrian Vermuele, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009) (distinguishing among and evaluating different types of “many 
minds” arguments). 
385.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Benjamin C. Glassman, 
Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 328 (2005–2006) (discussing the 
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responsibility often assume that, all else being equal, the state’s high 
court would follow whatever approach presently represents the majority 
view regarding the issue.386  As Judge Posner has written, “When state 
law on a question is unclear, . . . the best guess is that the state’s highest 
court, should it ever be presented with the issues, will line up with a 
majority of the states.”387  This “diversity amplification” of a majority 
rule can have two undesirable effects.388  First, it may lead to inadequate 
vetting of the current majority approach, which gets adopted simply 
because it is the prevailing rule.  Second, it may lock a state into the less-
than-optimal approach selected by the federal court.  If a state court 
that confronts the same issue later regards the rule chosen by the federal 
court as an inferior option, but believes that the costs associated with a 
switch to a different rule389 would outweigh the benefits of this 
transition, the state court may resign itself to the status quo. 
B. The Diffusion of Innovations and the Future of Tort Law 
What do these trends mean for the future of tort law?  Predictions 
regarding tort law’s direction often miss the mark.390  Nevertheless, the 
text below will venture three forecasts. 
 
challenges associated with this process). 
386.  See, e.g., Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818, 820 (11th Cir. 1988) (“In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the Georgia court would adopt the 
prevailing rule if called upon to do so.”); Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656, 662 (D. Mass. 
1981) (“It is appropriate, therefore, to consider decisions from other jurisdictions, in an effort 
to divine a majority trend which Maryland would likely follow.”). 
387.  Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). 
388.  But cf. Glassman, supra note 386, 239 (opining that federal courts, when required 
to develop state law, “must exercise their own independent judgment in resolving state-law 
issues according to their own calculations of best outcomes”). 
389.  See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 789 (2002) (discussing the types of “switching costs” that can arise in connection with a 
change in legal rules or norms). 
390.  See Robert L. Rabin, Past as Prelude: The Legacy of Five Landmarks of Twentieth-
Century Injury Law for the Future of Torts, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 52, 76 (M. Stuart 
Madden ed., 2005) (observing that “it is hazardous to look too far into the future” when 
trying to predict the long-term impact of past and ongoing changes in the tort system).  
Yesterday’s torts scholarship is littered with predictions that failed to materialize.  Professor 
Francis Bohlen, the reporter for the Restatement of Torts, opined in 1937 that “[i]t is safe to 
predict that whatever relief is to be granted for mental distress will be confined to cases in 
which the defendants intended to cause it.”  Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 725, 733 (1937).  This observation arguably misstated the law at the time it 
was written and is plainly incorrect today.  Likewise, Professor Fleming James, the father of 
“enterprise liability,” once predicted that if negligence “should retain its present extensive 
role in accident law, it is likely to be further diluted until it becomes ‘negligence in name 
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First, if current trends hold, the pace of common-law change will 
remain slow, and perhaps grow even more sluggish as a dearth of 
broadly accepted common-law innovations reinforces an impression of 
doctrinal torpor.  Legal cultures can change fairly quickly.  The shift 
toward more conservative (both politically and in their willingness to 
innovate) courts that Schwartz identified as a source of doctrinal 
“stabilization” in the 1980s and 1990s391 could easily lurch back toward a 
more innovation-prone judiciary in the decades to come.  But at least 
some of the structural limits on diffusion identified within this Article 
represent substantial barriers to rapid doctrinal change.  It seems likely 
that for the foreseeable future, the supreme courts of many states will 
decide only a handful of common-law tort cases each year.  This ceiling 
on their output will delay and in some cases frustrate doctrinal 
movement.  It remains possible that new controversies, theories, trends, 
or technologies will arise that will rally courts around a doctrinal 
innovation not yet conceived, or already in existence but not widely 
accepted.  But such a move would represent a break from, rather than a 
continuation of, present circumstances.  
Second, the stagnation of the national common-law tort docket may 
 
only,’ or ‘negligence without fault.’”  Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident 
Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 911, 917 (1967) (footnote omitted).  This forecast has flopped, with 
negligence exhibiting “unexpected persistence” as the core framing device in tort law.  G. 
Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 
1341 (2001).  And when perhaps the most prescient torts scholar of all, William Prosser, was 
asked to peer into his crystal ball in 1955, he accurately foresaw the continuation of ongoing 
trends but failed to anticipate novel developments such as mass-tort litigation, federal 
preemption, and the “tort reform” push that began in the 1970s and continues to the present 
day.  William L. Prosser, Recent Developments in the Law of Negligence, 9 ARK. L. REV. & 
BAR ASS’N J. 81 (1955).  Other scholarly works that have offered predictions about the future 
of tort law include KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 8, at 206–36; Jay M. Feinman, Unmaking 
and Remaking Tort Law, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 61 (2005); Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat 
Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883 (2007); William E. Knepper, 
About Tomorrow’s Tort Trends, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1966); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., 
Law in the Future: Tort Law 2003 (pt. 2), TRIAL, July 1983, at 90; Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., 
Law in the Future: Tort Law 2003 (pt. 3), TRIAL, Aug. 1983, at 62; Robert A. Leflar, Accident 
Law – Twenty-Five Years from Now: A Panel Discussion Technique, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 123 
(1959); Clarence Morris, Law and the Future: Torts, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (1956); Willard H. 
Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have a Future, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 782 (1978); Orville Richardson, Law 
in the Future Part One: A Glimpse of Justice to Come, TRIAL, June 1983, at 36; Michael L. 
Rustad, Forward to the Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Symposium Issue on Sophisticated New Tort 
Theories, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2005); Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas 
for the 70’s, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330 (1970); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in 
Personal Injury Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2403, 2433–36 (2000); Gary Wilson et al., The Future 
of Products Liability in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 85 (2000). 
391.  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 648, 700. 
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become self-perpetuating.  The common dialogue regarding tort law 
that crossed jurisdictional lines in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to a 
sense of excitement and coordination in this field,392 which in turn 
encouraged further experimentation.  As Professor Schwartz noted, this 
atmosphere has disappeared.393  The modern reality that generic 
common-law principles lie in relative stasis, with changes occurring 
mostly on the margins, discourages would-be and actual litigants from 
pressing novel arguments and gives judges pause about accepting 
significant innovations.  The shrinkage and fragmentation of the 
national torts docket, meanwhile, has made it difficult to kindle the 
coordinated conversations among courts that could catalyze the 
diffusion of innovations and revive a sense that tort law represents an 
area of significant doctrinal fermentation.  These trends will translate 
into even less fodder and enthusiasm for innovation in tort law going 
forward. 
A third, and final, prediction builds on the first by returning to the 
idea of a “policy window” for legal innovations.394  This concept 
connotes that, while favorable conditions sometimes align for the 
adoption of an innovation, these circumstances are often only 
temporary.  The longer it takes for an innovation to diffuse, the fewer 
states will fit within the prime window of opportunity.395  As pertinent 
here, the shrinking and fragmented common-law dockets of today’s 
state supreme courts make it difficult for any innovation to sweep 
through these bodies in the same way that strict products liability in tort 
did in the 1960s and 1970s, or the tort of wrongful discharge did in the 
1970s and 1980s.  Instead, the delays attendant to modern diffusion will 
allow alternative approaches to blossom, slow down any momentum 
that an innovation might otherwise generate, and alter the environment 
that had been conducive to reform.  For these reasons, not only will the 
diffusion of innovations likely remain slow, or grow even slower, but 
 
392.  Id. at 641 (describing the “excitement” shared by those judges who engaged in 
“public-policy innovation” by adopting strict products liability in tort). 
393.  Id. at 603. 
394.  See supra text accompanying note 22. 
395.  This window may widen slightly in situations where an innovation’s shortcomings 
are what cause the window to close, and these drawbacks only become well-known upon 
application in adopting jurisdictions.  Also, there may be a lingering gravitational pull toward 
a majority rule, at least across indifferent jurisdictions, in scenarios where a sufficient number 
of states adopted a rule during the window.  On the whole, however, the delayed nature of 
diffusion today threatens to impede an innovation’s ability to capitalize upon opportune 
circumstances. 
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new ideas also may not spread as widely as they once did, i.e., more 
holdouts will appear. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article merely provides a first take on the diffusion of 
innovations in tort law.  It does not purport to create a comprehensive 
model for this process, similar to those that marketing scholars have 
prepared to describe and forecast the spread of new products.396  Rather, 
the text above has detailed the basic features of a diffusion model used 
in other contexts,397 discussed its possible application to the diffusion of 
innovations in tort law,398 and then invoked aspects of that model, as 
appropriate, in charting and examining the diffusion of innovations in 
tort law.399  As this Article has observed, the basic framework for 
describing the diffusion of innovations requires several important 
adjustments to make sense and lend value in this context. 
At the same time, perhaps tort scholars can draw a useful lesson or 
two from other branches of diffusion research.  Companies that market 
new products commonly use diffusion models to help forecast the 
success or failure of these innovations.  In emphasizing the idiosyncratic 
nature of the development of tort doctrine, researchers may have 
overlooked the possibility that this process also has some predictable 
features.  Put another way, just because the diffusion of tort doctrines 
tends to be unpredictable does not necessarily mean that nothing can be 
foreseen about this process. 
While the sort of predictive precision sought by product marketers 
seems unrealistic in the common-law context, very basic probabilistic 
estimates of doctrinal diffusion are not totally out of the question.  It 
may be impossible to ascertain whether a particular doctrinal innovation 
will succeed or fail.  But one can venture rough parameters for how 
quickly a “successful” innovation will attract adherents.  For instance, 
even the simple analysis presented above makes it apparent that 
common-law innovations almost never spread at a rate of more than 
three jurisdictions per year, with some flagging near the point of full 
diffusion.  Hence, in predicting the diffusion of a new doctrine in tort 
 
396.  E.g., Frank Bass, A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables, 15 
MGMT. SCI. 15 215 (1969).  
397.  See supra Part II. 
398.  See supra Part III.  
399.  See supra Parts IV, V. 
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law, a twenty-year-minimum estimate for “full” diffusion may represent 
a best case scenario.  Other similar rules of thumb may emerge from 
closer study by other researchers.  Tort law is a complex system, but so 
too are weather patterns, political campaigns, sporting contests, and 
other contexts that admit to probabilistic predictions.  Even if one 
acknowledges the especially chancy character of the diffusion of tort 
doctrines, it remains possible that further research can make the future 
of tort law at least slightly less blurry. 
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APPENDIX A 
The text below relates the cases associated with the data in supra 
Chart VIII at note 292. 
 
California 2010: Ruiz v. Podolsky, 237 P.3d 584 (Cal. 2010); Klein v. 
United States, 235 P.3d 42 (Cal. 2010); Tverberg v. Fillner Constr., 232 
P.3d 656 (Cal. 2010); Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342 
(Cal. 2010). 
 
California 1970: Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1970); 
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970); Bozanich v. Kenney, 
477 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970); Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 471 P.2d 
988 (Cal. 1970); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d 360 
(Cal. 1970); Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1970); Pike 
v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 
466 P.2d 722 (Cal. 1970); Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 
61 (Cal. 1970). 
 
New Jersey 2010: Ryan v. Renny, 999 A.2d 427 (N.J. 2010); Salzano 
v. N.J. Media Grp. Inc., 993 A.2d 778 (N.J. 2010); Dean v. Barrett 
Homes, Inc., 8 A.3d 766 (N.J. 2010) (Products Liability Act, but 
applying common-law principles); Stelluti v. Casapeen Enters., LLC, 1 
A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010); Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 1 A.3d 
618 (N.J. 2010). 
 
New Jersey 1970: Yerzy v. Levine, 271 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1970); France 
v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); Immer v. Risko, 267 
A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970); Grove v. Seltzer, 266 A.2d 301 (N.J. 1970); 
McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 266 A.2d 284 (N.J. 1970); Gallas v. 
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 265 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1970); Black v. Pub. 
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 265 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1970); Zamel v. Port of N.Y. 
Auth., 264 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1970); Willis v. Dep’t of Conservation & 
Econ. Dev., 264 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1970); Fritsche v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 261 A.2d 657 (N.J. 1970); Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 260 A.2d 510 
(N.J. 1970); Germann v. Matriss, 260 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1970). 
 
Minnesota 2010: Booth v. Gades, 788 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 2010); Zutz 
v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010); J.E.B. v. Danks, 785 N.W.2d 741 
(Minn. 2010); Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2010); 
Lickteig v. Kolar, 782 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2010). 
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Minnesota 1970: Raymond v. Baehr, 184 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 1970); 
McDonald v. Stewart, 182 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1970); Seivert v. Bass, 181 
N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1970); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882 
(Minn. 1970); Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 181 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 
1970); Emerson v. Eystad, 181 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1970); Olson v. 
Hartwig, 180 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1970); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. of Minn., Inc., 180 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1970); McDonald v. Vokaty, 
180 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1970); Elm v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 180 N.W.2d 
262 (Minn. 1970); Granley v. Crandall, 180 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 1970); 
Swang v. Hauser, 180 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1970); Christy v. Saliterman, 
179 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1970); Holmboe v. Cook, 179 N.W.2d 276 
(Minn. 1970); Conroy v. Kleinman Realty Co., 179 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 
1970); Smith v. Lafortune, 179 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. 1970); A & J Builders 
Inc. v. Harms, 179 N.W.2d 98 (Minn. 1970); Edwards v. Engen, 178 
N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1970); Kluger v. Gallett, 178 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 
1970); Tschannen v. Hillsheim, 178 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 1970); Mjos v. 
Village of Howard Lake, 178 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1970); Holmgren v. 
Heisick, 178 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1970); Mathews v. Mills, 178 N.W.2d 
841 (Minn. 1970); Wallace v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1970); 
Beier v. Int’l Harvester Co., 178 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1970); Anderson v. 
St. Thomas More Newman Ctr., 178 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1970); 
Augustine v. Hitzman, 178 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1970); Synnott v. Midway 
Hosp., 178 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. 1970); Thoen v. Hatton, 177 N.W.2d 815 
(Minn. 1970); Schwab v. Soldner, 177 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1970); Hovey 
v. Wagoner, 177 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1970); DeWitt v. Schuhbauer, 177 
N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1970); Holland v. Hedenstad, 177 N.W.2d 784 
(Minn. 1970); Fiwka v. Johannes, 177 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1970); Smith v. 
Rekucki, 177 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1970); B.F. Griebenow, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 177 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1970); May v. Lemmon, 177 N.W.2d 
298 (Minn. 1970); Thole v. Noorlun, 177 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1970); 
Dubbs v. Trimont Cmty. Hosp., 177 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 1970); Strandjord 
v. Exley, 177 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. 1970); Erschens v. County of Lincoln, 
177 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1970); Bossons v. Hertz Corp., 176 N.W.2d 882 
(Minn. 1970); Johnson v. Callisto, 176 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1970); Shafer 
v. Gaylord, 176 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 1970); Soltis v. Geary, 176 N.W.2d 
633 (Minn. 1970); Rochester Wood Specialties, Inc. v. Rions, 176 
N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1970); Grams v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 742, 176 
N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 1970); Kloos v. Soo Line R.R. 176 N.W.2d 274 
(Minn. 1970); Weiss v. Great N. Ry. Co., 176 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. 1970) 
Ray v. Wagner, 176 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 1970); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor 
Travel Servs., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Lyman v. Recreational 
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Activities, Inc., 175 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1970); Berryman v. Riegert, 175 
N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1970); Schultz v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 175 N.W.2d 
177 (Minn. 1970); McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 175 N.W.2d 144 
(Minn. 1970); Pierson v. Edstrom, 174 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1970); Reese 
v. Henke, 174 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1970); Eicher v. Jones, 173 N.W.2d 
427 (Minn. 1970); Schmidt v. Beninga, 173 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 1970). 
 
Maine 2010: Lyman v. Huber, 10 A.3d 707 (Me. 2010); In re 
Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492 (Me. 
2010); Searle v. Town of Bucksport, 3 A.3d 390 (Me. 2010); Reardon v. 
Larkin, 3 A.3d 376 (Me. 2010); Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, LP, 2 
A.3d 276 (Me. 2010); Tibbetts v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 999 A.2d 930 (Me. 
2010); Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342 (Me. 2010); Ma v. Bryan, 997 
A.2d 755 (Me. 2010); Johnston v. Me. Energy Recovery Co., Ltd. 
P’ship., 997 A.2d 741 (Me. 2010); Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 
997 A.2d 84 (Me. 2010); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 995 
A.2d 651 (Me. 2010); Smith v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 988 A.2d 968 (Me. 
2010); Wahlcometroflex, Inc. v. Baldwin, 991 A.2d 44 (Me. 2010). 
 
Maine 1970: Gagnon v. Turgeon, 271 A.2d 634 (Me. 1970); 
Thompson v. Johnson, 270 A.2d 879 (Me. 1970); Ashemore v. 
Litsinberger, 270 A.2d 448 (Me. 1970); St. Pierre v. Houde, 269 A.2d 538 
(Me. 1970); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 
(Me. 1970); Rodway v. Wiswall, 267 A.2d 374 (Me. 1970); Collett v. 
Bither, 262 A.2d 353 (Me. 1970); Jamieson v. Lewiston-Gorham 
Raceways, Inc., 261 A.2d 860 (Me. 1970). 
 
Washington 2010: Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., 
Inc., 243 P.3d 521 (Wash. 2010); Curtis v. Lein, 239 P.3d 1078 (Wash. 
2010); Clayton v. Wilson, 227 P.3d 278 (Wash. 2010). 
 
Washington 1970: Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co., 478 P.2d 735 
(Wash. 1970); Cresap v. Pac. Island Navigation Co., 478 P.2d 223 (Wash. 
1970); Shasky v. Burden, 470 P.2d 544 (Wash. 1970); Sorensen v. Estate 
of McDonald, 470 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1970); Egan v. Morris, 468 P.2d 681 
(Wash. 1970); Crowe v. Prinzing, 468 P.2d 450 (Wash. 1970); Miles v. St. 
Regis Paper Co., 467 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1970); Pate v. Tyee Motor Inn, 
Inc., 467 P.2d 301 (Wash. 1970); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 
292 (Wash. 1970); Bjorvatn v. Pac. Mech. Constr., Inc., 464 P.2d 432 
(Wash. 1970). 
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Utah 2010: Jensen v. Young, 245 P.3d 731 (Utah 2010); Peak Alarm 
Co., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 243 P.3d 1221 (Utah 2010); Achuleta v. 
St. Mark’s Hosp., 238 P.3d 1044 (Utah 2010); Egbert v. Nissan Motor 
Co., Ltd., 228 P.3d 737 (Utah 2010); Clegg v. Wasatch County, 227 P.3d 
1243 (Utah 2010). 
 
Utah 1970: Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970); 
Stratton v. Nielsen, 477 P.2d 152 (Utah 1970); Hill v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970); Willden v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 476 P.2d 
687 (Utah 1970); Morgan v. Pistone, 475 P.2d 839 (Utah 1970); Davis v. 
Mulholland, 475 P.2d 834 (Utah 1970); Pollick v. J.C. Penney Co., 473 
P.2d 394 (Utah 1970); Brown v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970); 
Rhiness v. Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 (Utah 1970); Keller v. Patrakis, 471 P.2d 
159 (Utah 1970); Simpson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1970); Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970); 
Ujifusa v. Nat’l Housewares, Inc., 469 P.2d 7 (Utah 1970); Velasquez v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970); Stevens v. Colo. Fuel & 
Iron, 469 P.2d 3 (Utah 1970); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 
467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970); Christensen v. Cordova, 467 P.2d 405 (Utah 
1970); Melich v. Schelin, 465 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1970); Bramel v. Utah 
State Road Comm’n, 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970); Middleton v. Cox, 465 
P.2d 530 (Utah 1970); Calahan v. Wood, 465 P.2d 169 (Utah 1970); Carr 
v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 464 P.2d 580 (Utah 1970); Thompson v. 
Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 801 (Utah 1970). 
 
New York 2010: San Marco v. Village/Town of Mount Kisco, 944 
N.E.2d 1098 (N.Y. 2010); Roddy v. Nederlander Producing Co. of Am., 
Inc., 941 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 2010); Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917 
(N.Y. 2010); Simmons v. Sacchetti, 934 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 2010); Brandy 
v. Eden Cent. Sch. Dist., 934 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 2010); Estate of 
Schneider v. Finmann, 933 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 2010); Adams v. Genie 
Indus., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 2010); Trupia ex rel. Trupia v. Lake 
George Cent. Sch. Dist., 927 N.E.2d 547 (N.Y. 2010). 
 
New York 1970: Barrett v. McNulty, 266 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1970); 
Biberias v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 265 N.E.2d 775 (N.Y. 1970); Ritto v. 
Goldberg, 265 N.E.2d 772 (N.Y. 1970); Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d 
762 (N.Y. 1970); Green v. Downs, 265 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1970); 
Rindfleisch v. State, 263 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1970); Meagher v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 261 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1970); Shiles v. News Syndicate 
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Co., 261 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1970); Miles v. R&M Appliance Sales, Inc., 
259 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. 1970); Stanton v. State, 259 N.E.2d 494 (N.Y. 
1970); Trs. in Office N.Y. Shipping Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n 
(IND) Welfare Fund v. S.T. Grand, Inc., 259 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1970); 
Peters v. Gersch, 259 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1970); Manzitto v. Jack Parker 
Constr. Corp., 259 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1970); Doyle v. Jennings, 258 
N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1970); Hayes v. Malkan, 258 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1970); 
Potter v. Furniture Mfrs. Bldg., Inc., 258 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1970); Rivers 
v. Sauter, 258 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 1970); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). 
 
Ohio 2010: Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc., 932 N.E.2d 313 
(Ohio 2010); State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
931 N.E.2d 1082 (Ohio 2010); Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010); Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio 
2010); Jaques v. Manton, 928 N.E.2d 434 (Ohio 2010); Beckett v. 
Warren, 921 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 2010). 
 
Ohio 1970: Deming v. Osinski, 265 N.E.2d 554 (Ohio 1970); Krupp v. 
Poor, 265 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio 1970); Dean v. Angelas, 264 N.E.2d 911 
(Ohio 1970); Mikula v. Tailors, 263 N.E.2d 316 (Ohio 1970); Pryor v. 
Webber, 263 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970); Hasapes v. Drake, 262 N.E.2d 870 
(Ohio 1970); Rohde v. Farmer, 262 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1970); Darnell v. 
Eastman, 261 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1970); Agnew v. Porter, 260 N.E.2d 830 
(Ohio 1970); Briere v. Lathrop Co., 258 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio 1970); 
Wholesale Elec. & Supply, Inc. v. Robusky, 258 N.E.2d 432 (Ohio 1970); 
Durham v. Gabriel, 258 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio 1970); Clouston v. Remlinger 
Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 1970); Crowe v. 
Bumford, 258 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio 1970); Braun v. Styles, 258 N.E.2d 109 
(Ohio 1970); Morris v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 254 N.E.2d 683 
(Ohio 1970); Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co., 262 N.E.2d 703 
(Ohio 1970); Mann v. Lewis, 259 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1970); Burwell v. 
Maynard, 255 N.E.2d 628 (Ohio 1970); Robert Neff & Sons, Inc. v. City 
of Lancaster, 254 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio 1970). 
 
Georgia 2010: Robinson v. Boyd, 701 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 2010); Deen v. 
Stevens, 698 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 2010); Cowart v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 
(Ga. 2010); Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 2010); Walker v. 
Cromartie, 696 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 2010); Opensided MRI of Atlanta, LLC 
v. Chandler, 696 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 2010); Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 694 
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S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2010); Hicks v. Heard, 692 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. 2010); 
Holmes v. Grubman, 691 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 2010); Summerlin v. Ga. Pines 
Cmty. Serv. Bd., 690 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 2010); Broda v. Dziwura, 689 
S.E.2d 319 (Ga. 2010). 
 
Georgia 1970: Cooper v. Plott, 177 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 1970); Morgan v. 
Reeves, 177 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 1970); Thompson v. Ingram, 177 S.E.2d 61 
(Ga. 1970); Buckhead Glass Co. v. Taylor, 174 S.E.2d 568 (Ga. 1970); 
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 173 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 1970); Nobles v. 
H.W. Durham & Co., 173 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1970); Kiker v. Anderson, 172 
S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 1970). 
 
Missouri 2010: Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 
S.W.3d 112 (Mo. 2010); D.R. Sherry Constr., Ltd. v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 316 S.W.3d 899 (Mo. 2010); Spradling v. SSM Health Care St. 
Louis, 313 S.W.3d 683 (Mo. 2010); Hayes v. Price, 313 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. 
2010); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010). 
 
Missouri 1970: Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 
1970); Grothe v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 460 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 
1970); Silberstein v. Berwald, 460 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. 1970); McWilliams v. 
Wright, 460 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1970); Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 
1970); Wors v. Glasgow Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. 
1970); Stover v. Patrick, 459 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1970); Young v. Grotsky, 
459 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. 1970); Burns v. Owens, 459 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1970); 
Furlow v. Campbell, 459 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1970); Falke v. Snyder, 459 
S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1970); Erny v. Revlon, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 
1970); Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Prods. Co., 458 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1970); 
Friederich v. Chamberlain, 458 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. 1970); Moore v. Parks, 
458 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1970); Mathes v. Trump, 458 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 
1970); Dalby v. Hercules, Inc., 458 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1970); Pruneau v. 
Cain, 458 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1970); Cochran v. Johnson, 458 S.W.2d 254 
(Mo. 1970); Blackburn v. Swift, 457 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1970); Feinstein v. 
Edward Livingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1970); Claridge v. 
Watson Terrace Christian Church of St. Louis, 457 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 
1970); Markman v. Bi-State Transit Sys., 457 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1970); 
Slusher v. United Elec. Coal Cos., 456 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1970); Cover v. 
Phillips Pipe Line Co., 454 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1970); Creager v. Chilson, 
453 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1970); Barnett v. Schumacher, 453 S.W.2d 934 
(Mo. 1970); Frogge v. Nyquist Plumbing & Ditching Co., 453 S.W.2d 913 
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(Mo. 1970); Green v. Sutton, 452 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1970); McCarthy v. 
Wulff, 452 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1970); Salanski v. Enright, 452 S.W.2d 143 
(Mo. 1970); Miller v. Higgins, 452 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1970); Denny v. 
Mathieu, 452 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1970); S. Agency Co. v. Hampton Bank 
of St. Louis, 452 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1970); Piepmeyer v. Johnson, 452 
S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1970); Arbogast v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 452 
S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1970); Thompson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 451 S.W.2d 147 
(Mo. 1970); Brewer v. Swift & Co., 451 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1970); 
Stahlheber v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970); Gormly v. 
Johnson, 451 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1970); Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 451 
S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1970); Brownridge v. Leslie, 450 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1970); 
Gaston v. Coop. Farm Chems. Ass’n, 450 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1970); 
Headrick v. Dowdy, 450 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1970); Zipp v. Gasen’s Drug 
Stores, Inc., 449 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1970); Noel v. Roberts, 449 S.W.2d 
572 (Mo. 1970); Joly v. Wippler, 449 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1970); Heberer v. 
Duncan, 449 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1970). 
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APPENDIX B 
This appendix relates the cases and statutes that supply the data in 
the charts within the main Article text, except as provided in 
accompanying footnotes. 
 
Strict Products Liability in Tort: Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 
Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. 
1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965); Dealers 
Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co. 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Santor v. 
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965); State Stove Mfg. 
Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 
1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); 
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967); Heaton v. 
Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 
Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 
N.W.2d 55 (1967); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968); 
Act of Apr. 9, 1968, No. 1085, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1166, 1166–67; Clary v. 
Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); Keener v. 
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Buttrick v. Arthur 
Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969); Ulmer v. Ford Motor 
Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 
470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970); Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 
(Nev. 1970); Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 
1971); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 1971); Ritter v. 
Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1971); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 
497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); Act of Feb. 13, 1973, Act 111, § 1, 1973 Ark. 
Acts 331, 331–32; Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 300 N.E.2d 335 
(Ind. 1973); Act of Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 466, § 1, 1973 Me. Laws 822, 822; 
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 
1973); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973); Engberg v. Ford 
Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 
518 P.2d 857 (Idaho 1974); Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 
57 (N.D. 1974); Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 
1974); Act of July 9, 1974, No. 1184, § 1, 1974 S.C. Acts 2782, 2782; Higel 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 
A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975); Atkins v. Am. Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 
1976); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Brooks 
v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 
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A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Ernest W. Hanh, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 
152 (Utah 1979); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 
666 (W. Va. 1979); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 
1986). 
 
Right to Privacy: Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, § 2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 
308, 308; Act of Mar. 7, 1904, ch. 66, § 2, 1904 Va. Acts 111, 112; 
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Itzkovitch v. 
Whitaker, 39 So. 499 (La. 1905); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 
364 (Ky. 1909); Act of Mar. 11, 1909, ch. 61, § 3, 1909 Utah Laws 83, 83; 
Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 
195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938); Holloman v. Life Ins., 7 S.E.2d 169 (S.C. 1940); 
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941); Barber v. Time, 
Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 
1944); Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133 (Ariz. 1945); 
State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946); Smith v. Doss, 
37 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 
911 (Mich. 1948); Gill v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); 
Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816 (Mont. 1952); Bremmer v. Journal-
Tribune Publ’g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1956); Housh v. Peth, 133 
N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956); In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679 (Pa. 1956); Roach v. 
Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l 
Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 
22 (Ark. 1962); Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841 (Md. 1962); Hubbard v. 
Journal Publ’g Co., 368 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1962); Barbieri v. News-Journal 
Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); Truxes v. Keneo Enters., Inc., 119 
N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 
1964); Act of July 9, 1965, ch. 431, § 2, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 850, 850; 
Martin v. Senators, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1967); Fergerstrom v. 
Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Haw. 1968); Rugg v. 
McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250 
(Ill. 1970); Act of May 5, 1972, ch. 281, § 1, 1972 R.I. Pub. Laws 1091, 
1091–92; Act of Oct. 23, 1973, ch. 941, 1973 Mass. Acts 968, 968; Billings 
v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 
365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ’g Co., 326 So. 
2d 471 (Miss. 1976); Act of May 1. 1979, Legis. B. 394, §§ 2–4, 1979 Neb. 
Laws 1130, 1130–31; Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 
80 N.W.2d 129 (1979); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 
1981); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 
(Conn. 1982); Montesano v. Donrey Media Grp., 668 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 
1983); Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d 700 (Vt. 1984); 
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Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 (N.J. 1988); Luedtke v. Nabors 
Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989); Lake v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). 
 
Bystander NIED: Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182 (Md. 1933); 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Wilson v. Lund, 491 P.2d 1287 
(Wash. 1971); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 
1972); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974); D’Ambra v. United 
States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 
(Colo. 1978); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); 
Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 
300 (N.H. 1979); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 
417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 
(Vt. 1980); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Entex, Inc. v. 
McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982); Rickey v. Chi. Transit Auth., 457 
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1983); Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 
1983); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Paugh v. 
Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 
(N.Y. 1984); Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); James v. Lieb, 
375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985); 
Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985); Garrett 
by Kravit v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985); 
Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986); 
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986); Freeman v. City of 
Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 
556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp., 799 
S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology 
Assoc., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990); Shaumber v. Henderson, 579 
N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Hammond v. Cent. Lane Commc’ns Ctr., 816 
P.2d 593 (Or. 1991); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279 (Me. 1992); 
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992); Heldreth v. 
Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992); Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 
852 (Conn. 1996); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996); 
Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. 1999); Lee v. State Farm 
Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2000); Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 
706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005). 
 
Loss of a Chance: Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); 
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 
1983); Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983); Thompson v. 
Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984); Evers v. 
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Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 
824 (Mont. 1985); Brown v. Koulizakis, 331 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1985); 
DeBurkate v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Hastings v. Baton 
Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713 (La. 1986); McKellips v. Saint Francis 
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 
N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Ehlinger ex rel. Ehlinger v. Sipes, 155 Wis. 2d 1, 
454 N.W.2d 754 (1990); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 
(Nev. 1991); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992); 
Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); Roberts v. Ohio 
Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); Holton v. 
Mem’l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202 (Ill. 1997); Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 
1279 (N.M. 1999); Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. 2000); 
Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366 (S.D. 2000); McMackin v. Johnson 
Cty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094 (Wyo. 2003); Matsuyama v. 
Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008); Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. 
Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013). 
 
Crashworthiness: Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969); 
Garst v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47 (Kan. 1971); Brandenburger v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Bolm v. 
Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973); Engberg v. Ford Motor 
Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 
S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 
737 (Md. 1974); Friedrich v. Anderson, 217 N.W.2d 831 (Neb. 1974); 
Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); 
Baumgardner v. Am. Motors Corp., 522 P.2d 829 (Wash. 1974); Arbet v. 
Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975); Horn v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 551 P.2d 398 (Cal. 1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 
201 (Fla. 1976); Wernimont v. Int’l Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137 
(Idaho 1976); McMullen v. Volkswagen of Am., 545 P.2d 117 (Or. 1976); 
Buehler v. Whalen, 374 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 1978); Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 
N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 
(Wyo. 1978); Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); 
Leichthamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981); Lee v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985); Camacho v. Honda 
Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987); Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 410 
N.W.2d 706 (Mich. 1987); Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135 (Ariz. 
1988); Warren v. Colombo, 377 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Miller 
v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990); Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 
796 P.2d 1092 (Nev. 1990); Hillricks v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 
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1991); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991); 
Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995); Slone v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 457 S.E.2d 51 (Va. 1995); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Wolker, 
686 A.2d 170 (Del. 1996); Mistich v. Volkswagen of Ger., Inc., 666 So. 
2d 1073 (La. 1996); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 
1997); Cooper v. Gen. Motors Corp., 702 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1997); Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998); Trull v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477 (N.H. 2000); Toyota Motor 
Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35 (Ky. 2004); Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 
209 (Pa. 2005); Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 
2007). 
 
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy: Frampton v. 
Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Geary v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); 
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Kelsay v. 
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978); Harless v. First Nat. Bank in 
Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978); Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); Tameny v. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 
127 (Mont. 1980); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 
(Conn. 1980); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981); 
Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981); 
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); 
Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982); 
Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); 
Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 
666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 
2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Hansen v. Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 
1984); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); 
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); 
Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985); 
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Bowman 
v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985); Knight v. Am. 
Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986); DeRose v. Putnam 
Mgmt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428 (Mass. 1986); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 
586 (Vt. 1986); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 
1987); Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987); 
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988); Springer v. 
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Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988); Coleman v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 647 (Kan. 1988); Johnson v. 
Kreiser’s, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988); Chavez v. Manville Prods. 
Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., Inc., 381 
S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Griess v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989); Greeley v. 
Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990); 
Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992); Martin Marietta 
Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992); McArn v. Allied Bruce-
Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993); Fleshner v. Pepose 
Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010). 
 
Strict Liability for Concussions Associated with Blasting: Colton v. 
Onderdonk, 10 P. 395 (Cal. 1886); Fitzsimmons & Connell Co. v. Braun, 
65 N.E. 249 (Ill. 1902); Longtin v. Persell, 76 P.2d 699 (Mont. 1904); 
Gossett v. S. Ry. Co., 89 S.W. 737 (Tenn. 1905); Hickey v. McCabe & 
Bikler, 75 A. 404 (R.I. 1910); Patrick v. Smith, 134 P. 1076 (Wash. 1913); 
Lovden v. City of Cincinnati, 106 N.E. 970 (Ohio 1914); Watson v. Miss. 
River Power Co., 156 N.W. 188 (Iowa 1916); City of Muskogee v. 
Hancock, 158 P. 622 (Okla. 1916); Feinberg v. Wis. Granite Co., 224 
N.W. 184 (S.D. 1929); Wendt v. Yant Const. Co., 249 N.W. 599 (Neb. 
1933); Madsen v. E. Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942); Brown v. 
L.S. Lunder Const. Co., 240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942); Federoff v. 
Harrison Const. Co., 66 A.2d 817 (Pa. 1949); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. 
Elliott & Watrous Eng’g Co., 79 A.2d 591 (Conn. 1951); Bedell v. 
Goulter, 261 P.2d 842 (Or. 1953); Cent. Expl. Co. v. Gray, 70 So. 2d 33 
(Miss. 1954); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845 (La. 
1955); Garden of the Gods Vill. v. Hellman, 294 P.2d 597 (Colo. 1956); 
Beckstrom v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 42 Haw. 353 (Hawaii 1958); 
Summers v. Tavern Rock Sand Co., 315 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1958); Thigpen 
v. Skousen & Hise, 327 P.2d 802 (N.M. 1958); Wallace v. A. H. Guion & 
Co., 117 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 1960); Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting 
Corp., 118 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1961); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 
Thiokol Chem. Corp., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962); Enos Coal Mining Co. 
v. Schuchart, 188 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1963); Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. 
Blythe Bros. Co., 131 S.E.2d 900 (N.C. 1963); Malloy v. Lane Constr. 
Corp., 194 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1963); Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 
755 (Ky. 1965); W. Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Mason, 402 S.W.2d 657 
(Ark. 1966); Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969); Harper v. 
Regency Dev. Co., 399 So. 2d 248 (Ala. 1981); Laughon & Johnson, Inc. 
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v. Burch, 278 S.E.2d 856 (Va. 1981); Dyer v. Me. Drilling & Blasting, 
Inc., 984 A.2d 210 (Me. 2009). 
 
Abrogate Impact Rule: Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890); 
Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892); Sloane v. S. 
Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320 (Cal. 1896); Mack v. South-Bound R. Co., 29 S.E. 
905 (S.C. 1898); Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068 (Iowa 1902); Watkins v. 
Kaolin Mfg. Co., 42 S.E. 983 (N.C. 1902); Stewart v. Ark. S. R. Co., 36 
So. 676 (La. 1904); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 66 A. 202 (R.I. 1907); 
Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 73 A. 688 (Md. 1909); Pankopf v. 
Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. 
Bernstein, 194 S.W. 902 (Tenn. 1917); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 167 N.W. 
398 (S.D. 1918); Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244 (W. Va. 1924); 
Hanford v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 203 N.W. 643 (Neb. 1925); 
Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 150 A. 540 (N.H. 1930); 
Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 28 P.2d 862 (Mont. 1934); Frazee v. W. Dairy 
Prods., 47 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1935); Orlo v. Conn. Co., 21 A.2d 402 
(Conn. 1941); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961); Robb v. 
Penn. R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 
(N.J. 1965); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656 (Vt. 1967); 
City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 466 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1970); Rodrigues v. 
State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 
Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Dailey v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 
1970); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Penn. 1970); Whetham v. 
Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Hughes v. Moore, 197 
S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973); First Nat’l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 
1975); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978); Dziokonski v. 
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 
400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Rickey v. Chi. Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 
(Ill. 1983); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Ramirez v. 
Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 
(Ohio 1983); Tommy’s Elbow Room v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 
(Alaska 1986); Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 
P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988); 
Czaplicki v. Gording Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 775 P.2d 640 (Idaho 1989); 
Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023 (Nev. 2000); Osborne v. Keeney, 399 
S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012). 
 
Attractive Nuisance Rule: Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 
610 (1858); Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875); 
Kansas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kan. 686 (1879); A. & N. R. 
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Co. v. Bailey, 9 N.W. 50 (Neb. 1881); Nagel v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Mo. 
653 (1882); Evansich v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 57 Tex. 123 (1882); 
Bramsom’s Adm’r v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 (1884); Ferguson v. Columbus 
& Rome Ry., 75 Ga. 637 (1885); Bridger v. Asheville & Spartanburg 
R.R. Co., 25 S.C. 24 (1886); Mackey v. Mayor of Vicksburg, 2 So. 178 
(Miss. 1887); Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C., & St. L. R. Co., 12 N.E. 451 
(Ohio 1887); Penso v. McCormick, 25 N.E. 156 (Ind. 1890); Ilwaco Ry. 
& Nav. Co. v. Hedrick, 25 P. 335 (Wash. 1890); Barrett v. S. Pac. R.R. 
Co., 27 P. 666 (Cal. 1891); O’Conner v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 10 So. 678 (La. 
1892); Brinkley Car-Works & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 31 S.W. 154 (Ark. 
1895); City of Pekin v. McMahon, 39 N.E. 484 (Ill. 1895); O’Leary v. 
Brooks Elevator Co., 75 N.W. 919 (N.D. 1898); Kramer v. S. Ry. Co., 37 
S.E. 468 (N.C. 1900); Ala. G.S.R. v. Crocker, 31 So. 561 (Ala. 1901); 
Kopplekom v. Colo. Cement-Pipe Co., 64 P. 1047 (Colo. 1901); York v. 
Pac. & I. N. Ry. Co., 69 P. 1042 (Idaho 1902); Edgington v. Burlington, 
C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 90 N.W. 95 (Iowa 1902); Driscoll v. Clark, 80 P. 1 
(Mont. 1905); Brown v. Salt Lake City, 93 P. 570 (Utah 1908); City of 
Shawnee v. Creek, 137 P. 724 (Okla. 1913); Baxter v. Park, 184 N.W. 198 
(S.D. 1921); Stark v. Holtzclaw, 105 So. 330 (Fla. 1925); Colebank v. 
Nellie Coal & Coke Co., 145 S.E. 748 (W. Va. 1928); Slattery v. Drake, 
281 P. 846 (Or. 1929); Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 215 Wis. 
47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934); Afton Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 54 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 
1936); Thompson v. Reading Co., 23 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1942); Lee v. Salt 
Water Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 238 P.2d 945 (Ariz. 1951); Petrak v. 
Cooke Contracting Co., 46 N.W.2d 574 (Mich. 1951); Strang v. S. Jersey 
Broad. Co., 86 A.2d 777 (N.J. 1952); Selby v. Tolbert, 249 P.2d 498 
(N.M. 1952); Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Nav. Co., 391 P.2d 15 (Alaska 
1964); Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 235 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 
1968); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969); 
Moonan v. Clark Wellpoint Corp., 268 A.2d 384 (Conn. 1970); Haddad 
v. First Nat’l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d 93 (R.I. 1971); Jones v. Billings, 289 
A.2d 39 (Me. 1972); Kimberlin v. Lear, 500 P.2d 1022 (Nev. 1972); 
Schorah v. Carey, 331 A.2d 383 (Del. 1975); Oullette v. Blanchard, 364 
A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976); Soule v. Mass. Elec. Co., 390 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 
1979). 
 
False Light: Hinish v. Meier & Frank, Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941); 
State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946); Gill v. Curtis 
Pub. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 
2d 321 (Ala. 1961); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 
(Idaho 1961); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); 
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Truxes v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Household 
Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878 (Md. 1969); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 
327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1975); 
Berthiaume’s Estate v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Winegard v. 
Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1977); Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 590 
S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 
1386 (La. 1979); Act of May 1, 1979, Legis. B. 394, § 4, 1979 Neb. Laws 
1130, 1131; McCormack v. Okla. Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980); 
Act of May 16, 1980, ch. 403, § 1, 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 1565, 1567; 
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 
1981); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 
(Conn. 1982); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. 
Va. 1983); Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d 700 (Vt. 1984); 
Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1986); Romaine 
v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 (N.J. 1988); Cox. v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1988); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 
1989); Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987 
(Ill. 1989); Lance v. Hagedone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230 (Mont. 1993); 
PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1121 (Nev. 1994); Moore v. Sun 
Pub. Corp., 881 P.2d 735 (N.M. 1994); West v. Media Gen. 
Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. 2001); Chung v. McCabe 
Hamilton & Renny Co., Ltd., 128 P.3d 833 (Haw. 2006); Welling v. 
Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2006); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41 
(Alaska 2007). 
 
Mode of Operation: Lewis v. Barber’s Super Mkts., Inc., 384 P.2d 
470 (N.M. 1963); Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513 
(N.J. 1966); Morgan v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 145 S.E.2d 877 (N.C. 
1966); Strack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 35 Wis. 2d 51, 150 N.W.2d 
361 (1967); Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt. 1970); 
Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973); Gonzales v. 
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976); Buttrey Food Stores 
Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980); Lingerfelt v. Winn-Dixie 
Tex., Inc., 645 P.2d 485, 489 (Okla. 1982); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 
658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888 
(Wash. 1983); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 298 (Tex. 
1983); McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 707 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1985); 
Waller v. Dixieland Food Stores, Inc., 492 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1986); 
Chiara v. Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1987); 
Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo. 1989); Jackson 
v. K-Mart Corp., 840 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1992); Sprague v. Lucky Stores, 
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Inc., 849 P.2d 320 (Nev. 1993); Dumont v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 
664 A.2d 846 (Me. 1995); Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 407 
(Haw. 2000); Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 
2001); Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2003); 
Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. 
2007); Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 918 A.2d 249 (Conn. 2007); Rallis v. 
Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 977 A.2d 527 (N.H. 2009). 
 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 
S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882 
(Minn. 1970); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971); Stevens v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973); McEwen v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974); Terhune v. A. H. Robins 
Co., 577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978); Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., 592 P.2d 
1383 (Mont. 1979); Pfizer, Inc. v. Jones, 272 S.E.2d 43 (Va. 1980); Seley 
v. G. D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981); McKee v. Moore, 
648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs, 447 So. 
2d 1301 (Ala. 1984); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 
N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 
N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1987); Wyeth Labs, Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688 
(Miss. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398 (Del. 1989); Felix 
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1989); Niemiera v. 
Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 1989); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032 
(Kan. 1990); West v. Searle & Co., G.D., 806 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1991); 
Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992); Martin v. Hacker, 
628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425 
(Tenn. 1994); Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138 (Haw. 1995); Act of July 29, 
1995, ch. 522, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872, 1875; Freeman v. 
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000); Vitanza v. 
Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001); McCombs v. Synthes, 587 
S.E.2d 594 (Ga. 2003); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758 (Ky. 2004); 
Rohde v. Smiths Med., 165 P.3d 433 (Wyo. 2007); Centocor, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012). 
 
Abolition or Modification of Invitee/Licensee/Trespasser 
Framework: Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pickard v. 
City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969); Mile High Fence 
Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Peterson v. Balach, 199 
N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); 
Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 
Inc., 333 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1975); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 
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836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 
2d 367 (La. 1976); Oullette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976); 
Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976); Webb v. City & Borough of 
Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); O’Leary v. Coenan, 251 N.W.2d 746 
(N.D. 1977); Poulin v. Colby Coll., 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979); Corrigan v. 
Janney, 626 P.2d 838 (Mont. 1981); Rangone v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 
1J, 633 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1981); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 
1984); Act of Sept. 12, 1984, Pub. Act 83-1398, § 2, 1984 Ill. Laws 2747, 
2747; Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1991); Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo 
Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110 (N.J. 1993); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 
(Wyo. 1993); Moody v. Manny’s Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994); 
Ford v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 879 P.2d 766 (N.M. 1994); Heins v. 
Webster Cty., 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996); Nelson v. Freeland, 507 
S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1998); Mallett v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 
1999); Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 2009); Demag v. Better 
Power Equip., 102 A.3d 1101 (Vt. 2014). 
 
Abrogation of “Completion and Acceptance” Rule: Foley v. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 68 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1949); Russell v. Arthur 
Whitcomb, Inc., 121 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1956); Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 
100 So. 2d 493 (La. 1957); Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 143 
N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957); Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 321 P.2d 736 (Cal. 
1958); Thompson v. Busk Eng’g Sales Co., 106 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1960); 
Tipton v. Clower, 356 P.2d 46 (N.M. 1960); Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 
P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 705, 112 N.W.2d 705 
(1961); Cosgriff Neon Co. v. H. E. Matthews, 371 P.2d 819 (Nev. 1962); 
Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962); Strandholm v. Gen. 
Const. Co., 382 P.2d 843 (Or. 1963); Talley v. Skelly Oil Co., 433 P.2d 
425 (Kan. 1967); Totten v. Gruzen, 245 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1968); Saylor v. 
Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); McDonough v. Whalen, 313 N.E.2d 
435 (Mass. 1974); L. H. Bell & Assoc., Inc. v. Granger, 543 P.2d 428 
(Ariz. 1975); Johnson v. Oman Const. Co., 519 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1975); 
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1977); Act of Apr. 
1, 1977, ch. 617, 1977 Va. Acts 1052, 1059; Layman v. Braunschweigische 
Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 334 (N.D. 1983); Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); McFadden v. Ten-T Corp., 529 So. 2d 
192 (Ala. 1988); McKinstry v. County of Cass, 424 N.W.2d 322 (Neb. 
1988); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1993); Pierce v. 
ALSC Architects, P.S., 890 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1995); Louk v. Isuzu 
Motors, Inc., 479 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1996); Brent v. Unicol, Inc., 969 
P.2d 627 (Alaska 1998); Suneson v. Holloway Const. Co., 992 S.W.2d 79 
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(Ark. 1999); Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. 2004); Dorrell v. 
S.C. Dep’t of Trans., 605 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 2004); Davis v. Baugh Indus. 
Contractors, Inc., 150 P.3d 545 (Wash. 2007). 
 
MacPherson Doctrine: Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047 
(Ky. 1911); Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., 145 N.W. 626 (Minn. 1914); 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Collette v. 
Page, 114 A. 136 (R.I. 1921); Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement 
Co., 205 P. 1118 (Idado 1922); Flaherty v. Helfont, 122 A. 180 (Me. 
1923); Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 128 A. 242 (N.J. 1925); McLeod v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 1 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1927); White Sewing Mach. 
Co. v. Feisel, 162 N.E. 633 (Ohio 1927); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 
Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 
(Wash. 1932); Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 167 A. 90 (Conn. 1933); 
Tegler v. Farmers’ Union Gas & Coal Co., 246 N.W. 721 (Neb. 1933); 
Kalash v. L.A. Ladder Co., 34 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1934); Rotche v. Buick 
Motor Co., 193 N.E. 529 (Ill. 1934), Crane Co. v. Sears, 35 P.2d 916 
(Okla. 1934); Lenz v. Standard Oil Co., 186 A. 329 (N.H. 1936); Altorfer 
Bros. Co. v. Green, 183 So. 415 (Ala. 1938); Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers 
Mfg. Co., 100 P.2d 723 (Kan. 1940); Ebers v. Gen. Chem. Co., 17 
N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1945); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693 (Mass. 
1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 192 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. 1946); 
Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949); Foley v. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 68 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1949); Otis Elevator Co. v. 
Embert, 184 A.2d 876 (Md. 1951); Hooper v. Gen. Motors Corp., 260 
P.2d 549 (Utah 1953); Roush v. Johnson, 80 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 1954); 
Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Stout v. Madden, 
300 P.2d 461 (Or. 1956); Kientz v. Carlton, 96 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. 1957); 
Rauch v. Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 104 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 
1960); Ciociola v. Del. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 
1961); Gen. Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 122 S.E.2d 548 (Va. 1961); 
Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 382 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1963); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963); J. I. Case Co. v. Sandefur, 
197 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1964); Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 
(Colo. 1964); O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 212 A.2d 69 (Vt. 1965); 
Lang v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); State Stove 
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Salladin v. Tellis, 146 
S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1966); L. A. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); O. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 
1968); Act of Apr. 9, 1968, No. 1085, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1166, 1166–67; 
Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Const. Co., 440 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1968); Clary 
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v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); Stewart 
v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970); Knudson v. 
Edgewater Auto. Div., 486 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1971); Media Prod. 
Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 
1972); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973). 
 
Abrogation/Limitation of Parental Immunity: Goller v. White, 20 
Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 
(N.H. 1966); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Act of July 1, 
1967, Pub. Act No. 596, § 1, 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 910, 910; Nuelle v. 
Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631 
(Minn. 1968); Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 
(Haw. 1969); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); Streenz 
v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 
267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); 
Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 
351 (Pa. 1971); Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Plumley 
v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 
(Nev. 1974); Act of July 9, 1974, No. 1177, § 4B, 1974 S.C. Acts 2718, 
2756; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Act of June 
19, 1975, ch. 685, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 911, 911; Lee v. Comer, 224 
S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977); 
Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 
634 (Me. 1979); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); 
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 
P.2d 891 (Wash. 1980); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); 
Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 
1066 (Fla. 1982); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982); Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983); Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 
N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); 
Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 
712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988); 
Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); Glaskox v. Glaskox, 
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992); Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 
(Wyo. 1992); Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993); Broadwell v. 
Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994); Act of Apr. 20, 2001, ch. 199, § 1, 
2001 Md. Laws 1747, 1747–48; Verdier v. Verdier, 219 S.W.3d 143 (Ark. 
2005). 
 
Abrogation/Limitation of Interspousal Immunity: Brown v. Brown, 
89 A. 889 (Conn. 1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657 (N.H. 1915); 
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Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 
202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481 (Ala. 1931); 
Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932); Pardue v. 
Pardue, 166 S.E. 101 (S.C. 1932); Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740 (Colo. 
1935); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1938); Scotvold v. 
Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 
(Ky. 1953); Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957); Klein v. Klein, 
376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); 
Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 122 (La. 1965); 
Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969); Hosko v. Hosko, 187 
N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 
1972); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 324 N.E.2d 137 (N.Y. 1974); Rogers v. 
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1975); Maestas v. Overton, 
531 P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 
1978); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Shook 
v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Imig v. March, 279 N.W.2d 382 
(Neb. 1979); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Brown 
v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1980); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 
(Utah 1980); Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1981); Act of Mar. 21, 
1981, ch. 451, 1981 Va. Acts 654, 654; Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878 
(Ariz. 1982); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Shearer v. 
Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1985); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 
342 (Mont. 1986); Flagg v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1987); Price v. 
Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987); Tater v. Tater, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 
1987); Act of Sept. 20, 1987, Pub. Act 85-625, § 1, 1987 Ill. Laws 2712, 
2712–13; Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988); Heino v. Harper, 
759 P.2d 253 (Or. 1988); Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1993); 
Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993); Act of Apr. 26, 1993, Act 
70, § 2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 87, 87; Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450 
(Md. 2003). 
 
Economic Loss Rule: Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 
1965); Inglis v. Am. Motors Corp., 209 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 1965); Price v. 
Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Or. 1965); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 
209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 
(Colo. 1975); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 
1976); Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 
1977); Clark v. Int’l Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); N.C. 
State Ports Auth. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 240 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 
1978); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 
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1981); Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 2, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 112, 114; 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982); 
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1322 (N.Y. 
1982); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Page Eng’g Co., 783 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1989); Salt 
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 
350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. Am. Hoist 
& Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986); Cent. Bit Supply, Inc. v. 
Waldrop Drilling & Pump, Inc., 717 P.2d 35 (Nev. 1986); Ellis v. Robert 
C. Morris, Inc., 513 A.2d 951 (N.H. 1986); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987); Nelson v. Todd’s 
Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 120 (Iowa 1988); Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671 (Ala. 1989); Bay State-Spray & Provincetown 
S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350 (Mass. 1989); 
Kennedy v. Columbia Leather & Mfg. Co., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 
1989); Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 
Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989); Waggoner v. Town & Country 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1990); Danforth v. Acorn 
Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1992); Neibarger v. Universal 
Coops., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992); Streich v. Hilton-Davis 692 P.2d 
440 (Mont. 1992); Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 
1078 (Ind. 1993); A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 634 
A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994); City of Lennox v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 
330 (S.D. 1994); Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass’n v. 
Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267 (Me. 1995); In re Consol. Vista 
Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 893 P.2d 438 (N.M. 1995); Bos. Inv. Prop. 
No. 1 State v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 658 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995); Ritter v. 
Custom Chemicides, Inc., 912 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1995); State v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294 (Haw. 1996); Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1998); Paquette v. Deere & Co., 
719 A.2d 410 (Vt. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 736 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1999); Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 
(Utah 2002); Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 
729 (Ky. 2011). 
 
“Connecticut Rule” for Natural Accumulations of Snow or Ice: 
Rooney v. Siletti, 115 A. 664 (N.J. 1921); Reardon v. Shimelman, 128 A. 
705 (Conn. 1925); Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat’l Bank, 139 A. 82 (Me. 
1927); Massor v. Yates, 3 P.2d 784 (Or. 1931); Robinson v. Belmont-
Buckingham Holding Co., 31 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1934); Goodman v. Corn 
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Exch. Nat’l Bank & T. Co., 200 A. 642 (Pa. 1938); Reuter v. Iowa Trust 
& Sav. Bank 57 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1953); Davis v. Lindau, 270 Wis. 218, 
70 N.W.2d 686 (1955); Strong v. Shefveland, 81 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 
1957); Crawford v. Soennichsen, 120 N.W.2d 578 (Neb. 1963); Langley 
Park Apartments, Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, 199 A.2d 620 (Md. 1964); 
Langhorne Road Apartments, Inc. v. Bisson, 150 S.E.2d 540 (Va. 1966); 
Monroe Park Apartments Corp. v. Bennett, 232 A.2d 105 (Del. 1967); 
Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 229 A.2d 338 (N.H. 1967); Cornwell v. Barton, 
422 P.2d 663 (Utah 1967); Kremer v. Carr’s Food Ctr., Inc., 462 P.2d 747 
(Alaska 1969); Rogers v. Tore, Ltd., 459 P.2d 214 (Nev. 1969); Smith v. 
Monmaney, 255 A.2d 674 (Vt. 1969); Fuller v. Hous. Auth., 279 A.2d 
438 (R.I. 1971); Proctor v. Waxler, 503 P.2d 644 (N.M. 1972); Quinlivan 
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. 1975); Geise v. 
Lee, 529 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1975); Childress v. Bowser, 546 N.E.2d 1221 
(Ind. 1989); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994); Richardson v. 
Corvallis Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 950 P.2d 748 (Mont. 1997); Makeeff v. 
City of Bismarck, 693 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 2005); Fowler Props., Inc. v. 
Dowland, 646 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. 2007); Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 
N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 2010); Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 273 P.3d 1266 (Idaho 
2012). 
 
Abolition or Modification of Assumption of the Risk Defense: 
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959); 
Bolduc v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1962); McConville v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); Bulatao v. 
Kauai Motors, Ltd., 406 P.2d 887 (Haw. 1965); Felgner v. Anderson, 133 
N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1965); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); 
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 68 (Alaska 1968); Barrett v. Fritz, 248 
N.E.2d 111 (Ill. 1969); Springrose v. Willmore, 192 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 
1971); Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147 (N.M. 1971); Rosenau v. City 
of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972); Act of June 17, 1973, Pub. 
Act No. 73-622, § 1, 1973 Conn. Acts 1458, 1458 (Reg. Sess.); Act of 
Dec. 4, 1973, ch. 1123, § 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 1291, 1292; Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 209, § 1, 1973 Utah Laws 710, 710–11; 
Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 821 (Wash. 1973); Messmer v. 
Ker, 524 P.2d 536 (Idaho 1974); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 
1974); Act of Mar. 10, 1975, Act 367, § 2, 1975 Ark. Acts 922, 922; Act of 
May 6, 1975, ch. 69, § 1, 1975 N.Y. Laws 94, 94; Act of July 2, 1975, ch. 
599, § 4, 1975 Or. Laws 1412, 1413; Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976); 
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Sunday v. Stratton 
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Corp., 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 
1979); Kopischke v. First Cont’l Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1980); 
Rutter v. Ne. Beaver Cty. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981); Act of 
Apr. 21, 1983, P.L. 317-1983, § 1, 1983 Ind. Acts 1930, 1930; Gustafson v. 
Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780 
(Ohio 1983); Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, ch. 237, 
§ 1, 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 878, 880; Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 680 
P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984); Act of May 23, 1986, ch. 107, § 3, 1986 Colo. Sess. 
Laws 677, 679; Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 737 P.2d 1158 (Nev. 
1987); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988); King v. 
Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989); Knight v. Jewett, 834 
P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992); Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390 (Del. 1992); 
Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994); Horton v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995); Davenport v. Cotton Hope 
Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 1998). 
 
Abolish Breach of Promise: Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, § 1, 1935 
Ala. Laws 780, 780; Act of May 4, 1935, § 1, 1935 Ill. Laws 716, 716; Act 
of Mar. 11, 1935, ch. 208, § 1, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009; Act of June 3, 
1935, No. 127, § 1, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201; Act of June 27, 1935, 
ch. 279, § 1, 1935 N.J. Laws 896, 896; Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, § 61-
b, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 733; Act of June 22, 1935, No. 189, § 2, 1935 Pa. 
Laws 450, 451; Act of Apr. 27, 1937, ch. 111, § 1, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 
403, 403; Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 350, § 1, 1938 Mass. Acts 326, 326; Act 
of May 10, 1939, ch. 128, § 2, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1245, 1245; Act of Mar. 25, 
1941, ch. 104, § 1, 1941 Me. Laws 140, 140; Act of June 5, 1941, ch. 150, 
§ 1, 1941 N.H. Laws 223, 223–24; Act of Feb. 10, 1941, ch. 36, § 2, 1941 
Wyo. Sess. Laws 32, 32; Act of Mar. 5, 1943, ch. 53, § 2, 1943 Nev. Stat. 
75, 75; Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 23138, § 1, 1945 Fla. Laws 1342; Act of 
May 4, 1945, ch. 1010, § 1, 1945 Md. Laws 1759, 1760; Act of Oct. 28, 
1959, ch. 595, § 73, 1959 Wis. Act 740, 765; Act of Mar. 7, 1963, ch. 200, 
§§ 1–2, 1963 Mont. Laws 598, 598–99; An Act Abolishing Breach of 
Promise and Alienation of Affection Suits, No. 275, § 1, 1967 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 324, 324; Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 716, § 1, 1968 Va. Acts 1259, 
1259; Act of Mar. 6, 1969, ch. 101, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1036, 1036; Act of 
July 5, 1972, ch. 489, § 1, 58 Del. Laws 1601, 1601 (1972); Act of Apr. 2, 
1974, No. 198, § 1001, 1973 Vt. Acts & Resolves 208, 208; Act of Mar. 
23, 1978, ch. 515, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 141, 141; Act of Mar. 8, 1978, 
1978 Ohio Laws 2017; Act of Apr. 14, 1983, ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 
441, 445–46; Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995); Gilbert v. 
Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999). 
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Abolish Alienation of Affections: Moulin v. Monteleone, 115 So. 
447, 456–57 (La. 1927); Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, § 1, 1935 Ala. Laws 
780, 780; Act of May 4, 1935, § 1, 1935 Ill. Laws 716, 716; Act of Mar. 11, 
1935, ch. 208, § 1, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009; Act of June 3, 1935, No. 
127, § 1, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201; Act of June 27, 1935, ch. 279, 
§ 2, 1935 N.J. Laws 896, 897; Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, § 61-b, 1935 
N.Y. Laws 732, 733; Act of June 22, 1935, No. 189, §§ 1–2, 1935 Pa. Laws 
450, 450–51; Act of Apr. 27, 1937, ch. 111, § 1, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 
403, 403; Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 128, § 2, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1245, 1245; 
Act of Feb. 10, 1941, ch. 36, § 2, 1941 Wyo. Sess. Laws 32, 32; Act of 
Mar. 5, 1943, ch. 53, § 2, 1943 Nev. Stat. 75, 75; Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 
23138, § 1, 1945 Fla. Laws 1342, 1342; Act of May 4, 1945, ch. 1010, § 1, 
1945 Md. Laws 1759, 1760; Act of Mar. 7, 1963, ch. 200, §§ 1–2, 1963 
Mont. Laws 598, 598–99; An Act Abolishing Breach of Promise and 
Alienation of Affection Suits, No. 275, § 1, 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 324, 
324; Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 716, § 1, 1968 Va. Acts 1259, 1259; Act of 
Mar. 6, 1969, ch. 101, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1036, 1036; Act of July 5, 1972, 
ch. 489, § 1, 58 Del. Laws 1601, 1601 (1972); Act of Apr. 11, 1972, ch. 
220, § 19, 1971 Wis. Act 641, 646; An Act Relating to Civil Actions for 
Alienation of Affections, ch. 298, 1973 Me. Acts 586, 587; Act of Apr. 2, 
1974, No. 198, § 1001, 1973 Vt. Acts & Resolves 208, 208; Act of July 2, 
1975, ch. 562, § 1, 1975 Or. Laws 1285, 1285; Act of May 31, 1976, ch. 
164, § 2, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 230, 230; Act of May 31, 1977, ch. 138, 
§ 16, 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 645, 656; Act of Mar. 30, 1978, 1978 Ohio 
Laws 137; Act of Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 515, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 141, 141; 
Act of Apr. 4, 1979, No. 86, § 46, 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 496–97; Wyman v. 
Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (Wash. 1980); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 
N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981); Act of June 2, 1981, ch. 192, § 1, 1981 N.H. 
Laws 165, 165–66; Act of April 21, 1982, ch. 240, § 1, 1982 Kan. Sess. 
Laws 1083, 1083; Act of Apr. 14, 1983, ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 
445–46; Act of Sept. 18, 1985, ch. 274, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 536, 536; Act 
of June 14, 1985, ch. 123, § 2, 1985 R.I. Pub. Laws 182, 183; O’Neil v. 
Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Act of Mar. 31, 1986, LB 
877, § 1, 1986 Neb. Laws 1308, 1308; Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 453, § 1, 
1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2030, 2030; Act of Nov. 14, 1989, No. 46, § 6, 1989 
Ark. Acts 4112, 4114; Act of June 2, 1989, ch. 517, § 1, 1989 Tenn. Pub. 
Acts 902, 902; Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992); Russo v. 
Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (S.C. 1992); Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 
231, 233 (Mo. 2003). 
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Abolish Criminal Conversation: Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, § 1, 
1935 Ala. Laws 780, 780; Act of May 4, 1935, § 6, 1935 Ill. Laws 716, 717; 
Act of Mar. 11, 1935, ch. 208, § 1, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009; Act of June 
3, 1935, No. 127, § 1, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201; Act of June 27, 
1935, ch. 279, § 1, 1935 N.J. Laws 896, 896; Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, 
§ 61-b, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 733; Act of Apr. 27, 1937, ch. 111, § 1, 1937 
Colo. Sess. Laws 403, 403; Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 128, § 2, 1939 Cal. 
Stat. 1245, 1245; Act of Feb. 10, 1941, ch. 36, § 2, 1941 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
32, 32; Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 23138, § 1, 1945 Fla. Laws 1342, 1342; 
Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 716, § 1, 1968 Va. Acts 1259, 1259; Act of May 
17, 1971, No. 177, 1971 Conn. Pub. Acts 269, 269; Act of Apr. 11, 1972, 
ch. 220, § 19, 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 641, 646; Act of Apr. 2, 1974, No. 198, 
§ 1001, 1973 Vt. Acts & Resolves 208, 208; Act of July 2, 1975, ch. 562, 
§§ 1–2, 1975 Or. Laws 1285, 1285; Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 637, § 1, 1975 
Tex. Gen. Laws 1942, 1942; Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (Pa. 
1976); Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 1978); Act of 
Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 515, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 141, 141; Act of Mar. 8, 
1978, § 1, 1978 Ohio Laws 138; Act of Apr. 4, 1979, No. 86, § 46, 1979 
Ga. Laws 466, 496–98; Act of June 2, 1979, ch. 584, § 2, 1979 Nev. Stat. 
1171, 1171–72; Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980); Lynn v. 
Shaw, 620 P.2d 899, 902–03 (Okla. 1980); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 
821 (S.D. 1981); Act of Apr. 14, 1983, ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 
445–46; Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 1984); Act of Sept. 
18, 1985, ch. 274, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 536, 536; Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 
123, § 2, 1985 R.I. Pub. Laws 182, 183; Act of Mar. 31, 1986, LB 877, § 1, 
1986 Neb. Laws 1308, 1308; Act of Mar. 21, 1988, No. 391, § 1, 1988 S.C. 
Acts 2783, 2783; Act of Nov. 14, 1989, No. 46, § 6, 1989 Ark. Acts 4112, 
4114; Act of May 1, 1990, ch. 1056, § 1, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 773, 773–
74; Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 17–18 (Utah 1991); Hoye v. Hoye, 
824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992); Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 
1219 (Miss. 1992); Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994); 
Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 873–75 (Idaho 1994); State ex rel. Golden v. 
Kaufman, 760 S.E.2d 883, 895 (W. Va. 2014). 
